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ESSAY 
THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN FAMILY LAW 
Clare Huntington* 
Historically, the legal system justified family law’s rules and 
policies through morality, common sense, and prevailing cultural 
norms. In a sharp departure, and consistent with a broader trend 
across the legal system, empirical evidence increasingly dominates the 
regulation of families. 
There is much to celebrate in this empirical turn. Properly used, 
empirical evidence in family law can help the state act more effectively 
and efficiently, unmask prejudice, and depoliticize contentious battles. 
But the empirical turn also presents substantial concerns. Beyond 
perennial issues of the quality of empirical evidence and the ability of 
legal actors to use it, there are more fundamental problems: Using 
empirical evidence focuses attention on the outcomes of legal rules, 
discouraging a debate about contested and competing values. Reliance 
on empirical evidence overlays a veneer of neutrality on normative 
judgments. And uncritically adopting evidence about present conditions 
without interrogating the role of historical discrimination that 
continues to disadvantage some families can replicate that 
discrimination. 
Given the promise and peril of the empirical turn in family law, 
this Essay proposes a framework to guide the use of this evidence. The 
framework preserves space for debating multiple values and advises 
decisionmakers when to use empirical evidence, with particular 
attention to the dangers for nondominant families. The framework also 
recommends strengthening evidentiary gatekeeping and elevating the 
potential for legal scholarship to serve as a bridge from the broader 
research base to the courts. With this guidance in place, empirical 
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evidence can take its rightful place as a useful but cabined tool in the 
legal regulation of families. 
 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 228 
I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE COMES TO FAMILY LAW ........................................ 235 
A. The Historical Baseline .............................................................. 237 
B. Empirical Evidence Across the Institutions of Family Law ....... 240 
1. Litigation ............................................................................. 241 
a.  Marriage Equality.......................................................... 241 
b. Abortion ....................................................................... 250 
c. Intimate Partner Violence and the Child Welfare 
System ........................................................................... 252 
d. Juvenile Sentencing ..................................................... 253 
e. Child Custody .............................................................. 255 
2. Legislation ........................................................................... 257 
3. Administration ..................................................................... 259 
C. Patterns in the Empirical Turn .................................................. 263 
II. THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF AN EMPIRICAL FAMILY LAW ...................... 266 
A. The Benefits of Evidence-Based Family Law.............................. 267 
B. The Empirical Turn in Critical Perspective ............................... 271 
1. Reliability and Translation. ................................................. 272 
2. Facts and Values .................................................................. 281 
a. Skewing Debates. ......................................................... 282 
b. Providing Political Cover ............................................. 291 
c. Replicating Discrimination ......................................... 293 
III. GUIDING THE USE OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN FAMILY LAW ................ 296 
A. The Proper Role of Empirical Evidence .................................... 296 
B. Practical Tools ............................................................................. 303 
1.  Gatekeeping ......................................................................... 303 
2.   Attention to Intersecting Identities .................................... 306 
3.  A Translation Role for Legal Scholars ................................ 308 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 310 
 
INTRODUCTION 
At the crux of the fight over marriage equality, a court in northern 
California conducted a remarkable twelve-day trial.1 Faced with a 
                                                                                                                           
 1. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. 
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challenge to the State’s marriage restriction, the court heard evidence on 
a range of social facts relating to family structure and child outcomes, the 
physical and economic benefits of marriage, the nature of sexual 
orientation, and the increased risk of physical and mental harm from 
discrimination and stigma.2 This empirical evidence was pivotal to the 
court’s decision striking down the marriage restriction. A crucial part of 
the decision was the finding that children of same-sex parents have simi-
lar outcomes to children raised by different-sex couples, undermining 
California’s rationale for differentiating couples based on sexual 
orientation.3 
This example of relying on empirical evidence—defined broadly as 
research and data gathered through both quantitative and qualitative 
methods4—to resolve fundamental questions of family law is hardly 
unique. Consistent with an increasingly widespread reliance on empirical 
evidence across sectors of the economy, academic disciplines, and within 
the law,5 family law decisionmakers regularly draw on sociology, 
psychology, neuroscience, data analytics, and related social and hard 
sciences to make critical choices about the legal regulation of families.6 
In addition to using empirical evidence to decide constitutional cases, 
courts turn to psychological research about parental alienation syndrome 
to decide custody suits.7 Lawmakers draw on studies about the harms of 
foster care to drastically revamp the child welfare system.8 And agency 
                                                                                                                           
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); see also Kenji Yoshino, Speak Now: 
Marriage Equality on Trial 91–228 (2015) (describing the trial in detail). 
 2. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. at 932–38. 
 3. See id. at 935, 950, 963–73, 981, 994–1003. 
 4. This Essay loosely contrasts this empirical information with values. There exists a 
longstanding, if contested, distinction between the two. See David Hume, A Treatise of 
Human Nature 458–70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 
1978) (1739–1740) (discussing the distinction between moral judgments and empirical 
facts). As explored throughout this Essay, the line between empirical evidence and values 
is blurred, and one often informs the other. Empirical evidence can influence values in 
numerous ways identified in this Essay, but values can also influence empirical evidence, 
partly because knowledge is inherently situated in culture. This is particularly true in the 
social sciences, but it can also be true in the hard sciences. The political and cultural 
valence of juvenile crime, for example, accounts at least in part for the research agenda of 
neuroscientists interested in adolescent brain development. See generally Hilary Putnam, 
The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays 28–45 (2002) (demonstrating 
how the distinction between facts and values breaks down in numerous ways); Ruth Anna 
Putnam, Creating Facts and Values, 60 Phil. 187, 190–204 (1985) (arguing facts are value-
laden and values are fact-laden). 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 34–43. 
 6. See infra section I.B. 
 7. See infra section I.B.1.e. 
 8. See infra section I.B.2. 
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officials mine data about risk factors for child abuse and neglect to 
construct predictive analytics for family intervention.9 
Despite this stark shift in family law, there is limited, albeit growing, 
scholarly attention to the subject. Some family law scholars have explored 
the use of empirical evidence in specific contexts,10 but few interrogate 
or analyze the larger trend.11 
                                                                                                                           
 9. See infra section I.B.3. 
 10. See, e.g., Libby Adler, Just the Facts: The Perils of Expert Testimony and Findings 
of Fact in Gay Rights Litigation, 7 Unbound: Harv. J. Legal Left 1, 19–21 (2011) (noting 
the multiple downsides of the empirical battle over marriage equality, including that the 
facts found are not stably pro-gay and instead can be used by anti-gay advocates); Susan 
Frelich Appleton, Gender and Parentage: Family Law’s Equality Project in Our Empirical 
Age, in What Is Parenthood? Contemporary Debates About the Family 237, 245–48 (Linda 
C. McClain & Daniel Cere eds., 2013) (critiquing the use of empirical studies to determine 
the proper place of gender in parentage laws); Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating a Child-
Friendly Child Welfare System: The Use and Misuse of Research, 13 Whittier J. Child & 
Fam. Advoc. 1, 10–14 (2014) (arguing that inaccurate statistical reports in a national study 
of child maltreatment—which found similar rates of maltreatment across races—fed 
claims of bias in the child welfare system and supported family-preservation efforts); Joan 
S. Meier, Johnson’s Differentiation Theory: Is It Really Empirically Supported? 12 J. Child 
Custody 4 (2015) [hereinafter Meier, Johnson’s Differentiation Theory] (analyzing the 
empirical basis for a purported typology of intimate partner violence and finding that the 
empirical evidence does not support the claimed differentiation). Helpfully, the Family 
Court Review published a “Researchers’ Roundtable,” addressing the problem of 
translating social science about families into legal rules. See Researchers’ Roundtable, 54 
Fam. Ct. Rev. 134, 134–66 (2016). 
 11. There are two notable exceptions. Professor Margaret Brinig, one of the leading 
advocates and producers of empirical work in family law, has identified several reasons why 
research on families may not be reliable and may not translate well into legal rules and 
policies, including the following: population heterogeneity, the confidentiality or 
unavailability of data, bias by principal investigators, and the absence of control groups. 
See Margaret F. Brinig, Empirical Work in Family Law, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1083, 1084–94 
[hereinafter Brinig, Empirical Work] (describing challenges in conducting reliable 
empirical work on family law and arguing that scholars and legislatures should neither 
respond too quickly to any single study nor overstate the likelihood that a law will change 
behavior). Brinig thus addresses questions about data reliability and the translation of 
empirical evidence by legal actors, both touched upon in sections II.B.1 and II.B.2. Brinig 
does not, however, address the other concerns of this Essay: the tendency of empirical 
evidence to obscure the importance of a range of values, conceal normative judgments, 
and normalize discrimination. See infra section II.B.2. Additionally, Professor Peggy 
Cooper Davis has explored an important aspect of an empirically based family law: the 
process by which judges absorb and use social science evidence in family law cases as they 
relate to legislative facts. See Peggy C. Davis, “There Is a Book Out . . .”: An Analysis of 
Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1539, 1542 (1987) [hereinafter 
Davis, There Is a Book Out] (noting the article was “undertaken to identify the ways in 
which judges find and use legislative facts; to discover whether there are patterns of 
misuse; and to document the effect of legislative facts upon the development of law”). 
Davis does not, however, engage more broadly with the use of empirical evidence across 
the institutions of family law and many of the questions explored in this Essay. Perhaps 
most importantly, Davis does not explore the central concern of this Essay: that empirical 
evidence discourages a debate about competing values. See infra sections II.B.2, III.A. For 
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There is much to celebrate about this empirical turn in family law. 
Traditionally, decisionmakers in family law have drawn on a combination 
of moral judgments, prevailing cultural norms, and perceived common 
sense.12 An empirical grounding for family law has considerable 
advantages over this historical approach. 13 A detailed understanding of 
family life and the legal system is essential to the development of effective 
rules. Rigorous consideration of empirical evidence can guide state 
investments, promoting the efficient and effective use of scarce resources, 
and it can give decisionmakers a clearer sense of areas in which legal 
inputs might yield particular social outcomes. It can help family law be 
more inclusive and move beyond narrow dominant norms. And it holds 
the potential to help depoliticize battles over family recognition and 
support, or at least to separate political arguments and social beliefs from 
the empirical evidence.14 It is not surprising, then, that Professor Kenji 
Yoshino would say, of legal contests that turn on legislative facts, “[l]et 
there be a trial.”15 
                                                                                                                           
an argument that family law sorely lacks an empirical basis and that family law scholars 
should do more to produce and engage with empirical work about families, see Carl E. 
Schneider & Lee E. Teitelbaum, Life’s Golden Tree: Empirical Scholarship and American 
Law, 2006 Utah L. Rev. 53, 78–91. 
 12. See infra section I.A. 
 13. See infra section II.A. 
 14. Indeed, with the new presidential Administration skeptical about well-settled 
science, evidence may be more important than ever. Perhaps the best example of 
President Trump’s willingness to ignore overwhelming scientific evidence is climate 
change. Compare Juliet Eilperin, Trump Says “Nobody Really Knows” If Climate Change 
Is Real, Wash. Post (Dec. 11, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2016/12/11/trump-says-nobody-really-knows-if-climate-change-is-real/ 
?utm_term=.9a2c5009c609 [http://perma.cc/9SV7-FHPC] (reporting then-President-
elect Trump as saying about climate change, “I’m still open-minded. Nobody really 
knows”), with Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate Is Warming, Global Climate Change, 
NASA, http://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ [http://perma.cc/YF6S-FUZQ] (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2017) (“[Ninety-seven] percent or more of actively publishing climate 
scientists agree: Climate-warming trends over the past century are extremely likely due to 
human activities.”). President Trump’s skepticism about the well-settled evidence on 
childhood vaccines, however, is a good example within family law. See Michael D. Shear et 
al., Anti-Vaccine Activist Says Trump Wants Him to Lead Panel on Immunization Safety, 
N.Y. Times (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/us/politics/anti-
vaccine-activist-trump-immunizations.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(describing how then-President-elect Trump met with Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., a vaccine 
skeptic, and asked him to lead a commission on vaccine safety). For a discussion of 
empirical evidence and the legal debate about mandatory vaccines, see infra text 
accompanying notes 237–244. 
 15. Yoshino, supra note 1, at 280 (emphasis omitted); see also Linda Greenhouse 
& Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole Woman Makes: Protection for the Abortion 
Right After Whole Woman’s Health, 126 Yale L.J. Forum 149, 156–61 (2016), http:// 
www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/11.Greenhouse-SiegelFinalforPDF_io54a7ck.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/4U7V-DMPL] (arguing a rigorous application of the undue burden test that 
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But not so fast. Despite its considerable benefits, the empirical turn 
in family law also presents substantial concerns. As a threshold matter, 
there are well-rehearsed issues with the quality of the research and the 
capacity of legal actors to use empirical evidence in a nuanced manner.16 
These concerns take on a particular hue in the context of family law, in 
which research about families addresses complex questions such as the 
relationship between family structure and child outcomes.17 Moreover, 
even the most sophisticated research can leave out variables that are 
difficult to quantify and yet are central to family life—love and a sense of 
belonging, distrust and a sense of dislocation.18 In these ways, empirical 
evidence tells us something, but not everything, about family life. 
More fundamentally, empirical evidence exerts a gravitational influ-
ence on decisionmaking in a number of deeply troubling ways. To begin, 
the empirical turn focuses attention on the outcomes of legal rules. Many 
of these outcomes, notably child well-being and the reduction of family 
violence, embody important values, and family law is rightly focused on 
these concerns. But there are competing, and often contested, values 
also at play in family law, including equality, autonomy, pluralism, and 
inclusion, to mention but a few.19 The focus on the outcomes of legal 
rules discourages a forthright debate about these competing values and 
the tradeoffs inherent in any legal regulation. Moreover, even if 
decisionmakers address the full range of values at issue, empirical 
evidence does not tell decisionmakers how to weight the competing 
values. It can clarify the stakes in a debate and show how different policy 
options further different values, but empirical evidence does not help 
decisionmakers prioritize competing values and thus should not play an 
outsized role. 
Compounding the problem, decisionmaking based on empirical 
evidence appears neutral, allowing legal actors to sidestep difficult and 
contentious debates, such as which families deserve legal recognition and 
                                                                                                                           
draws on empirical evidence is a promising new front in the fight to protect reproductive 
rights). 
 16. See infra section II.B.1. 
 17. See infra sections II.B.1–.2. 
 18. See infra section II.B.1. 
 19. See infra section II.B.3. Simply naming the values at play in family law is a fraught 
endeavor, both because they are so numerous and because they often conflict. By 
mentioning a few in the text, and omitting others clearly at play, such as the privatization 
of dependency, the goal is not to elevate some values over others but rather to underscore 
that family law is heavily and inevitably value-laden. For a discussion of the changing values 
in family law, see Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 
225, 227–29, 236–48 (1997) (reviewing Nancy E. Dowd, In Defense of Single-Parent 
Families (1997) & Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Divorce Culture (1997)) (arguing that, 
with the challenge to traditional morality as a justification for family law, there is a 
competing vision for family law—the “new family morality”—that embraces values 
including gender equality, caregiving, and commitment). 
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support or which families should receive coercive intervention because of 
concerns about child abuse and neglect.20 In the child welfare system, for 
example, the adoption of predictive analytics to triage suspected cases of 
child abuse and neglect allows agency officials to throw up their hands 
and claim they are simply following the algorithm, thus avoiding 
questions about whether the system improperly intervenes in the lives of 
low-income families of color.21 
Finally, relying on empirical evidence poses particular dangers to 
nondominant families. The use of empirical evidence risks describing 
present conditions without interrogating the role of historical 
discrimination that continues to disadvantage some families.22 Advocates 
challenging the heightened protections for removing Native American 
children from their homes in cases of abuse and neglect, for example, 
contend that this policy harms child well-being.23 But evidence on child 
outcomes obscures the role of historical discrimination—indeed, 
genocide—against Native American families. Government policies are a 
direct cause of instability in Native American families,24 and uncritically 
adopting the evidence on outcomes replicates discrimination against this 
marginalized population. 
To understand these concerns with empirical evidence, consider 
debates over custody and visitation rights for unmarried fathers.25 Unlike 
divorced and married fathers, there is not clear evidence that 
maintaining a relationship between unmarried fathers and their children 
improves child outcomes.26 As courts and legislatures decide the rules for 
unmarried fathers, the absence of empirical evidence showing positive 
child outcomes is likely to be influential. But focusing on child well-being 
ignores the other value-based reasons for protecting father–child 
relationships, including gender equality and fathers’ liberty interests in 
the relationship. Foregrounding child outcomes provides a seemingly 
neutral rationale for the choice not to protect the parental rights of a 
socially marginalized group. And taking the empirical evidence at face 
value disregards government policies, such as mass incarceration,27 that 
                                                                                                                           
 20. See infra section II.B.2.b. 
 21. See infra section III.B.2. 
 22. See infra section II.B.2.c. 
 23. For a discussion of this example, see infra text accompanying notes 313–316 
(explaining that the plaintiffs are challenging both the heightened removal standards and 
the preference for placement with Native American families). 
 24. See infra text accompanying notes 345–347. 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 317–320. 
 26. See infra text accompanying note 318. 
 27. See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness 4 (rev. ed. 2012) (describing how mass incarceration operates “as a 
stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised system of racialized social control that 
functions in a manner strikingly similar to Jim Crow”). 
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make it harder for some unmarried fathers, particularly fathers of color, 
to play a beneficial social and economic role in their children’s lives.28 In 
short, there are reasons to be highly cautious about the use of empirical 
evidence in some contexts. 
To be clear, this Essay does not condemn empirical evidence writ 
large. As noted throughout, empirical evidence does and should play a 
vital role in answering many family law questions and guiding family 
policies. But it is essential to have a nuanced understanding of what the 
empirical turn means for family law and to be ready to bend the arc to-
ward its most promising trajectory. 
How, then, should family law use empirical evidence? This Essay 
proposes a framework for taking advantage of the benefits of empirical 
evidence while also guarding against the significant concerns raised by 
the empirical turn. Not all questions are amenable to resolution through 
empirical analysis, and decisionmakers must know when and why to use 
this evidence. Decisionmakers should generally rely on empirical 
evidence when seeking to achieve a particular, agreed-upon outcome, 
such as reducing family violence, when the valence of the choice is 
relatively uncontested and when there is a general agreement about how 
to balance competing values. In this context, empirical evidence can 
guide choices among rules and policies, highlighting effective and effi-
cient means for reducing violence. But contested and competing values 
inhere in family law, and it is critical to preserve space for debating these 
values. Empirical evidence can play a limited role in debates about 
values, but decisionmakers should not use it to avoid a debate about con-
tested values and norms, nor should decisionmakers prioritize only those 
values that are more amenable to measurement or are more compelling 
because of evidence. 
Even when empirical evidence is relevant, decisionmakers must be 
cautious about how they use it. To guide this nuance, this Essay’s 
framework calls for more effective gatekeeping mechanisms across the 
institutions of family law. It warns decisionmakers to be attentive to the 
potential for empirical evidence to reflect and refract the legal salience 
of intersecting identities, including race, gender, and class. And the 
framework encourages a robust role for legal scholars to make empirical 
evidence accessible and comprehensible for those crafting legal rules 
and policies. 
                                                                                                                           
 28. See Donald Braman, Doing Time on the Outside: Incarceration and Family Life 
in Urban America 37–96, 177–87 (2007) (describing the impact of incarceration on 
prisoners’ families); Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender 
Status, and Employment Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 Va. L. Rev. 893, 894–
98 (2014) (describing the employment impact of a criminal record and noting that this 
disproportionately affects men of color). 
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This Essay focuses on the empirical turn in family law, but empirical 
evidence is now an entrenched feature of the legal system.29 By exploring 
the benefits and dangers of the empirical turn in one context, this Essay 
contributes to the broader debate about the use of empirical evidence 
trans-substantively in the law.30 Although some of the concerns identified 
in this Essay are family law specific, such as the general disregard for the 
Daubert test in family court,31 most of the issues are generalizable, and 
this Essay thus holds lessons for other areas of the law.32 
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I describes the increasingly 
widespread use of empirical evidence across many family law contexts. 
Part II unpacks the substantial benefits of, and significant concerns 
raised by, this empirical turn. Part III draws on this descriptive and 
analytical foundation to chart a path for the use of empirical evidence in 
family law. 
I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE COMES TO FAMILY LAW 
Empirical evidence is so thoroughly integrated into modern life that 
it is easy to overlook its existence.33 Decisionmakers in the public,34 
                                                                                                                           
 29. See infra text accompanying notes 38–43. 
 30. To give one example, Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski has argued that empirical 
evidence may make sense of that large debate in domains in which singularly focused 
outcomes can be reasonable organizing principles—as in medicine, with the goal of 
treating patients effectively, or business, with the goal of profit maximization. See Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 901, 917–19 (2011). In law, however, 
the endeavor is more fraught because law is inherently political, with often contested and 
competing goals. See id. 
 31. See infra text accompanying notes 166–169 (describing the failure of most family 
court judges to use the Daubert test to screen out unreliable expert testimony). 
 32. Thus, this Essay resists family law exceptionalism, see Janet Halley, What Is Family 
Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 Yale J.L. & Human. 1, 3–6 (2011) (describing and challenging 
family law exceptionalism), and instead uses family law as an example of the benefits, but 
also potential dangers, of the broader empirical turn. 
 33. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 129 (P. M. S. Hacker & 
Joachim Schulte eds., G. E. M. Anscombe et al. trans., 4th ed. 2009) (1953) (“The aspects 
of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and 
familiarity.”). 
 34. In the public sector, Mayor Michael Bloomberg was a leader in basing public 
policies on quantitative data, using them in multiple areas, including public health, 
building and transportation safety, climate change, and poverty. See Michael Flowers, 
Beyond Open Data: The Data-Driven City, in Beyond Transparency: Open Data and 
the Future of Civic Innovation 185, 187–95 (Brett Goldstein & Lauren Dyson eds., 
2013) (describing New York City’s experience beginning to use data to drive decisions 
on multiple fronts including city infrastructure and building safety); Alan Feuer, The 
Mayor’s Geek Squad, N.Y. Times (Mar. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/03/24/nyregion/mayor-bloombergs-geek-squad.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (describing the use of data-driven decisionmaking in multiple policy areas under 
Mayor Bloomberg). But see Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658–67 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding the city’s data-driven stop-and-frisk policy unconstitutional). For 
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private,35 and nonprofit sectors36 regularly rely on empirical evidence.37 
Similarly, the legal system has long integrated empirical evidence.38 Since 
at least the era of the Brandeis brief, legal actors have drawn on data 
from the social and hard sciences.39 Economic analysis is thoroughly 
embedded in the law.40 The judicial system has developed methods for 
                                                                                                                           
further discussion of evidence-based policymaking in the public sector, see Ian Ayres, 
Super Crunchers: Why Thinking-by-Numbers Is the New Way to Be Smart 69–87 (2007) 
(describing the trend toward evidence-based policymaking in the United States and 
elsewhere). For a skeptical view on the ability of governments to synthesize and then 
translate data into social policy, see Peter Schuck, Why Government Fails So Often: And 
How It Can Do Better 161–67 (2014) (describing the challenges with this process, 
including the unavailability of data, the competing interpretations of data, and the 
uncertainty of how regulated entities will react to social policies). 
 35. See Ayres, supra note 34, at 29–31 (describing this trend in business and using 
the example of Wal-Mart, which deploys data to make virtually every decision); Kristina 
McElheran & Erik Brynjolfsson, The Rise of Data-Driven Decision Making Is Real but 
Uneven, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Feb. 3, 2016), http://hbr.org/2016/02/the-rise-of-data-driven-
decision-making-is-real-but-uneven [http://perma.cc/U9Z7-YR9B] (describing data-driven 
decisionmaking in the private sector, using manufacturing as a case study). 
 36. See, e.g., Annual Letter 2013: Measuring Progress, Bill & Melinda Gates Found. 
(Jan. 2013), http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/Resources-and-Media/Annual-
Letters-List/Annual-Letter-2013 [http://perma.cc/MQW6-R6U8] (describing a core objective 
of the Gates Foundation’s approach to philanthropy as developing effective measurement tools 
to ensure that programs are furthering identified goals); Evidence-Based Decision Making, 
Laura & John Arnold Found., http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/initiative/evidence-based-
policy-innovation/evidence-based-decision-making/ [http://perma.cc/5DLP-VYNY] (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2017) (“[M]any of the[] well-intentioned efforts [to address issues such as 
hunger, homelessness, and unemployment] have failed to produce adequate improvements. 
If we are to solve these problems, we must dramatically accelerate the pace at which we learn 
what works and insist on services that deliver measurable results.”). 
 37. One of the first sectors of the economy to embrace empirical evidence was 
medicine. See Shirley Reynolds, The Anatomy of Evidence-Based Practice: Principles and 
Methods, in Evidence-Based Practice: A Critical Appraisal 17, 17–22 (Liz Trinder ed., 
2000) (describing the history of evidence-based medicine). An acknowledgement of the 
widespread use of empirical evidence entered popular culture through Michael Lewis’s 
book about the professional baseball team, the Oakland A’s. See generally Michael Lewis, 
Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (2003). 
 38. For a discussion of the distinction between evidence used to establish adjudicative 
versus legislative facts, see infra text accompanying notes 208–216. 
 39. See Brief for Defendant in Error, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 
107) (available in full on HeinOnline). But see Noga Morag-Levine, Facts, Formalism, and 
the Brandeis Brief: The Origins of a Myth, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 59, 61–62 (arguing the use 
of social science evidence in the courts predated the Brandeis brief). The use of social 
science data and methodologies is one of the distinguishing features of the Legal Realist 
movement. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1247 (1931) (describing the difficulty of evaluating lower 
courts’ actions and noting “the techniques of the social sciences are being drawn upon 
and modified to make the work possible”). 
 40. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (using 
cost-benefit analysis to determine negligence); Guido Calabresi, The Decision for 
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identifying and adjudicating the reliability of expert testimony.41 And 
legal scholars have embraced empirical work across multiple fields,42 with 
an entire field of empirical legal studies dedicated to producing, not 
simply using, empirical evidence.43 
As this Part shows, family law increasingly embraces empirical 
evidence as well. Beginning in the second half of the twentieth century, 
and accelerating over the past several decades, family law has regularly 
drawn on empirical evidence, profoundly changing the process of judg-
ing, legislating, and administering the law.44 But as the first section 
shows, this was not always the case. 
A. The Historical Baseline 
Family autonomy is one of the animating principles at the heart of 
family law. When the Supreme Court first held in the early twentieth cen-
tury that there are limits on the state’s power to interfere with parental 
decisionmaking, the Court relied only on the language of rights, not em-
pirical evidence. In a pair of cases, the Court held that, under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state cannot unduly 
burden the “liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing 
and education of children under their control.”45 The Court found that 
“[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him 
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to 
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”46 
                                                                                                                           
Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 722–42 
(1965) (using economic analysis in the context of accident law). 
 41. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 (setting forth the standard for admission of expert 
testimony); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993) (setting 
forth a test for admitting expert testimony that requires evidence to be grounded in 
reliable scientific methodology and reasoning and must be relevant to the facts of the 
case); Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific 
and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453 §§ 1–2 (2001) (describing 
the adoption of the Daubert standard and alternatives in state courts). 
 42. See Daniel E. Ho & Larry Kramer, Introduction: The Empirical Revolution in 
Law, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1195, 1195–97 (2013) (introducing a special issue dedicated to 
identifying and exploring the many ways legal scholars and the legal system integrate 
empirical evidence across multiple fields). 
 43. See Society for Empirical Legal Studies, Cornell Univ. Law Sch., http:// 
www.lawschool.cornell.edu/sels/ [http://perma.cc/MH4L-GJMH] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) 
(describing the society’s purpose, sponsored events, scholarship, and Journal of Empirical 
Legal Studies). 
 44. See infra section I.B. 
 45. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (establishing a liberty interest in parental control of children’s 
education). 
 46. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. 
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Later in the century, when the Court qualified parental rights by 
acknowledging children’s interests, again, it did not cite evidence and 
instead relied on perceived common sense. In Parham v. J.R., the Court 
held that the law could presume that parents make medical decisions to 
further their children’s welfare, and thus children are not constitutionally 
entitled to formal adversarial proceedings when parents seek to commit 
them to psychiatric hospitals.47 The Court justified this presumption by 
claiming that “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best 
interests of their children”48 and that “pages of human experience . . . 
teach that parents generally do act in the child’s best interests.”49 
More broadly, decisionmakers in family law established and justified 
legal rules by relying on traditional morality and norms, such as the need 
to police sexuality outside marriage and reinforce gender roles within 
marriage.50 These values were widely accepted, and decisionmakers did 
not generally invoke empirical evidence to support laws furthering these 
values and norms.51 
Even when the Court was presented with empirical evidence in 
family law cases, it often did not rely on it, turning instead to basic values. 
In Loving v. Virginia, the state argued the Court should defer to the legis-
lature because there was “conflicting scientific opinion [about] the 
effects of interracial marriage, and the desirability of preventing such 
alliances, from the physical, biological, genetic, anthropological, cultural, 
psychological and sociological point of view.”52 The Court did not 
engage with this evidence and instead found that Virginia’s law, which 
                                                                                                                           
 47. 442 U.S. 584, 602–03 (1979). 
 48. Id. at 602. 
 49. Id. at 602–03. The notion that love between parents and children will lead 
parents to care for their children has deep roots. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries 
*434–35 (“[P]rovidence has done it more effectually than any laws, by implanting in the 
breast of every parent . . . [an] insuperable degree of affection, which not even the 
deformity of person or mind, not even the wickedness, ingratitude, and rebellion of 
children, can totally suppress or extinguish.”); 2 James Kent, Commentaries on American 
Law 160 (1826) (“The obligation of parental duty is so well secured by the strength of 
natural affection, that it seldom requires to be enforced by human laws.”); see also id. at 
159 (“The wants and weaknesses of children render it necessary that some person 
maintain them, and the voice of nature has pointed out the parent as the most fit and 
proper person.”). 
 50. See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American 
Family Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1808–19 (1985) (describing moral justification as a 
traditional basis for family law). 
 51. Cf. id. at 1807–19 (describing the historical basis for family regulation—
conventional morality—and the shift away from this grounding since the 1960s). 
 52. Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellee at 7, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967) (No. 395), 1967 WL 93641. For a description of this aspect of the litigation, see 
Linda C. McClain, Prejudice, Moral Progress, and Not Being “On the Wrong Side of 
History”: Debating the Legacy of Loving for the Right to Marry 6–15 (Mar. 17, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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restricted intermarriage with whites and not along other racial lines, 
could be understood only as an expression of white supremacy and 
therefore was invidious racial discrimination.53 Similarly, in Palmore v. 
Sidoti—a custody battle between two white parents, with the father chal-
lenging the mother’s custody because her new husband was Black—the 
Court was uninterested in whether a child raised by an interracial couple 
might suffer stigma and harm; instead, the Court focused on the 
importance of race-neutral decisionmaking.54 
Outside of constitutional law, courts also relied on common sense 
and traditional norms, not empirical evidence. For instance, the spousal 
immunity privilege permits a spouse to refuse to provide adverse testi-
mony in a criminal trial of the other spouse,55 and the marital 
communications privilege protects confidential communications between 
spouses.56 Courts justified these privileges by claiming that they promote 
marital harmony and solidarity.57 But courts did not cite any evidence to 
support the contention that testifying against each other or breaching 
marital confidences would introduce strife and distrust into marriage.58 
Instead, courts relied on common sense and traditional notions of 
marriage.59 
                                                                                                                           
 53. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. 
 54. 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“The question, however, is whether the reality of 
private biases and the possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for 
removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother. We have little difficulty 
concluding that they are not.”). 
 55. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (“[T]he witness-spouse 
alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to 
testify nor foreclosed from testifying.”). There are numerous nuances not relevant here, 
such as the differences between federal and state law. For details, see Milton C. Regan, Jr., 
Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2045, 2052–55 (1995). 
 56. See Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 334 (1951) (holding a defendant’s refusal 
to reveal his wife’s location, which she may have confidentially shared with him, was 
lawful); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (noting the “basis of the immunity 
given to communications between husband and wife is the protection of marital 
confidences”). For a discussion of both spousal privileges, see Dan Markel et al., Criminal 
Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1147, 1168–69. 
 57. See Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 14 (stating the marital communications privilege was 
“regarded as so essential to the preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh 
the disadvantages to the administration of justice”); United States v. Armstrong, 476 F.2d 
313, 315 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting the spousal immunity privilege “preserve[s] family peace 
by preventing husband and wife from becoming adversaries in a criminal proceeding”). 
 58. See, e.g., Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 14 (citing the reasoning for the privilege but 
providing no supporting evidence to suggest that it is necessary to preserve marital 
harmony). 
 59. In Trammel, the Court reasoned that “[w]hen one spouse is willing to testify 
against the other in a criminal proceeding . . . their relationship is almost certainly in 
disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to 
preserve.” Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52. 
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When legal actors did invoke empirical evidence, it was generally 
pseudoscience. Consider the odious history of sterilization programs. 
From 1929 to 1975, North Carolina sterilized approximately 7,600 
people,60 targeting low-income women of color and people with low IQ 
test scores or low levels of education.61 Programs like this were justified 
by the “science” of phrenology and the like, purportedly proving the 
inferiority of people of color and low-income populations.62 
In sum, the traditional mode of analysis and the justification for 
legal rules was not empirical, at least as we understand the term today. As 
the next section describes, this absence of empirical evidence did not 
last. 
B. Empirical Evidence Across the Institutions of Family Law 
In stark contrast to the historical baseline, empirical analysis in 
family law is now widespread. This trend is consistent with the 
empiricization of law generally, but it also responds to a particular 
demand in family law. In the last part of the twentieth century, the 
Supreme Court largely rejected traditional morality and dominant norms 
as acceptable justifications for family law.63 It was thus necessary to find 
new justifications for the regulation of families, creating an opening for 
empirical evidence. Additionally, as family norms rapidly changed during 
the same period—including an increase in divorce, a rise in 
cohabitation, and more childbearing outside of marriage64—societal 
consensus about family values began to wane.65 Empirical evidence thus 
appealed as a seemingly neutral basis for decisionmaking. Responding to 
these changes, courts and legislatures embraced empirical evidence, with 
psychological theories about parents and children fundamentally shaping 
                                                                                                                           
 60. Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human 
Heredity 92–94 (1985); Adam Owens, N.C. Dedicates Marker to Eugenics Program, WRAL 
(June 22, 2009), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/5406081/ [http://perma.cc/ 
HP3U-9PYQ]; Victims of State Sterilization Tell Their Stories, WRAL (June 30, 2011), 
http://www.wral.com/news/video/9755940/#/vid9755940 [http://perma.cc/YV4Z-8YAX]. 
 61. Clarence J. Gamble, Eugenic Sterilization in North Carolina, 12 N.C. Med. J. 550, 
550–51 (1951). 
 62. See Robert V. Guthrie, Even the Rat Was White: A Historical View of Psychology 
92–104 (1976); Kevles, supra note 60, at 92–94. 
 63. For two, among many, such decisions, see Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461–65 
(1988) (adopting intermediate scrutiny for statutory distinctions based on the marital 
status of parents and discussing earlier cases suggesting heightened scrutiny was warranted 
for classifications based on illegitimacy); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281–83 (1979) (striking 
down a state statute authorizing the award of alimony for only women, not men). 
 64. See Clare Huntington, Failure to Flourish: How Law Undermines Family 
Relationships 28–31 (2014) [hereinafter Huntington, Failure to Flourish] (describing 
these changes). 
 65. See Cahn, supra note 19, at 227–29, 236–49. 
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child custody laws66 and research on child abuse leading to mandatory 
reporting laws and the modern child welfare system.67 
This section describes the empirical turn in three contexts: 
litigation, legislation, and administration. As this section shows, both the 
type and quality of empirical evidence vary. Decisionmakers use evidence 
from the hard sciences, demographic statistics about changes in family 
form, and social science studies about the relationship between those 
changes and child outcomes. Some empirical evidence satisfies scientific 
standards for reliability, but other evidence decidedly does not. Although 
the empirical turn reaches across all of family law, this section describes it 
in detail in the context of litigation, with a particular focus on the 
marriage equality cases. This fine-grained description of the marriage 
equality litigation lays the groundwork for the critique of empirical 
evidence in Part II and the proposed framework in Part III. 
1. Litigation 
a. Marriage Equality. — In the early days of the marriage equality 
movement,68 the debate did not focus on children.69 In the 1980s, 
                                                                                                                           
 66. See Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 156–58 (Iowa 1966) (reviewing the 
social science literature and drawing on the then-dominant theory of psychological 
parenthood to determine that the child’s best interests would be served by remaining in 
the care of his grandparents, with whom the child had lived for nearly three years, rather 
than the biological father); Davis, There Is a Book Out, supra note 11, at 1542–47 
(describing how social science research influenced the best-interests standard beginning 
in the 1960s). 
 67. C. Henry Kempe, et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 17, 
23 (1962) (describing the results of a national study of injured children and defining a 
new diagnosis—Battered Child Syndrome); Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from 
Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes, 53 
Hastings L.J. 1, 55–60 (2001) (describing the Battered Child Syndrome study and its 
pivotal role in the creation of the modern child welfare system). Another pioneer was 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who was an early advocate for using social science to inform 
government policy. See James T. Patterson, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Moynihan 
Report and America’s Struggle over Black Family Life—From LBJ to Obama 14 (2010) 
(describing Moynihan’s efforts to “put into practice his faith in the capacity of expert 
social scientists to fashion public policy”). Some examples of influential empirical 
evidence in family law over the succeeding decades include the work of Professors Martha 
Fineman and Robert Mnookin. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Illusion of Equality: 
The Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform 18–20, 32–33, 55, 61–73 (1991) (describing 
the negative effect of no-fault divorce on women); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody 
Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, Law & Contemp. Probs., 
Summer 1975, at 226, 229–30 (documenting the inconsistent, unpredictable, and 
undesirable consequences of the best-interests standard in child welfare and child custody 
cases). 
 68. See Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital 
Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 87, 117–46 (2014) 
(arguing that even before advocates began making explicit and sustained claims for 
marriage in the 1990s, marriage still shaped the battle for relationship recognition—
domestic partnerships and civil unions—with advocates patterning these models of 
relationship recognition on marriage). 
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however, a significant number of lesbians had begun to conceive 
children and raise them with a partner,70 and advocates began to argue 
                                                                                                                           
This Essay focuses on the marriage equality litigation as an example of the 
importance of empirical evidence in LGBT family rights because the issue had such 
widespread social salience. But the evidentiary battle played out in related cases as well, 
such as litigation over the adoption rights of LGBT adults. These cases had many of the 
same hallmarks. For example, in a federal case challenging Florida’s ban on adoption by 
“homosexuals,” Fla. Stat. § 63.042(3) (2014) (amended 2015), the Eleventh Circuit 
upheld the state law, finding that the State Legislature could rationally conclude that the 
ban was necessary because there was no conclusive evidence that children do not benefit 
from growing up with two different-sex, married parents. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of 
Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 825 (11th Cir. 2004). The court stated: 
[W]e must ask not whether the latest in social science research and professional 
opinion support the decision of the Florida legislature, but whether that evidence 
is so well established and so far beyond dispute that it would be irrational for the 
Florida legislature to believe that the interests of its children are best served by 
not permitting homosexual adoption. 
Id. The court also noted the absence of longitudinal studies following subjects into 
adulthood, concluding that the Legislature could find the relevant research insufficiently 
developed to rely upon, see id. at 826, and that “the question of the effects of homosexual 
parenting . . . is one on which even experts of good faith reasonably disagree,” id. The 
court determined that the Legislature could rationally rely on the “unprovable 
assumption” that a married man and woman is the “optimal social structure” for 
childrearing, and thus, the State could prefer this family structure to others in the context 
of adoption. Id. at 819–20, 826. 
Six years later, the Florida District Court of Appeal struck down the adoption ban, 
relying heavily on empirical evidence. See Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of 
X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 91–92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). The court referred to the trial 
court’s finding that rigorous research, including longitudinal studies that followed 
participants for up to fourteen years, demonstrated no difference between parenting by 
LGBT and heterosexual parents and no difference in the adjustment of children raised by 
same-sex and different-sex parents. See id. at 86–87. The trial court had closely examined 
the evidence, rejecting one expert’s analysis of social science studies because other experts 
testified that the analysis had fundamental errors and most of the scientific community 
disagreed with the analysis. See id. at 88. The trial court also rejected expert testimony that 
LGBT adults have a higher lifetime prevalence of certain mood and substance disorders, 
concluding that if every demographic group with elevated rates of these disorders was 
excluded from adopting, then only Asian American men would be allowed to adopt. See 
id. at 89. 
 69. See NeJaime, supra note 68, at 117–21, 151 (describing the arguments made for 
and against relationship recognition, which centered primarily on the intimate bond 
between partners and their economic interdependency, and further noting that social 
conservatives were worried about the impact of domestic partnerships on the traditional 
definition of marriage). 
 70. See George Chauncey, Why Marriage? The History Shaping Today’s Debate over 
Gay Equality 105 (2004) (“[T]he lesbian baby boom of the 1980s represented something 
new: a generation of women who lived openly as lesbians and no longer felt obliged to 
marry a man in order to have a child.”). 
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that same-sex relationships should be recognized to help protect the 
children.71 
With LGBT parenting as a central component of the marriage 
equality movement, advocates on both sides began to make arguments 
about the quality of that parenting.72 Advocates had a ready source of 
social scientific evidence—studies on LGBT parenting that had been 
conducted in response to custody battles in the 1970s.73 At first, 
opponents of marriage equality argued that LGBT parents harmed their 
children.74 Over time, this argument morphed into a claim that even if 
children were not actively harmed, the optimal childrearing environment 
for a child was with two different-sex, married parents.75 
After the Supreme Court held in 2003 that the State could not 
reflexively draw on traditional values to regulate lesbians and gay men, at 
least in criminal law,76 the focus on empirical evidence became all the 
more important. The state needed to show a reason, beyond moral 
                                                                                                                           
 71. Id. Many LGBT parents were already raising children, but they were generally 
raising children conceived in previous different-sex relationships. Id. The change in the 
1980s was that lesbians began conceiving children within same-sex relationships. Id. 
 72. This began with the litigation in Hawaii. Addressing a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the State’s law, Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 572-1 (LexisNexis 2015), the 
Hawaii Supreme Court found the law discriminated on the basis of sex and therefore was 
subject to heightened scrutiny. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 65–66 (Haw. 1993). The 
court remanded the case to allow the State to introduce evidence to satisfy this standard. 
In a bench trial, the plaintiffs presented expert witnesses to testify about the effects of 
same-sex parenting on child development. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 
694235, at *10–16 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), rev’d mem., 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999). 
The trial court found that the testimony presented by two experts for the plaintiffs, a 
sociologist and a psychologist, was “especially credible,” id. at *10, and that the State had 
not produced sufficient evidence to establish adverse public consequences from allowing 
same-sex couples to marry or that traditional marriage needed to be protected, see id. at 
*16–17. After noting that the evidence indicated that the most important factor in child 
development was the quality of the parent–child relationship, the court concluded that 
sexual orientation is not an indicator of parental fitness. See id. at *17. 
 73. Marie-Amélie George, The Custody Crucible: The Development of Scientific 
Authority About Gay and Lesbian Parents, 34 Law & Hist. Rev. 487, 493–99 (2016) 
(describing cases in which courts were deciding whether to award custody to the 
heterosexual parent or the parent who had begun a relationship with a same-sex partner). 
 74. Edward Stein, The “Accidental Procreation” Argument for Withholding Legal 
Recognition for Same-Sex Relationships, 84 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 403, 408 (2009) (“This 
argument, which I call the ‘gays make bad parents’ argument, was embraced in some form 
by all three appellate courts that heard challenges to prohibitions against same-sex 
marriages in the 1970s.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (crediting the 
argument that “it is better, other things being equal, for children to grow up with both a 
mother and a father”). 
 76. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (noting that “for centuries there 
have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral” but that “[t]he 
issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the 
whole society through operation of the criminal law”). 
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judgments, for keeping same-sex couples out of marriage. Ultimately, 
opponents of marriage equality abandoned the comparative argument 
about same-sex parents and different-sex parents entirely and instead 
cited a new outcomes-based justification for the restriction: that the state 
had an interest in channeling procreative sex into marriage to ensure a 
child had two parents, and thus the state could privilege different-sex 
marriage as a way of inducing these couples to marry.77 
Advocates of marriage equality made their own empirically 
grounded claims. Citing demographic evidence, they demonstrated that 
same-sex couples were raising children in increasing numbers.78 Drawing 
on social science evidence, they argued that children raised by same-sex 
couples have similar outcomes to children raised by different-sex 
couples.79 Relying on economic and social science evidence, they con-
tended that marriage provides economic and emotional stability to 
children.80 And, finally, looking to social science research, advocates 
posited that children raised by same-sex couples would benefit from their 
parents’ access to marriage.81 
Some courts were skeptical about the relevance of this empirical 
evidence, especially early in the movement. In the state court litigation 
over New York’s marriage restriction,82 the Court of Appeals applied 
rational basis review and found the different-sex requirement did not 
violate the state constitution.83 In a plurality opinion, the court invoked 
family law’s traditional methodology, relying on “the undisputed 
assumption that marriage is important to the welfare of children.”84 On 
this basis, the court held that the Legislature could rationally decide that 
different-sex couples are far more likely than same-sex couples to 
procreate and could seek to stabilize these families to channel 
procreation into marriage.85 The court likewise held that the Legislature 
could rationally conclude that it is better for a child to grow up with a man 
                                                                                                                           
 77. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 660 (7th Cir. 2014) (describing the prevention 
of nonmarital childbearing as the sole argument advanced by Indiana); Perry v. Brown, 
671 F.3d 1052, 1086 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (“The primary rationale Proponents offer for Proposition 8 
is that it advances California’s interest in responsible procreation and childrearing.”). 
 78. See infra note 202. 
 79. See infra text accompanying notes 97, 112. For a summary of the underlying 
studies, see Carlos A. Ball, Social Science Studies and the Children of Lesbians and Gay 
Men: The Rational Basis Perspective, 21 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 691, 702–15 (2013). 
 80. See infra text accompanying note 97. 
 81. See infra text accompanying notes 97–98, 112. 
 82. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006) (describing the history of 
this litigation and noting that the trial courts in four cases granted summary judgment, 
one in favor of the plaintiffs challenging the New York law and three in favor of the State). 
 83. See id. at 9–12. 
 84. Id. at 7. 
 85. Id. 
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and a woman as the two parents.86 The court cited no evidence, instead 
stating that “[i]ntuition and experience suggest that a child benefits 
from having before his or her eyes, every day, living models of what both 
a man and a woman are like.”87 In response to the plaintiffs’ argument 
that the optimal childrearing proposition was factually untrue, the court 
dismissed any social science evidence as inconclusive, and thus “the 
Legislature could rationally think otherwise.”88 
In many other cases, however, the empirical evidence played a 
critical role.89 Often courts considered this evidence at summary judg-
ment,90 but in two of the three cases that made it to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the trial court conducted lengthy trials, developing a rich factual 
record that largely turned on empirical evidence.91 In the first such case, 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the federal challenge to California’s constitutional 
amendment limiting marriage to different-sex couples,92 the trial court 
held a twelve-day bench proceeding.93 The effect on child outcomes of 
                                                                                                                           
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 7–8 (“[T]he studies . . . do not establish beyond doubt that children fare 
equally well in same-sex and opposite-sex households . . . . In the absence of conclusive 
scientific evidence, the Legislature could rationally proceed on the commonsense premise 
that children will do best with a mother and father in the home.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896, 899–901 (Iowa 2009) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to Iowa’s marriage restriction and concluding that the governmental 
justification that different-sex parents provide children with the optimal childrearing 
environment did not pass). In one of the final lower court decisions striking down 
different-sex marriage requirements, Judge Posner eviscerated arguments made by 
Indiana and Wisconsin in support of their marriage restrictions: He concluded that “more 
than unsupported conjecture that same-sex marriage will harm heterosexual marriage or 
children or any other valid and important interest of a state is necessary to justify 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.” Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 671 (7th 
Cir. 2014). Indeed, he found that “the grounds advanced by Indiana and Wisconsin for 
their discriminatory policies are not only conjectural; they are totally implausible.” Id. 
 90. See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 899 (citing the “abundance of evidence and 
research . . . supporting the proposition that the interests of children are served equally by 
same-sex parents and opposite-sex parents” and noting that the “opinions that dual-
gender parenting is the optimal environment for children” are “largely unsupported by 
reliable scientific studies”). 
 91. This section discusses the trials in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 
929 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), 
vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), and 
DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761–68 (E.D. Mich.), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 
2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). The trial court in 
Windsor v. United States did not conduct a trial and instead granted summary judgment to 
the plaintiff. See 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), 
aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 92. Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5 (“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or 
recognized in California.”), ruled unconstitutional in Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921. 
 93. See 704 F. Supp. 2d at 929. 
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being raised by two married, different-sex parents was a central issue in 
the litigation.94 
The trial was largely a battle of experts. The plaintiffs produced nine 
experts, and the defendants produced two.95 The plaintiffs’ experts 
included two historians; one testified about the historical meaning of 
marriage, and the other put California’s constitutional amendment in 
the historical context of discrimination against LGBT people.96 Three 
psychologists were called to testify: one about the evidence on LGBT 
parenting, one about the physical and economic benefits of marriage, 
and one about the nature of sexual orientation.97 Two economists 
weighed in on the economic benefits to a state flowing from marriage as 
compared with domestic partnerships and the economic benefits of 
marriage to the couple.98 A social epidemiologist testified about the 
increased risk of physical and mental harms for gays and lesbians as a 
result of the constitutional amendment.99 And a political scientist 
testified about the extent to which homophobia infects the political 
process.100 In response, proponents101 of the ballot initiative that led to 
the constitutional amendment introduced the founder and president of 
the Institute for American Values; opining as an expert, he testified 
about marriage, fatherhood, and family structure, contending that 
children do best when raised by married, biological parents.102 
The trial court engaged in a lengthy analysis of this empirical 
evidence. The court dissected the methodological and substantive 
components of the underlying social science, focusing on sample size, 
                                                                                                                           
 94. In proposing the amendment to the state constitution, the ballot initiative 
contained this explanatory language in favor of the amendment: “[T]he best situation for 
a child is to be raised by a married mother and father.” Ron Prentice et al., Argument in 
Favor of Proposition 8, in California General Election: Official Voter Information Guide, 
General Election Ballot 56 (2008), http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/pdf-guide/vig-
nov-2008-principal.pdf [http://perma.cc/H9PQ-HXYE]. At trial, the defendants continued 
this line of argument, contending that limiting marriage to different-sex couples 
“[p]romotes ‘statistically optimal’ child-rearing households; that is, households in which 
children are raised by a man and a woman married to each other.” Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 
at 931 (quoting defendants’ written submissions). 
 95. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 932. 
 96. See id. at 933–37. 
 97. See id. at 934–36. 
 98. See id. at 934–36, 938. 
 99. See id. at 935–36. 
 100. See id. at 937. 
 101. The plaintiffs had sued the Governor and Attorney General of California as well 
as several other government officials, but none of the defendants was willing to defend the 
constitutional amendment. Id. at 928. Thus, five proponents of the constitutional 
amendment argued in favor of the amendment. See id. at 928, 954. 
 102. Id. at 945–50. The proponents also introduced a political science expert, who 
testified about the political power of LGBT people in California. See id. at 950–52. 
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replicability, and so on.103 The court readily accepted the plaintiffs’ ex-
pert testimony,104 but it found that the opinions of the proponents’ 
experts were “not supported by reliable evidence or methodology” and 
therefore were “entitled to essentially no weight.”105 
This evidentiary battle was dispositive in the resulting decision, with 
the court concluding that “[t]he trial evidence provides no basis for 
establishing that California has an interest in refusing to recognize 
marriage between two people because of their sex”106 and that “the 
evidence presented at trial fatally undermines the premises underlying 
proponents’ proffered rationales for” the constitutional amendment.107 
Speaking directly to the question of LGBT parenting, the court found 
that “[c]hildren raised by gay or lesbian parents are as likely as children 
raised by heterosexual parents to be healthy, successful and well-adjusted. 
The research supporting this conclusion is accepted beyond serious 
debate in the field of developmental psychology.”108 The court thus 
concluded that California’s different-sex limitation on marriage violated 
both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.109 
The nine-day bench trial challenging Michigan’s constitutional 
amendment,110 DeBoer v. Snyder, was similarly replete with expert testi-
mony and debates about methodology, sample sizes, and correlation 
                                                                                                                           
 103. The court noted, for example, that the studies finding that married different-sex 
parents provide the optimal childrearing environment did not explore the outcomes for 
children raised in a stable same-sex household, id. at 935, and thus these studies “do not 
inform conclusions about outcomes for children raised by same-sex parents in stable, long-
term relationships,” id. at 981. 
 104. See id. at 940–44. 
 105. Id. at 950; see also id. at 947, 952. 
 106. Id. at 934. 
 107. Id. at 938. The trial court required only some evidence to support the 
constitutional amendment: “An initiative measure adopted by the voters deserves great 
respect. The considered views and opinions of even the most highly qualified scholars and 
experts seldom outweigh the determinations of the voters. When challenged, however, the 
voters’ determinations must find at least some support in evidence.” Id. 
 108. Id. at 980. The trial court made eighty findings of fact, including that children 
raised by same-sex parents benefit economically and psychologically when their parents 
are able to marry, see id. at 973, that the gender and sexual orientation of the parent do 
not affect child outcomes, see id. at 980, and that having two different-sex parents does 
not increase the likelihood a child will have positive life outcomes, see id. at 981. 
 109. See id. at 991–1003. 
 110. Mich. Const. art. I, § 25 (“To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our 
society and for future generations of children, the union of one man and one woman in 
marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any 
purpose.”); DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating that the trial 
court “held a nine-day trial on the issue”), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584 (2015). 
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versus causation.111 The plaintiffs introduced empirical evidence about 
families headed by same-sex parents, academic achievement for children 
raised by same-sex couples, an ongoing study about relationship stability, 
and so on.112 Defendants introduced competing empirical evidence on 
the same subjects.113 As in Perry, the trial court meticulously scrutinized 
this empirical evidence. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ 
studies used convenience samples—small, self-selected populations 
rather than large, representative samples—but noted that this was the 
standard methodology in the relevant fields.114 By contrast, the court 
criticized the defendants’ evidence because it compared children who 
had not experienced a family breakup with those who had; the court 
noted that the comparison should be between children raised in stable 
homes with different-sex parents and children raised in stable homes 
with same-sex parents.115 The court further found that one of the central 
studies relied upon by the defendants had been funded by a party who 
was certain the study would show the value of different-sex marriage, 
which undermined the credibility of the study.116 For these reasons, the 
court found the testimony of the defendants’ experts “entirely 
unbelievable and not worthy of serious consideration.”117 
This empirical evidence was critical to the court’s ruling, with the 
court concluding that the Michigan constitutional amendment could not 
even pass the rational basis test under the Equal Protection Clause.118 
The court rejected all of the State’s rationales,119 including the argument 
that married different-sex parents provide the optimal environment for 
raising children. The court found that there was no evidence that 
children benefit from being raised by married different-sex parents and 
                                                                                                                           
 111. 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388, rev’d sub nom. 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. As in California, the plaintiffs in the Michigan litigation 
contended that the limitation violated the federal Due Process Clause and Equal 
Protection Clause. See id. at 760. Michigan defended the provision by arguing that it 
served four legitimate purposes: giving children “‘biologically connected’ role models of 
both genders that are necessary to foster healthy psychological development,” “avoiding 
the unintended consequences that might result from redefining marriage,” “upholding 
tradition and morality,” and channeling procreation into stable relationships. See id. The 
court assumed the standard of review was rational basis. See id. at 760–61. 
 112. See id. at 761–64. 
 113. See id. at 765–67. 
 114. See id. at 761–62. 
 115. See id. at 765. 
 116. See id. at 766. 
 117. Id. at 766–68. The trial court found the testimony of all three experts “clearly 
represent[s] a fringe viewpoint that is rejected by the vast majority of their colleagues 
across a variety of social science fields.” Id. at 768. 
 118. See id. at 768–69. In light of the holding on equal protection grounds, the court 
declined to address the due process argument. See id. at 768. 
 119. See id. at 770. 
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that even if it were true, carrying this argument to its logical conclusion 
would lead the State to restrict marriage for demographic groups that are 
correlated with poor outcomes for children, such as minority and low-
income families, a proposition the court called an “absurdity.”120 
By the time marriage equality came before the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the empirical decisionmaking in the lower courts had largely settled the 
question about same-sex parenting and child outcomes, and there was no 
reason to rehash the debate.121 It is unsurprising, then, that the Court’s 
opinion in Obergefell did not mention the underlying evidence on same-
sex parenting and instead waxed poetic about the importance of 
marriage.122 Even though it was not at the forefront of the decision, 
however, it is likely that the empirical evidence played a role. It is hard to 
imagine the Court, and Justice Kennedy in particular, approving 
marriage equality if there were evidence that this family form harmed 
children. 
                                                                                                                           
 120. Id. at 770–72. 
 121. Indeed, the defenders of the different-sex requirement did not make evidence on 
same-sex parenting a central issue. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners at 31–48, Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 457384 [hereinafter Perry Petitioners 
Brief]. Instead, they relied on other arguments, notably that the state has a particular 
interest in channeling procreative sex into marriage, that caution counsels in favor of a go-
slow approach, and that the issue should be left to the democratic process. See, e.g., Brief 
for Respondent at 11–35, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556), 2015 
WL 1384100; Perry Petitioners Brief, supra, at 31–61. 
In Perry, at least some of the Justices wanted to revisit the empirical question. At oral 
argument, for example, Justice Scalia noted that “there’s considerable disagreement 
among . . . sociologists as to what the consequences [are] of raising a child in a . . . single-
sex family, [and] whether that is harmful to the child or not,” see Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 19, Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 6908183, and “that there’s 
no scientific answer to that question at this point in time,” see id. at 20. Justice Kennedy 
acknowledged that the “sociological information is new” but that the Court should focus 
on the injury to the children of same-sex parents. See id. at 21. The case was ultimately 
decided on jurisdictional grounds, see Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2668, so the opinion did not 
mention the evidence. 
In Obergefell v. Hodges, although some amici addressed the empirical evidence directly, 
see, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae American Sociological Association in Support of 
Petitioners at 5–27, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 1048442 (discussing 
the empirical evidence at length); Brief of Amici Curiae the Ruth Institute and Dr. 
Jennifer Roback Morse, PhD, in Support of Respondents and in Opposition to Reversal at 
21–29, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 1501656 (same), neither the 
parties nor the Court addressed it in any detail, and it was mentioned only in passing at 
oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-
556), 2015 WL 2399419 (documenting an exchange between Justice Scalia and Solicitor 
General Donald Verilli about whether “all of the evidence shows there is no problem” with 
same-sex couples raising children). 
 122. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (describing marriage as “a keystone of our social 
order”); see also id. at 2594, 2608 (arguing marriage “embodies the highest ideals of . . . 
family” and “is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations”). 
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b. Abortion. — Empirical evidence has also played a key role in 
abortion jurisprudence. The basic liberty right of a woman to decide 
whether to continue or terminate a pregnancy rests on notions of privacy 
and individual liberty,123 but empirical evidence has long been pivotal in 
decisions recognizing and effectuating this right.124 Empirical evidence 
has taken on even greater importance since 1992, when the test to 
determine the constitutionality of an abortion regulation became 
whether the restriction imposes an “undue burden” on the right to 
reproductive freedom.125 This is fundamentally an empirical inquiry, 
centered on whether the purpose or effect of the restriction creates a 
substantial obstacle to exercising the right.126 
In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the Court pored over evidence 
about the state restrictions, notably the requirement that doctors 
performing abortions have admitting privileges in nearby hospitals.127 
The Court described the trial evidence—both expert testimony and peer-
reviewed medical studies—finding that abortions are a safe procedure 
and that hospital admissions are rare.128 The Court also considered the 
extensive evidence introduced at trial that the requirement had led to 
the closure of half of the abortion facilities in Texas.129 Based on this 
                                                                                                                           
 123. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (plurality 
opinion) (“It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty 
which the government may not enter.”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This 
right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.”). 
 124. In Roe v. Wade, the Court compared data on mortality rates from early-pregnancy 
abortions and childbirth to establish that maternal mortality rates for abortions performed 
before the end of the first trimester are “as low as or lower than the rates for normal 
childbirth,” 410 U.S. at 149, and the viability test established in the case rests on a 
scientific understanding of fetal development, see id. at 163 (explaining the state has a 
compelling interest in protecting the life of the fetus at the point of the viability “because 
the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s 
womb”). For another example, see Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52, 76–79 (1976) (invalidating a state ban on a procedure using saline amniocentesis 
by relying on data comparing the use of this procedure and alternative procedures). 
 125. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876–77. 
 126. See id. (“[A] statute which, while furthering . . . [a] valid state interest, has the 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be 
considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”); id. at 878 (“Unnecessary 
health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a 
woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.”). 
 127. See 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310–11 (2016); see also Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 
§ 171.0031(a) (West 2017) (“A physician performing or inducing an abortion . . . must, on 
the date the abortion is performed or induced, have active admitting privileges at a 
hospital that . . . is located not further than 30 miles from the location at which the 
abortion is performed or induced.”). 
 128. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310–11. 
 129. See id. at 2312. 
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evidence, the Court concluded that the requirement imposed a 
substantial obstacle to the exercise of the right.130 
In another abortion case, the Supreme Court also relied on 
empirical evidence—albeit much more questionable evidence—to draw 
conclusions about the mental health consequences of an abortion. In 
Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court held that it was permissible for a state to 
prohibit a medical procedure, in part because there was evidence that 
after an abortion “[s]evere depression and loss of esteem can follow.”131 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy cited an amicus brief 
representing the views of 181 women who had had an abortion and who 
felt that the procedure created “adverse emotional and psychological 
health effects.”132 This brief also cited to a South Dakota task force that 
purportedly established the detrimental mental health effects of an 
abortion.133 
As this last example demonstrates, judicial reliance on empirical 
evidence is not inevitably a neutral or thorough process. Indeed, in 
Carhart the parties had not extensively litigated the mental health effects 
of abortions in the two-week bench trial in the case.134 If they had, the 
challengers likely would have introduced the abundant evidence finding 
                                                                                                                           
 130. See id. at 2311–12. The other state restriction at issue in the case required 
facilities providing abortions to meet the standards for ambulatory surgical centers. In 
finding that the requirement did not promote women’s health, was unnecessary, and 
placed a substantial obstacle to exercising the right to reproductive choice, the Court 
credited expert testimony at trial predicting the closure of clinics, finding that although 
the prediction was not ultimately borne out, it had relied on the “scientific method” of 
making a hypothesis and then attempting to verify the hypothesis with further studies. See 
id. at 2314–17. 
 131. 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (citing Brief for Sandra Cano, the Former “Mary Doe” 
of Doe v. Bolton, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 22–24, Carhart, 550 U.S. 
124 (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 1436684 [hereinafter Sandra Cano Brief]). Another reason for 
prohibiting the procedure was that a woman might later regret her decision to terminate a 
pregnancy once she found out the details of the procedure. See id. (“[S]ome women 
come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”); see 
also id. at 159–60 (“It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort 
must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns . . . 
that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her 
unborn child . . . .”). The Court acknowledged that there was no evidence to support this 
regret rationale. See id. at 159 (“While we find no reliable data to measure the 
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their 
choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”). 
 132. Sandra Cano Brief, supra note 131, at 1. 
 133. See id. at 16–21. For a discussion of the task force, see infra text accompanying 
notes 291–294. 
 134. See Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 852–1002 (D. Neb. 2004) 
(summarizing the medical evidence at trial but noting the psychological effects of 
abortion only in passing), aff’d sub nom. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 
2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
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that abortions are not correlated with mental health problems,135 and the 
Supreme Court would have had to grapple with this more complete 
evidentiary record. The discussion below returns to the issue of selective 
use of empirical evidence.136 
c. Intimate Partner Violence and the Child Welfare System. — Empirical 
evidence was also a decisive factor in a significant rights-based case that 
significantly affected the child welfare system—the litigation over New 
York City’s practice of responding to intimate partner violence by 
removing children from their homes and placing them in foster care.137 
In a class action challenging the practice, the district court held a twenty-
four-day bench trial, with twelve expert witnesses.138 These witnesses 
addressed the research on children and intimate partner violence, 
focusing on whether witnessing intimate partner violence produced 
adverse effects for children and whether a home with intimate partner 
violence was more likely to be a home with child abuse.139 The experts 
also described the research on the detrimental effects of removal on 
                                                                                                                           
 135. See Brenda Major et al., Am. Psychol. Ass’n, Report of the APA Task Force on Mental 
Health and Abortion 4–5 (2008), http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/abortion/mental-
health.pdf [http://perma.cc/LN5J-H76C] (“[A]mong adult women who have an 
unplanned pregnancy the relative risk of mental health problems is no greater if they have a 
single elective first-trimester abortion than if they deliver that pregnancy. The evidence 
regarding the relative mental health risks associated with multiple abortions is more 
equivocal.”). 
 136. See infra section II.B.2. 
 137. See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 208–10, 228–29 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(describing the city’s practice of finding that a victim of intimate partner violence was 
neglecting the child). The city persisted in this practice even when the child had not 
witnessed the violence firsthand, when the child was not the direct victim of the abuse, and 
when the mother was otherwise adequately caring for the child. See id. at 169–72, 228. For 
a firsthand account of the litigation from the perspective of the plaintiffs’ attorney, see 
generally Jill M. Zuccardy, Nicholson v. Williams: The Case, 82 Denv. U. L. Rev. 655 (2005). 
 138. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 165; Zuccardy, supra note 137, at 662 (noting that 
the trial included twelve expert witnesses). 
 139. See Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 197–98. Drawing on extensive studies and their 
own work, five experts offered the following opinions: Children experience a range of 
negative effects, from minor psychological disturbance to post-traumatic stress syndrome; 
numerous factors influence a child’s reaction including the severity of the abuse, the 
child’s proximity to the abuse, and the parent’s ability to support the child; witnessing 
domestic violence is correlated with a higher risk of substance abuse and violence as an 
adult, but the vast majority of children exposed to intimate partner violence do not 
experience these problems as an adult; and even when children are exposed to severe 
intimate partner violence, if they are then in a safe place and the violence ends, significant 
psychological problems disappear completely for the majority of children. See id. 
Plaintiffs’ experts testified that although intimate partner violence and child abuse often 
occur together, it is almost always the same adult inflicting both kinds of abuse—it is not 
typically a situation in which the father hits a mother who then hits the child. See id. at 
198. 
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children, especially in cases of intimate partner violence,140 and the best 
practices for addressing intimate partner violence in the child welfare 
system.141 
Relying extensively on the expert testimony, the district court ruled 
that the city’s practice was unconstitutional.142 Although the decision was 
subsequently narrowed on appeal,143 the decision continues to resonate 
across the child welfare system.144 Moreover, there is no question that 
that empirical evidence was critical to the outcome of the case.145 
d. Juvenile Sentencing. — Empirical evidence has had a profound 
effect on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In a series of cases 
addressing the constitutionality of sentences for crimes committed by 
juveniles, the Supreme Court relied heavily on research in the fields of 
neuroscience, psychology, and sociology.146 The underlying research 
                                                                                                                           
 140. Id. at 198–99. The experts noted that removing a child from the home, and thus 
disrupting the parent–child relationship, can have extreme consequences for the child’s 
sense of security and safety and that when the child has been removed because of intimate 
partner violence, the child’s sense of danger is often heightened because the child is 
concerned about the parent left behind. Id. Further, the experts testified that children 
often blame themselves for the removal, leading to psychological problems, and 
placement in foster care introduces a new set of risks, including abuse and neglect, 
inadequate medical care, and disruption of the child’s contacts with family, school, and 
community. Id. at 199. 
 141. Id. at 200–05 (describing extensive expert testimony and a report by the National 
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges). This evidence suggested to the court that 
mothers should not be accused of neglect merely for being victims of domestic violence, 
perpetrators should be held accountable, children should be protected by offering 
services to the mother, removal should be used only as a last resort, and child welfare 
workers should be adequately trained on the dynamics of these cases. See id. 
 142. See id. at 233–60 (finding a likelihood of success on the merits for the plaintiffs’ 
Fourth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Nineteenth Amendment claims and thus 
issuing a preliminary injunction). 
 143. The case had a lengthy subsequent history not relevant to the issue of how courts 
use empirical evidence. For a discussion of this history, see Zuccardy, supra note 137, at 
669. 
 144. See Kathleen A. Copps, The Good, the Bad, and the Future of Nicholson v. 
Scoppetta: An Analysis of the Effects and Suggestions for Further Improvements, 72 Alb. L. 
Rev. 497, 510–12, 523–25 (2009) (describing the changes in New York City as a result of 
the litigation and cataloguing the decision’s influence in other jurisdictions). 
 145. See Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 198–99, 250 (reviewing expert testimony about 
the harm of removing children from their homes even when there is domestic violence in 
the home and concluding that “[t]he evidence demonstrates that the compelling state 
interest in protecting children” is hindered by “policies of prosecuting abused mothers 
and removing their children”). 
 146. For a small sample of this literature, see, e.g., Alison S. Burke, Under 
Construction: Brain Formation, Culpability, and the Criminal Justice System, 34 Int’l J.L. 
& Psychiatry 381, 382–83 (2011) (presenting neuroscience research indicating “the brain 
is still growing and maturing during adolescence” and arguing that charging children as 
adults is overly punitive); Eveline A. Crone & Maurits W. van der Molen, Developmental 
Changes in Real Life Decision Making: Performance on a Gambling Task Previously 
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shows that, although brain structure is primarily in place by age five or 
six, the brain continues to develop through early adulthood. Neuro-
scientists have focused in particular on the prefrontal cortex, finding that 
adolescents have less forethought and impulse control than fully 
matured adults.147 Additionally, adolescents are still developing their 
characters and personalities, and there are many opportunities for 
change and growth.148 
Working with scholars in other disciplines, legal scholars played a 
pivotal role in translating this research into legal rules and principles.149 
One of the most productive collaborations was between legal scholar 
Elizabeth Scott and psychologist Laurence Steinberg. In a highly 
influential article, Scott and Steinberg laid out a framework for a devel-
opmentally sensitive approach to juvenile justice.150 They contended that 
developmental insights should inform the approach to juvenile crime: 
The immaturity of adolescents means they are not as morally culpable, 
their vulnerability to peer pressure makes it difficult for adolescents to 
leave a situation in which a crime may be committed, and their still-
developing characters means there is an opportunity for rehabilitation.151 
                                                                                                                           
Shown to Depend on the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, 25 Developmental 
Neuropsychology 251, 252 (2004) (presenting research indicating juvenile brains do not 
fully appreciate future consequences); Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, 1021 Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci. 77, 83 (2004) (noting 
research indicating important brain functions that “inhibit impulses, weigh consequences 
of decisions, prioritize, and strategize” are “still under construction for a decade after the 
throes of puberty and may therefore be related to some of the behavioral manifestations 
of the teen years”); Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical 
Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 
8174, 8174, 8178 (2004) (mapping brain development over time and noting that regions 
associated with more complex and integrative tasks developed last). 
 147. See Burke, supra note 146, at 382–83 (“Research shows that youths also have a 
less than fully developed brain and this difference can account for many behavioral 
discrepancies between adolescents and adults. Because the brain is still forming and 
changing during the teenage years, the culpability of adolescent behavior may be 
diminished.”); Crone & van der Molen, supra note 146, at 274 (noting that study 
participants, with advancing age, “made increasingly more advantageous choices”); Giedd, 
supra note 146, at 83 (concluding that “brain structure goes through explosive changes 
during the teen years”). 
 148. See Laurence Steinberg, Age of Opportunity: Lessons from the New Science of 
Adolescence 18–64 (2014) (arguing that adolescence is a “remarkable period of brain 
reorganization and plasticity”). 
 149. See Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and 
Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 Law & Ineq. 
263, 277–83 (2013) (reviewing the legal literature, which heavily draws on the underlying 
interdisciplinary research). 
 150. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: 
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 
Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014 (2003). 
 151. See id. 
2018] THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN FAMILY LAW 255 
 
Starting with Roper v. Simmons in 2005,152 and through the most 
recent pronouncement in Montgomery v. Louisiana in 2016,153 the Court 
drew heavily on the underlying research. The Court embraced the 
developmentally sensitive framework proposed by Scott and Steinberg,154 
holding that the Eighth Amendment places substantial constraints on 
sentences for crimes committed by minors.155 
e. Child Custody. — Finally, empirical evidence is playing an 
influential role in contemporary custody decisions. In custody disputes 
between parents, every state uses some variant of the best-interests-of-the-
child standard,156 which itself was shaped by empirical evidence.157 This 
test gives nearly boundless discretion to the court.158 As scholars have 
shown,159 courts are ill-equipped to implement this standard, and thus 
courts look to more definite criteria, such as each parent’s willingness 
and ability to foster a relationship between the child and the other 
parent.160 
To determine a parent’s openness to the child’s ongoing 
relationship with the other parent, some courts have relied on so-called 
parental alienation syndrome.161 Developed by a single psychologist 
                                                                                                                           
 152. 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005). 
 153. 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016). 
 154. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
 155. See id. at 578 (holding it unconstitutional to impose the death penalty upon a 
seventeen-year-old minor who committed first-degree murder); see also Montgomery, 136 S. 
Ct. at 736 (holding Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 
2455, 2471 (2012) (partially extending Graham v. Florida to minors guilty of homicide but 
clarifying that the Eighth Amendment “mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain 
process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing 
[life without the possibility of parole on a minor convicted of homicide]”); Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (“The Constitution prohibits [imposing] a life without 
parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide. A State need not 
guarantee the offender eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide 
him or her with some realistic opportunity to obtain release . . . .”). 
 156. All states have some variant on the best-interests standard, but there is a 
preference for continued contact with both parents. See Theresa Glennon, Still Partners? 
Examining the Consequences of Post-Dissolution Parenting, 41 Fam. L.Q. 105, 114–17 
(2007). 
 157. See Davis, There Is a Book Out, supra note 11, at 1542–49. 
 158. See Mnookin, supra note 67, at 226, 255–62. 
 159. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody: 
The Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 77 Law & Contemp. Probs., no. 1, 
2014, at 69, 72–75 (arguing that courts often cannot obtain verifiable information about 
parenting because the qualitative proxies to determine best interests, such as closeness of 
the relationship between a parent and child, are highly complex and difficult to assess, 
and the standard gives no guidance on weighing multiple factors). 
 160. See id. at 95–100 (discussing how courts rely on expert opinions that assess family 
violence or “parental alienation” to evaluate custody disputes). 
 161. For a summary of the history and ongoing use of parental alienation syndrome, 
see Joan S. Meier, A Historical Perspective on Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental 
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based on interviews with only his clients and self-published without the 
benefit of peer review,162 parental alienation syndrome is not recognized 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM),163 
and it has been uniformly discredited by psychologists.164 Despite this 
lack of scientific basis, many courts and mental health professionals, who 
provide highly influential custody evaluations to courts, have invoked 
parental alienation syndrome.165 
In light of the looser evidentiary rules used in family court,166 the 
Daubert standard, developed for the purpose of distinguishing reliable 
                                                                                                                           
Alienation, 6 J. Child Custody 232, 235–50 (2009) [hereinafter Meier, A Historical 
Perspective]; Joan S. Meier & Sean Dickson, Mapping Gender: Shedding Empirical Light 
on Family Courts’ Treatment of Cases Involving Abuse and Alienation, 35 Law & Ineq. 
311, 316–19 (2017). 
 162. See Richard A. Gardner, Child Custody Litigation: A Guide for Parents and 
Mental Health Professionals 76–104 (1986); Carol S. Bruch, Parental Alienation Syndrome 
and Alienated Children—Getting It Wrong in Child Custody Cases, 14 Child & Fam. L.Q. 
381, 386–87 (2002) (noting Gardner self-published most of his work). Gardner conceded 
that most of the studies supporting his theory were based on direct patient observation, 
rather than experiments and statistical analysis. See Richard A. Gardner, Commentary on 
Kelly and Johnston’s “The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation 
Syndrome,” 42 Fam. Ct. Rev. 611, 617–18 (2004). 
 163. See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(5th ed. 2013). 
 164. See, e.g., Robert E. Emery, Parental Alienation Syndrome: Proponents Bear the 
Burden of Proof, 43 Fam. Ct. Rev. 8, 8–9 (2005) (noting that “there have been no 
independent, objective, or public replications of Gardner’s assertions”); Janet R. Johnston 
& Joan B. Kelly, Rejoinder to Gardner’s “Commentary on Kelly and Johnston’s ‘The 
Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation Syndrome,’” 42 Fam. Ct. Rev. 
622, 622 (2004) (rejecting calling parental alienation syndrome “a syndrome and 
grant[ing] it status as a DSM diagnostic category . . . outright”); Joan B. Kelly & Janet R. 
Johnston, The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation Syndrome, 39 
Fam. Ct. Rev. 249, 249–50 (2001) (“[T]here is a relative absence of any empirical or 
research support for the reliable identification of [parent alienation syndrome], other 
than Gardner’s (and other proponents’) clinical experience and ‘expert testimony.’”). For 
a summary of the research finding that parental alienation syndrome has no scientific 
basis, see Bruch, supra note 162, at 383–89; Meier, A Historical Perspective, supra note 
161, at 235–40. 
 165. See Bruch, supra note 162, at 387–88 (discussing cases in which courts allowed 
parental alienation syndrome testimony but noting that when Richard Gardner, the 
psychologist who identified parental alienation syndrome, attempted to testify, most courts 
disallowed the testimony, either because it went to the ultimate determination of custody 
or because the court found the syndrome unsupported); Meier, A Historical Perspective, 
supra note 161, at 240 (describing the ubiquity of parental alienation syndrome in family 
court); Scott & Emery, supra note 159, at 99–100 & n.164 (citing cases and discussing the 
continuing widespread reliance on parental alienation syndrome). 
 166. See Meier, A Historical Perspective, supra note 161, at 240; Meier & Dickson, 
supra note 161, at 319; Scott & Emery, supra note 159, at 99–100 (explaining that family 
courts often do not screen custody opinions from mental health professionals, may believe 
the professionals are neutral and therefore do not need the scrutiny, and may believe the 
court appointment itself suffices as a validation of the professional’s scientific credibility). 
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scientific evidence from unreliable scientific evidence,167 is not an effective 
tool for combatting parental alienation syndrome. Family courts rarely use 
the test, either to screen expert witnesses in court or when drawing on 
reports from mental health professionals evaluating custody.168 As a 
result, highly unreliable and unscientific evidence continues to dominate 
in family court.169 
2. Legislation. — Empirical evidence also plays an important role in 
lawmaking. Legislatures regularly use empirical evidence to identify 
problems and determine appropriate solutions. When Congress passed 
the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997,170 it relied on a 
wealth of empirical evidence about problems plaguing the child welfare 
system.171 Congress held hearings and found that the child welfare system 
was not serving the interests of children because family-preservation 
efforts were keeping some children in dangerous homes, the problem of 
“foster care drift” (the term used to describe both long stays in foster 
care and placement in multiple homes) was getting worse, and children 
would be better served by promoting adoption rather than family 
preservation.172 Congress responded to these problems by adopting a 
                                                                                                                           
 167. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993) (holding that 
before admitting expert testimony, courts must determine that the evidence is based on 
reliable scientific methodology and reasoning); see also John Conley & Jane Moriarty, 
Scientific and Expert Evidence 82 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining that Daubert applies in federal 
courts but that most states have adopted the standard or a similar one). 
 168. See Meier, A Historical Perspective, supra note 161, at 240–41 (“To a troubling 
degree, family courts and even courts of appeal are increasingly accepting the application 
of [parental alienation syndrome] . . . while sidestepping the admissibility question . . . .”); 
Scott & Emery, supra note 159, at 99–100 (explaining how “few jurisdictions require 
systematic scrutiny” of mental health professionals’ opinions). 
 169. See Meier, A Historical Perspective, supra note 161, at 240–41; Scott & Emery, 
supra note 159, at 99–100. But the tide may be beginning to turn. See Maxine Eichner, 
Bad Medicine: Parents, the State, and the Charge of “Medical Child Abuse,” 50 U.C. Davis 
L. Rev. 205, 271 & n.294 (2016) (listing cases in which courts, including family courts, 
rejected parental alienation syndrome as unscientific and unreliable). As Joan Meier 
explains, even though courts are less likely to rely on parental alienation syndrome, they 
now—and still problematically—invoke the related notion of parental alienation, which is 
not characterized as a syndrome, per se, but rather as a behavior that weighs against 
awarding custody to the alienating parent. See Meier, A Historical Perspective, supra note 
161, at 245–50. 
 170. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 171. See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of 
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 637, 646–50 (1999). 
 172. See Promotion of Adoption, Safety, and Support for Abused and Neglected 
Children: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 105th Cong. 1–9 (1997) (discussing the 
“demands on the [child welfare] system” and exploring the “pressure points at which 
reform might be aimed”); Improving the Well-Being of Abused and Neglected Children: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 104th Cong. 9–10 (1996) 
(statement of Richard J. Gelles, Director, Family Violence Research Program) (recounting 
the results of studies finding that current family-preservation efforts were ineffective); 
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standard that set a time limit on family-reunification efforts,173 thus 
moving children to permanent homes more quickly and making child 
safety and permanency—rather than family preservation—the para-
mount concerns of the child welfare system.174 In enacting ASFA, 
however, Congress selectively relied on empirical evidence. It did not 
focus on empirical evidence about competing concerns, such as the risks 
a child faces in foster care or the developmental harm of separating a 
child from a caregiver, especially during early childhood.175 
Legislatures have also used empirical evidence to develop responses 
to intimate partner violence. Since the 1970s, scholars in multiple 
disciplines have generated significant research about the extent of 
intimate partner violence, the harms it causes, and effective responses.176 
Both the federal and state legislatures have invoked this evidence to 
enact laws to protect victims and punish perpetrators. Evidence drove 
                                                                                                                           
Barriers to Adoption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Res. of the H. Comm. on 
Ways & Means, 104th Cong. 4–64 (1996) (considering whether federal intervention was 
necessary to promote adoption); Federal Adoption Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 104th Cong. 4–9 (1995) (exploring 
how to “simultaneously achieve the goals of both family preservation and timely 
adoption”); Child Welfare Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the 
H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 104th Cong. 4–8 (1995) (examining lessons learned since 
the passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, which required the 
Department of Health and Human Services to review the foster care caseload of every 
state); see also Gordon, supra note 171, at 646–50 (describing this legislative history, 
including the role of the Clinton Administration in pushing Congress to reform the child 
welfare system). 
 173. As a condition of receiving federal funds, states had to commence proceedings to 
terminate parental rights for children who had been in foster care for fifteen of the most 
recent twenty-two months. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). 
 174. ASFA conditioned federal funds on states developing a foster-care and adoption-
assistance plan in which “the child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern.” 
Id. § 671(a)(15)(A). 
 175. See Gordon, supra note 171, at 646–50 (describing the evidence presented in 
support of ASFA, which did not include material on these issues). 
 176. Intimate partner violence grew into a distinct academic discipline in the 1970s 
and 1980s, with scholars from different disciplines, including law, providing a theoretical 
framework for reform and legitimizing the study of the problem. See Leigh Goodmark, A 
Troubled Marriage: Domestic Violence and the Legal System 9–28 (2012) [hereinafter 
Goodmark, Troubled Marriage] (describing the legal and scholarly history of the intimate 
partner violence movement beginning in the 1970s). Since then, intimate partner violence 
has become a robust area of inquiry, studied by scholars in multiple disciplines, including 
sociology, see, e.g., Richard J. Gelles & Murray A. Straus, Intimate Violence (1988), 
psychology, see, e.g., Paula Nicolson, Domestic Violence and Psychology: A Critical 
Perspective (2010); Katherine M. Kitzmann et al., Child Witnesses to Domestic Violence: A 
Meta-Analytic Review, 71 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 339 (2003), medicine, see, e.g., 
Empowering Survivors of Abuse: Health Care for Battered Women and Their Children 
(Jacquelyn C. Campbell ed., 1998), and economics, see, e.g., Anna Aizer, The Gender 
Wage Gap and Domestic Violence, 100 Am. Econ. Rev. 1847 (2010). 
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many aspects of the federal Violence Against Women Act,177 federal 
immigration law provisions that address the incentive for a noncitizen to 
stay with a violent partner,178 and state laws that create civil and criminal 
protection orders.179 The empirical evidence does not always support the 
various legislative mandates,180 but there is no question that legislatures 
regularly use empirical evidence to develop legal responses to intimate 
partner violence. 
3. Administration. — Under the banner of “Bringing Business 
Intelligence to Child Welfare,”181 administrative agencies around the 
country are beginning to use predictive analytics—which employs 
statistics and modeling to forecast future events182—in their child welfare 
systems.183 Without this technology, social workers in the child welfare 
                                                                                                                           
 177. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 178. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(C) (2012) (allowing a victim of intimate partner 
violence to petition separately from a spouse or former spouse for the removal of 
conditional residency); id. § 1229b(b)(2)–(4) (authorizing a victim of intimate partner 
violence to self-petition for cancellation of removal rather than rely on a family member). 
 179. See Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 Yale L.J. 2, 13–17 (2006) 
(describing these orders). 
 180. See infra text accompanying notes 277–282 (discussing the conflicting evidence 
about mandatory-arrest policies and recidivism). 
 181. Innovations in Action, Eckerd Kids, http://www.eckerd.org/about-eckerd-kids/what-
were-doing/innovations-in-action/ [http://perma.cc/8B72-7PJ4] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017). 
 182. See Eric Siegel, Predictive Analytics: The Power to Predict Who Will Click, Buy, Lie, or 
Die 15 (rev. & updated ed. 2016) (“Predictive analytics (PA)—Technology that learns from 
experience (data) to predict the future behavior of individuals in order to drive better 
decisions.”); Charles Nyce, Am. Inst. for CPCU & Ins. Inst. of Am., Predictive Analytics 
White Paper 1 (2007), http://www.the-digital-insurer.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 
12/78-Predictive-Modeling-White-Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/4QUQ-Y9A4] (providing an 
overview of predictive analytics). Predictive analytics is used in myriad settings, from health 
care to retail marketing, and by both private and public actors. See Viktor Mayer-
Schönberger & Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution that Will Transform How We 
Live, Work, and Think 123–49 (2013) (describing the use of predictive analytics in the 
private sector); Siegel, supra, at 23–45 (describing the use of predictive analytics more 
broadly); Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart 
City, 20 Yale. J.L. & Tech. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6–11) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (describing the use of data analytics at the state and particularly 
local level as part of the move toward “smart cities”). 
 183. See, e.g., Gladys Carrión, Comm’r, N.Y.C. Admin. for Children’s Servs., Testimony 
to the Commission to Eliminate Child Abuse and Neglect Fatalities 10 (Aug. 6, 2015), 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/acs/pdf/testimony/2015/Commission_to_Eliminate_Child_
Abuse_and_Neglect_Fatalities_8_5_15.pdf [http://perma.cc/3JAR-BGXA] (describing New 
York City’s early use of predictive analytics); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Child 
Maltreatment 2015, at 133–34, 199–201 (2017) [hereinafter Child Maltreatment], http:// 
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/5MGJ-N6MG] 
(describing the use of predictive analytics in Connecticut and Oklahoma); Marquis 
Cabrera, Florida Leverages Predictive Analytics to Prevent Child Fatalities—Other 
States Follow, Huffington Post (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
marquis-cabrera/florida-leverages-predictive_b_8586712.html [http://perma.cc/ZV6T-S3CK] 
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system investigate cases and make pivotal decisions about cases using 
their experience, intuition, and rudimentary risk assessment tools, only 
some of which are empirically validated.184 Triaging cases is a daunting 
prospect, with an estimated four million reports of abuse and neglect 
annually,185 limited resources, and child safety and family integrity 
hanging in the balance.186 
Predictive analytics brings a data-driven approach to this process.187 
Agencies are using it in somewhat different ways, but the model—first 
developed in New Zealand in 2012—reviews reports of abuse and neglect 
and determines which cases are most serious and thus deserving of inten-
sive follow-up and intervention.188 After an agency receives a call about a 
particular family, the model mines the databases of several government 
systems—education, criminal justice, health, public benefits, and so on—
                                                                                                                           
(describing a nonprofit’s contracts to develop and use predictive analytics in Alaska, 
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maine, and Oklahoma); Dina Gusovsky, Can Life as a 
Data Point Save America’s At-Risk Children?, CNBC News (Jan. 14, 2016), http:// 
www.cnbc.com/2016/01/14/an-80-billion-annual-tax-bill-thats-failing-our-children.html 
[http://perma.cc/UG73-KRK9] (describing a pilot program using predictive analytics in 
Los Angeles County); Laura Santhanam, Can Big Data Save These Children?, PBS 
NewsHour (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/can-big-data-save-
these-children/ [http://perma.cc/66G7-XWU2] (describing the use of predictive 
analytics in Allegheny County, which includes Pittsburgh); Eckerd Kids, supra note 181 
(describing the use of predictive analytics in Florida). 
 184. In a typical case, the child welfare agency receives a report of abuse or neglect, 
and a caseworker investigates the claim and speaks with family members, the school, and 
other individuals and institutions in the child’s life. The caseworker then decides whether 
to substantiate the allegation of abuse or neglect and thus begin the process of state 
intervention in the family. See Child Maltreatment, supra note 183, at 6 (explaining the 
first step is determining whether the report should be screened in for an investigation and 
noting reports are screened out for a variety of reasons, including inadequate information 
in the report). For a description of the different risk assessment tools currently in use, see 
Richard J. Gelles, Out of Harm’s Way: Creating an Effective Child Welfare System 104–08 
(2017). 
 185. See Child Maltreatment, supra note 183, at 6 (noting that the number of these 
reports has increased by almost sixteen percent in four years). 
 186. See Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 637, 
642–52 (2006) [hereinafter Huntington, Rights Myopia] (describing the competing 
demands and the stakes in the child welfare system). 
 187. For an excellent overview of the use of predictive analytics in child welfare as well 
as a discussion of the many concerns associated with this practice, see Christopher E. 
Church & Amanda J. Fairchild, In Search of a Silver Bullet: Child Welfare’s Embrace of 
Predictive Analytics, 68 Juv. & Fam. Ct. J. 67, 68–78 (2017). 
 188. See Rhema Vaithianathan et al., Vulnerable Children: Can Administrative Data 
Be Used to Identify Children at Risk Of Adverse Outcomes? 6–9 (2012), http:// 
www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-resources/research/ 
vulnerable-children/auckland-university-can-administrative-data-be-used-to-identify-children-
at-risk-of-adverse-outcome.pdf [http://perma.cc/2YKU-WPZZ]. The model was also 
designed to work at a much earlier stage, identifying children at risk of abuse and neglect 
at the time a family member applies for a public benefit. See id. at 6. No child welfare 
agency in the United States is using predictive analytics at this stage. Id. 
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to obtain information about the family,189 combines this with demo-
graphic data, including age of the parents and children, education levels, 
and family structure, and then adds details about the family’s past 
involvement with the child welfare system, including whether the parent 
spent any time in foster care.190 The model runs these data points 
through a proprietary algorithm, producing a risk score for the child.191 
In the United States, Eckerd Kids is a nonprofit organization 
championing the use of predictive analytics and contracting with agen-
cies around the country.192 It has developed its own predictive analytics 
model that combs datasets and looks at risk factors, including the age of 
the child, the presence of a “paramour” in the home, a history of 
substance abuse and intimate partner violence, and the parent’s 
experience in the child welfare system as a child.193 Identified cases are 
slated for intensive follow-up, with the technological tool also prompting 
the caseworker to follow recommended steps.194 When tested against past 
cases, predictive analytics has been relatively accurate in identifying the 
                                                                                                                           
 189. See Gusovsky, supra note 183 (describing this process in Los Angeles County). 
 190. See Vaithianathan et al., supra note 188, at 10–11 (describing the family and 
child demographic characteristics that are included); Gusovsky, supra note 183 (noting 
the Los Angeles model combines information from the databases with information about 
the family because “experts say that whoever is living with the child has a big, if not the 
greatest, influence on his or her well-being”). 
 191. See Vaithianathan et al., supra note 188, at 7–11 (describing how the algorithm 
uses the variables to generate a risk score, or “the chance that the child who has started 
the spell will have an adverse outcome by some given age”); Gusovsky, supra note 183 
(detailing how the algorithm “provides a total risk score for each child based on numerous 
factors, as well as a map of that child’s social network and data points related to those 
connections, such as criminal history”). 
 192. See Cabrera, supra note 183 (describing Eckerd’s contracts with Alaska, 
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maine, and Oklahoma). 
 193. Eckerd Kids, supra note 181. 
 194. See Cabrera, supra note 183 (describing the implementation of Eckerd’s Rapid 
Safety Feedback program, which uses predictive analytics to reduce child fatality). 
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cases that resulted in child fatalities or severe injuries,195 but it has a high 
rate of false positives.196 
Administrative agencies also use empirical evidence to develop 
programs to support families. The abundant research establishing the 
importance of early childhood development has been particularly 
influential.197 In cities and states around the country, administrative 
agencies are adopting programs to promote language development and 
other skills in the first few years of life. In Providence, Rhode Island, the 
Mayor’s Office implemented Providence Talks, a program to boost 
language skills during early childhood with biweekly coaching sessions 
and a “word pedometer” to help parents track their children’s language 
exposure.198 In Oklahoma, the Department of Education offers a range 
of early childhood programs and services designed to prepare children 
for kindergarten.199 And in multiple cities and states, administrative 
agencies provide voluntary home-visiting programs to promote child 
                                                                                                                           
 195. See Vaithianathan et al., supra note 188, at 15–25 (describing the accuracy of the 
predictions and noting that the algorithm had a seventy-six percent area under the 
Receiver Operator Characteristic curve—a model with 100% area under the curve is 
considered to have a perfect fit in terms of predictive power); Santhanam, supra note 183 
(describing how Allegheny County found the model highly predictive of abuse and noting 
that “[a]mong children with the highest risk score, 40 percent were removed from their 
homes less than a year later” and “[a]mong those with the lowest risk score, the likelihood 
of entering foster care was . . . 0.3 percent”). See generally Emily Putnam-Hornstein et al., 
Preventing Severe and Fatal Maltreatment: Making the Case for the Expanded Use and 
Integration of Data, 92 Child Welfare 59, 64–70 (2013) (describing the model and the 
benefits of drawing on multiple sources of data through an automated system rather than 
the current approach). 
 196. See Church & Fairchild, supra note 187, at 71–72 (discussing the high rate of 
false positives); Vaithianathan et al., supra note 188, at 18 (noting if services are offered to 
the 3,284 children in the two groups with the highest risk scores, “1,211 children will have 
a maltreatment finding before age 5 and 2,073 [will] not”); Daniel Heimpel, Uncharted 
Waters: Data Analytics and Child Protection in Los Angeles, Chron. Soc. Change (July 20, 
2015), http://chronicleofsocialchange.org/featured/uncharted-waters-data-analytics-and-
child-protection-in-los-angeles/10867 [http://perma.cc/H4VA-C6WR] (noting that when 
applied to Los Angeles data, predictive analytics correctly identified seventy-six percent of 
the cases that resulted in death, near death, or severe injury but that the model also led to 
a false positive rate of more than ninety-five percent). A different concern is the lack of 
transparency in the algorithm. See Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 182, at 11–22. 
 197. For a summary of this research, see generally Jack P. Shonkoff & Deborah A. 
Phillips, Nat’l Acad. Sci., From Neurons to Neighborhoods: The Science of Early 
Childhood Development (2000). 
 198. About, Providence Talks, http://www.providencetalks.org/about [http://perma.cc/ 
3AEY-B7HY] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017). 
 199. Early Childhood and Family Education, Okla. State Dep’t of Educ., http:// 
sde.ok.gov/sde/early-childhood-and-family-education [http://perma.cc/55CB-KV3Z] (last 
updated Aug. 17, 2017). 
2018] THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN FAMILY LAW 263 
 
health and learning in the first years of life.200 These agencies regularly 
invoke the research on early childhood development to support their 
programs.201 
C. Patterns in the Empirical Turn 
As the above description illustrates, there are many kinds of 
empirical evidence in family law. Sometimes empirical evidence reflects 
relatively uncontested statistics, such as the number of children being 
raised by same-sex parents.202 Sometimes empirical evidence is 
embedded in a data-driven metric, such as predictive analytics. And 
often, empirical evidence reflects hotly contested correlations, such as 
                                                                                                                           
 200. See, e.g., Home Visiting, Mo. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., http:// 
health.mo.gov/living/families/homevisiting/ [http://perma.cc/K7KY-K9Z7] (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2017). 
 201. See, e.g., Research, Providence Talks, http://www.providencetalks.org/research/ 
[http://perma.cc/6X69-9YGZ] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017). 
 202. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 763 (E.D. Mich.) (relying on 
testimony from demographer Gary Gates that 5,300 children in Michigan were being 
raised by same-sex couples), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 
921, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing a study by the Williams Institute for the proposition that 
eighteen percent of same-sex couples in California are raising children), aff’d sub nom. 
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 
(relying on demographic data in an amicus brief showing that married same-sex couples 
experience economic advantages that unmarried same-sex couples do not). 
Statistics can, of course, be subject to contest. For further discussion of counting 
families headed by same-sex parents, see Gary J. Gates & Michael D. Steinberger, Same-Sex 
Unmarried Partner Couples in the American Community Survey: The Role of 
Misreporting, Miscoding and Misallocation 13–21 (May 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://economics-files.pomona.edu/steinberger/research/Gates_Steinberger_ACS_ 
Miscode_May2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/3LY6-ZGGP] (demonstrating that the U.S. 
Census both undercounts and overcounts children raised by same-sex parents). For an 
acknowledgement of the difference in counting same-sex couples raising children 
versus families headed by an LGBT parent, who may be single, see Same-Sex Couple and 
LGBT Demographic Data Interactive, Williams Inst. (May 2016), http:// 
williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/visualization/lgbt-stats/?topic=LGBT#demographic [http:// 
perma.cc/NE7G-MFLU]. 
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the relationship between race and child maltreatment203 or family struc-
ture and child outcomes.204 
Similarly, the quality of empirical evidence used in family law ranges 
broadly. Sometimes evidentiary standards sufficiently screen for quality, 
such as the trial courts’ rejection of some of the evidence introduced by 
supporters of different-sex marriage requirements.205 But sometimes 
courts, especially family courts, use evidence that falls far short of 
scientific standards, such as the invocation of parental alienation 
syndrome.206 And both courts and legislatures can use evidence that is 
politically motivated and highly selective, such as the finding that women 
who terminate a pregnancy experience depression and other mental 
health side effects.207 
Beyond these differences, decisionmakers use empirical evidence in 
a variety of ways. In litigation, judges typically use empirical evidence to 
establish what Professor Kenneth Culp Davis famously, if somewhat 
confusingly, called legislative facts.208 These are not facts found by the 
legislature (or facts about legislatures) but rather background social facts 
about the world used to decide broad questions of law and policy.209 The 
                                                                                                                           
 203. See Annie E. Casey Found., Disparities and Disproportionality in Child Welfare: 
Analysis of the Research 7 (2011), http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/AECF-
DisparitiesAndDisproportionalityInChildWelfare-2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/G9VV-EUC7] 
(conducting a meta-analysis examining the correlation between race and child 
maltreatment);  Andrea J. Sedlak et al., U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Supplementary 
Analyses of Race Differences in Child Maltreatment Rates in the NIS-4, at 4 (2010), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/nis4_supp_analysis_race_diff_mar2010.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/QJJ2-H9XE] (offering potential explanations for the NIS-4’s finding of a 
correlation between race and child maltreatment). 
 204. See supra text accompanying notes 112–117. 
 205. See supra text accompanying note 105. 
 206. See supra text accompanying notes 161–169. 
 207. See supra text accompanying notes 131–135; infra text accompanying notes 291–
294. 
 208. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the 
Administrative Process, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 402–03 (1942) [hereinafter Davis, Problems 
of Evidence] (distinguishing legislative and adjudicative facts); Laurens Walker & John 
Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 Va. L. Rev. 559, 
561–71 (1987) (describing a “social framework” role for empirical evidence: using it to 
evaluate a contested issue in a case, such as the reliability of the testimony of a specific 
eyewitness, by providing a broader context for understanding the reliability of eyewitness 
testimony generally). 
 209. See Davis, Problems of Evidence, supra note 208, at 402–03. Courts can consider 
evidence outside the record to establish legislative facts, but it is often the plaintiffs who 
introduce the evidence. Advocates deploy empirical evidence to establish legislative facts, 
such as introducing evidence about the economic benefits of marriage, and to establish 
adjudicative facts, such as introducing evidence about Shaken Baby Syndrome to show that 
a particular child was injured by a parent. See supra text accompanying note 97; infra text 
accompanying notes 283–287. Advocates also use empirical evidence to undermine an 
opponent’s case, such as the plaintiffs in the marriage equality cases presenting empirical 
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use of empirical evidence to adjudicate legislative facts is not new. From 
the Brandeis brief to the doll study in Brown v. Board of Education,210 
courts have looked to empirical evidence for this purpose.211 
In family law, legislative facts deeply influence judicial deter-
minations of rights. When a court finds, based on empirical evidence, 
that children raised by same-sex parents have similar outcomes as 
children raised by different-sex parents, this legislative fact informs the 
court’s judgment about the state’s purported rationale in limiting 
marriage to different-sex couples.212 When a court finds, based on 
empirical evidence, that witnessing intimate partner violence can be 
harmful to children but that foster care presents its own harm, these 
legislative facts help the court assess the constitutionality of policies 
removing children from homes with intimate partner violence.213 In a 
variety of contexts, then, social science and hard science inform judicial 
understandings of the implications of legal rules or the underlying 
conditions giving rise to familial conflicts. 
Legislative facts differ from adjudicative facts, which are case-specific 
facts about the parties before the court.214 Courts regularly use empirical 
evidence to establish adjudicative facts as well. Thus, when the Court 
applied the undue burden test in Whole Woman’s Health, it dissected the 
evidence about the actual effects of the restrictions at issue on the 
availability of abortion in Texas.215 
In legislatures, lawmakers also establish facts, although these are 
generally called legislative findings, not facts. Lawmakers use empirical 
evidence to establish legislative priorities, understand the contours of a 
                                                                                                                           
evidence about child outcomes to show that bias, not a concern about child well-being, 
animated the different-sex marriage requirement. See supra text accompanying notes 96–
100. 
 210. See 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.11 (1954) (“Whatever may have been the extent of 
psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, [the finding that children of 
color are harmed educationally and psychologically by segregation] is amply supported by 
modern authority.”); Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of 
Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality 315–40 (1975) (describing the efforts 
of the plaintiffs to build their social science case in the trial court and the difficulty of 
showing that psychological harm stemmed from legal segregation and not prejudice more 
broadly). 
 211. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 931, 933–40 
(1980) (arguing empirical evidence—as it relates to legislative facts—influences 
constitutional reasoning). Examples include the use of evidence about group size and 
decisionmaking to determine the constitutionality of a five-person jury, evidence on 
pornography and illegal behavior to uphold a zoning regulation, and evidence about the 
availability of contraceptives and early sexual activity to uphold a law restricting access to 
birth control for minors. Id. 
 212. See supra section I.B.1.a. 
 213. See supra section I.B.1.c. 
 214. See Davis, Problems of Evidence, supra note 208, at 402–03. 
 215. See supra text accompanying notes 127–130. 
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given social problem, and divine possible links between policy tools and 
preferred outcomes.216 
Administrative agencies use empirical evidence to develop and 
implement policies. When an agency decides on a priority, or im-
plements a state mandate, it turns to empirical evidence to guide the 
policy choices. The Mayor’s Office in Providence used research on effect-
ive early childhood interventions to design the program elements of 
Providence Talks.217 Administrative agencies also use empirical evidence 
to distribute resources. When deciding how to allocate caseworker time 
in the child welfare system, predictive analytics directs attention to the 
highest-risk cases.218 And, finally, administrative agencies use empirical 
evidence to evaluate the effectiveness of their efforts. Intervention 
programs, for instance, now regularly incorporate evaluation mech-
anisms.219 
This description of the empirical turn is not to claim that legal 
actors are using only empirical evidence across family law’s institutions. 
Moreover, when legal actors use empirical evidence, they can do so for a 
variety of reasons, as elaborated below.220 But there is no doubt that 
family law has embraced empirical evidence, a turn that has considerable 
upsides and downsides, as the next Part explores. 
II. THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF AN EMPIRICAL FAMILY LAW 
Family law can and should draw on the wealth of research on 
families. There are numerous advantages to an empirically based family 
law, and this Part briefly outlines these benefits. But there are also 
substantial bases for concern. Beyond the common problems of 
reliability and translation by legal actors, there are fundamental concerns 
about the multiple ways empirical evidence skews decisionmaking. As this 
Part argues in detail, empirical evidence focuses attention on the 
outcomes of legal rules, not competing values. It provides political cover 
for the value judgments that are made. And it risks replicating historical 
discrimination against nondominant families. 
                                                                                                                           
 216. There is considerable literature about the comparative institutional competence 
of legislatures, as compared with courts, to gather facts. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & 
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 886–87, 920–25 
(2003) (comparing the institutional capacities of courts and legislatures). 
 217. See supra text accompanying note 198. 
 218. See supra text accompanying note 188. 
 219. See Flowers, supra note 34, at 192–95 (discussing various means of evaluating 
collected data and of implementing insights). 
 220. See infra section II.B.2.b. 
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A. The Benefits of Evidence-Based Family Law 
At the most basic level, family law and policies should draw on a well-
informed understanding of family life. A periodic, congressionally 
mandated study of the incidence of child maltreatment, for example, 
illuminates the risk factors for child abuse and neglect. That study found 
that children in families with low socioeconomic status experience seven 
times the rate of neglect as children in families with higher 
socioeconomic status.221 This is a critical starting point for addressing and 
attempting to reduce the incidence of child neglect. 
More specifically, a rigorous, research-based approach to family law 
helps the government be more effective in its efforts, giving legal actors a 
clearer sense of where legal inputs might yield particular social 
outcomes. A recent study, for example, found that providing legal 
counsel to victims of intimate partner violence had substantial benefits: 
Over time, women reported substantially less physical violence in their 
lives, improved psychological well-being, and increased income.222 
Another example is groundbreaking work by economists Raj Chetty and 
                                                                                                                           
 221. See Andrea J. Sedlak et al., U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., Fourth National 
Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect (NIS-4): Report to Congress 12 (2010), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/nis4_report_exec_summ_pdf_jan2010.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/EXU5-83KW]. 
 222. See Carolyn Copps Hartley & Lynette M. Renner, The Longer-Term Influence of 
Civil Legal Services on Battered Women 7–8, 52–62 (2016), http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/249879.pdf [http://perma.cc/3PFU-HZTY]. As explored in section 
II.B, there are often questions about a study’s methodology and thus its relevance to legal 
debates. In this study, for example, the researchers could not, for both ethical and 
methodological reasons, use a control group. See id. at 30 (explaining that it would be 
unethical to assign some victims to a no-treatment group when the victims are facing 
imminent and significant danger). The researchers thus used a panel-study method, 
comparing the same group over time. See id. 
A related benefit is that empirical evidence informs both academic and policy 
debates. An empirical study of the impact of burdens of proof in child protection cases, 
for example, demonstrated that increasing the standard of proof decreased the number of 
substantiated reports, primarily affecting cases that were difficult to prove. See Nicholas E. 
Kahn, Josh Gupta-Kagan & Mary Eschelbach Hansen, The Standard of Proof in the 
Substantiation of Child Abuse and Neglect, 14 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 333, 356–57 
(2017). Similarly, the sociological research identifying a typology of intimate partner 
violence, see Michael P. Johnson, A Typology of Domestic Violence: Intimate Terrorism, 
Violent Resistance, and Situational Couple Violence (2008), has led to a sustained debate 
about both the typology itself, see Meier, Johnson’s Differentiation Theory, supra note 10, 
at 4, 6, 12–16 (arguing Johnson’s data do not support his typology or his claim that 
intimate terrorism is a rare phenomenon and identifying flaws in the research and 
conclusions), and the typology’s legal consequences, see Nancy Ver Steegh, Differentiating 
Types of Domestic Violence: Implications for Child Custody, 65 La. L. Rev. 1379, 1384–414 
(2005) (contemplating the effect of Johnson’s research on state intervention, particularly 
on allocating resources and determining child custody). In short, empirical work provides 
an important grounding for law-reform debates. 
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Emmanuel Saez on economic mobility.223 Their work has unearthed 
specific factors—particularly racial segregation, concentrated poverty, 
and a lack of transportation infrastructure—that deeply influence eco-
nomic mobility.224 The research shows the positive benefits of some 
government efforts, such as the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s Moving to Opportunity program, which helps families 
move from areas of high poverty to more mixed-income, higher-
opportunity neighborhoods.225 
Relatedly, empirical evidence can guide state investments, 
promoting the more efficient and effective use of scarce resources. 
Economist James Heckman has shown that investing in early childhood is 
far more cost effective for producing desirable long-term outcomes, such 
as high school graduation rates and adult earnings, than investments 
later in childhood and in adult training programs.226 At the federal level, 
President Obama was a leader in using empirical evidence to evaluate 
governmental programs, determining which were supported by evidence 
and which were not and, thus, should be changed or defunded.227 
Obama ran into political resistance as well as bureaucratic inertia when 
he tried to drop programs,228 but he was successful in supporting new 
programs with a strong evidence bases, such as teen pregnancy 
prevention efforts.229 As this example demonstrates, empirical evidence 
does not necessarily overcome entrenched interests and political 
preferences, but it can structure the debate about state policies and 
investments in families and children. 
                                                                                                                           
 223. How Can We Improve Economic Opportunities for Our Children? We Use Big 
Data to Identify New Pathways to Upward Mobility, Equal. of Opportunity Project, http:// 
www.equality-of-opportunity.org/ [http://perma.cc/M6H9-BTET] (last visited Sept. 11, 
2017). 
 224. See Raj Chetty et al., Where is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of 
Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129 Q.J. Econ. 1553, 1554–62, 1586–620 
(2014). 
 225. See Raj Chetty et al., The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on 
Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106 Am. Econ. Rev. 
855, 870–76 (2016). 
 226. See James J. Heckman, Giving Kids a Fair Chance 5–6, 13–41 (2013). 
 227. See Ron Haskins & Greg Margolis, Show Me the Evidence: Obama’s Fight for 
Rigor and Results in Social Policy 2–30 (2015) (explaining the Obama Administration’s 
policy of evaluating social intervention programs on the basis of rigorous evidence). 
 228. See Ron Haskins & Jon Baron, The Obama Administration’s Evidence-Based Social 
Policy Initiatives: An Overview, in Evidence for Social Policy and Practice 28, 28–29 (2011), 
http://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/evidence_for_social_policy_and_practice.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/QHX4-ZC4A] (observing that, even when an empirical evaluation finds 
a program to be ineffective, “it does not follow that the Administration or Congress will 
take action”). 
 229. See Haskins & Margolis, supra note 227, at 67–101 (explaining the Obama 
Administration’s approach to reducing teen pregnancy). 
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Empirical evidence can also justify state intervention in families, 
overcoming the basic rule of family autonomy. The child welfare system, 
for example, is predicated on the empirically grounded understanding 
that child abuse and neglect are harmful to children.230 Similarly, legal 
rules and policies around intimate partner violence are based on the 
knowledge that intimate partner violence has significant and far-reaching 
negative consequences both for individuals and society more broadly.231 
Additionally, drawing on empirical evidence can help unmask 
prejudice and help dislodge stereotypes. A persistent cultural image is 
the dysfunctional Black family and particularly the absent Black father.232 
Recent empirical evidence, both qualitative and quantitative, challenges 
this stereotype. As compared with white and Latino men, Black men who 
do not live with their children are more likely to maintain better co-
parenting relationships with the mothers of their children and more 
likely to be involved with their children.233 Another example is the de-
biasing evidence produced in the marriage equality cases. In Perry, one of 
the proponents of California’s constitutional amendment was the 
secretary of the America Return to God Prayer Movement, which 
operated a website containing statements urging people to vote for the 
amendment because “homosexuals are twelve times more likely to molest 
children.”234 The trial court used evidence introduced at trial to rebut 
                                                                                                                           
 230. See Weithorn, supra note 67, at 55–60 (describing the work of Henry Kempe 
establishing Battered Child Syndrome and the role of this research in spurring the 
creation of the modern child welfare system). 
 231. S. Rep. No. 103-138, pt. 3, at 41–42 (1993) (citing evidence about the rate of 
intimate partner violence and the ensuing cost and noting that “we spend $5 to $10 billion 
a year on health care, criminal justice, and other social costs of domestic violence”). 
 232. See Office of Policy Planning & Research, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Negro 
Family: The Case for National Action 5, 47 (1965), http://web.stanford.edu/~mrosenfe/ 
Moynihan%27s%20The%20Negro%20Family.pdf [http://perma.cc/2SMA-6M6R] (arguing 
measures such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were insufficient to assure African Americans 
full participation in society and partly blaming “the deterioration of the Negro family” on 
its “tangle of pathology . . . capable of perpetuating itself without assistance from the white 
world although also noting the large context of “three centuries of injustice”). 
 233. See Kathryn Edin & Timothy J. Nelson, Doing the Best I Can: Fatherhood in the 
Inner City 215 (2013) (“[O]ur black fathers are more involved than the white fathers are 
with their children, especially when the kids are younger.”); Marcia J. Carlson et al., 
Coparenting and Nonresident Fathers’ Involvement with Young Children After a 
Nonmarital Birth, 45 Demography 461, 473 (2008) (finding, among nonresident fathers, 
Black men were more likely than white or Hispanic men to have maintained contact with 
their children); Robert I. Lerman, Capabilities and Contributions of Unwed Fathers, 
Future Child., Fall 2010, at 63, 64, 75 (“Black fathers are more likely than white and 
Hispanic fathers to maintain close contact with their children, especially in cases when the 
father neither marries nor cohabits with the mother.”). 
 234. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing trial 
transcript pages 1919–22), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), 
vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); see also 
id. at 982–83 (using evidence to refute the stereotypes “that gays and lesbians are affluent, 
 
270 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 118:227 
 
this and other stereotypes.235 Similarly, trial courts used the Daubert test 
to dismiss expert testimony that was rooted in prejudice rather than 
scientifically grounded empirical evidence.236 
Finally, an empirically based family law helps provide a counter-
weight to politically fraught battles over family regulation. Overwhelming 
evidence has shown that childhood vaccines promote individual as well as 
communal health.237 There are risks for individual children,238 but there 
is no credible evidence that vaccines during early childhood cause 
widespread harm among children or that vaccines contribute to 
conditions such as autism.239 Based on this evidence, professional groups, 
such as the American Academy of Pediatricians, have stated their 
unqualified support for vaccinating young children.240 Empirical 
evidence does not easily combat motivated cognition,241 and thus, it has 
                                                                                                                           
self-absorbed and incapable of forming long-term intimate relationships” and that they are 
“disease vectors or . . . child molesters who recruit young children into homosexuality”). 
 235. See id. at 982–85 (finding no evidence to support this stereotype). 
 236. See id. at 948 (rejecting expert testimony of think tank founder David 
Blankenhorn because “nothing in the record other than the ‘bald assurance’ of 
Blankenhorn suggests that Blankenhorn’s investigation into marriage has been conducted 
to the ‘same level of intellectual rigor’ characterizing the practice of anthropologists, 
sociologists or psychologists” (first quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 43 F.3d 1311, 
1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (on remand); then quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 
137, 152 (1999))). 
 237. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Why Are Childhood Vaccines So 
Important?, Vaccines & Immunizations, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/howvpd.htm 
[http://perma.cc/928E-7EQZ] (last updated Aug. 18, 2017) (explaining that vaccines 
have prevented countless cases of diseases and saved millions of lives). 
 238. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Who Should NOT Get Vaccinated with These 
Vaccines?, Vaccines & Preventable Diseases, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd/should-not-
vacc.html [http://perma.cc/3S5Q-DRY2] (last updated May 8, 2017) (specifying circumstances 
in which certain children should not be vaccinated, often because of allergies or underlying 
medical conditions). 
 239. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Vaccines Do Not Cause Autism, Vaccine 
Safety, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/concerns/autism.html [http://perma.cc/9YKE-
R9ZG] (last updated Nov. 23, 2015). 
 240. Karen Remley, American Academy of Pediatrics Reiterates Safety and Importance 
of Vaccines, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.aap.org/ 
en-us/about-the-aap/aap-press-room/pages/American-Academy-of-Pediatrics-Reiterates-
Safety-and-Importance-of-Vaccines.aspx [http://perma.cc/R7KJ-ZAWQ]. 
 241. See Emily Balcetis & David Dunning, See What You Want to See: Motivational 
Influences on Visual Perception, 91 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 612, 612–13 (2006) 
(describing the literature finding that people perceive the world around them, including 
factual information, in a manner that is consistent with their beliefs); Cultural Cognition 
Project at Yale Law School, http://www.culturalcognition.net/ [http://perma.cc/NP8A-5U8Y] 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2017) (“Cultural cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to 
conform their beliefs about disputed matters of fact (e.g., whether humans are causing global 
warming; whether the death penalty deters murder; whether gun control makes society more 
safe or less) to values that define their cultural identities.”). For an example in family law, see 
The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, Cultural Cognition of Gay and Lesbian 
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not necessarily changed the minds of those vehemently opposed to 
childhood vaccines.242 Nor does evidence always overcome political 
preferences.243 But the empirical evidence has helped sway public policy, 
with states such as California tightening grounds for legal exemptions.244 
More broadly, the widespread availability of data and work in behavioral 
economics and other fields showing that human decisionmaking is prone 
to multiple biases has encouraged the use of empirical evidence and 
data-driven decisionmaking.245 The reliance in the public, private, and 
nonprofit sectors on data, algorithms, and so on is an attempt to correct 
for these biases and imperfections. In short, empirical evidence holds the 
potential—even if it does not always deliver—to help depoliticize debates 
and focus attention on workable solutions.246 
B. The Empirical Turn in Critical Perspective 
Despite the many benefits of an empirically based family law, there 
are also significant concerns. This section draws on the larger literature 
about evidence-based and data-driven decisionmaking to identify and 
explore what is concerning and fraught about the empirical turn in 
family law.247 This section identifies threshold concerns about the quality 
                                                                                                                           
Parenting: Summary of First Round Data Collection 16 [hereinafter Cultural Cognition 
Project Study], http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/386437/4705742/1264041920357/ 
Stage+1+Report.pdf?token=s1fuz1P6cvBYibVBP2pLhKH7oBQ%3D [http://perma.cc/5A5D-
RSZT] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) (“A majority of Americans say that their position on gay 
and lesbian adoption is centered on the welfare of children. However, few say they would 
change their minds if shown convincing contrary evidence.”). 
 242. See, e.g., Autism and the Vaccine Debate, Focus for Health, http:// 
www.focusforhealth.org/autism-and-vaccine-debate/ [http://perma.cc/5C45-ZUXC] (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2017) (“The debate over whether or not vaccines contribute to the 
development of autism is far from settled.”). 
 243. See Shear et al., supra note 14 (describing how then-President-Elect Trump met 
with Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., a vaccine skeptic, and asked him to lead a commission on 
vaccine safety). 
 244. See S.B. 277, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (describing the new law as 
“eliminat[ing] the exemption from existing specified immunization requirements based 
upon personal beliefs”). 
 245. See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 3–15 (2011) (showing how 
human decisionmaking reflects multiple, predictable biases); Mayer-Schönberger & 
Cukier, supra note 182, at 6–18 (discussing the role of big data in “humankind’s quest to 
quantify and understand the world”). 
 246. For another example, see Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal 
Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 167, 184–91 (2015) [hereinafter 
Huntington, Postmarital Family Law] (describing the debate about child outcomes and 
family structure and analyzing the growing evidence that family structure itself, and not 
just poverty and other characteristics that often accompany nonmarital childbearing, 
contribute to worse child outcomes). 
 247. See, e.g., Joel Best, Damned Lies and Statistics: Untangling Numbers from the 
Media, Politicians, and Activists 32 (2001) (explaining many statistics are produced 
inaccurately, by guessing or by relying on flawed sampling, measurements, or definitions); 
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of research and the ability of legal actors to use empirical evidence. 
These concerns are not particularly new, and this section thus describes 
these problems expeditiously. The section then turns to the heart of the 
Essay, arguing that even in a world of perfect information, with legal 
actors well trained in the use of evidence, the empirical turn can 
influence decisionmaking in troubling ways. 
1. Reliability and Translation. — Much empirical evidence on the 
family is less reliable than a casual observer might conclude. The most 
fundamental question is whether empirical evidence on families—
especially social scientific evidence—satisfies basic scientific norms. 
Methodological concerns are rife. As noted in the marriage equality deci-
sions, many studies on the family use small convenience samples and not 
large cross-sections of the population.248 Further, because of ethical 
concerns, subjects are not randomly assigned to control and intervention 
groups. It would be unethical, for example, to remove some children 
from homes that are perceived to pose a threat to the child’s physical 
safety and leave another group of children in homes with the same 
perceived threat level. Hence, when researchers compare outcomes for 
children placed in foster care and children left at home, they are not 
comparing similar groups.249 
By contrast, when the state offers a limited benefit—say, spaces in a 
Head Start program—it can randomly assign participants. But even then, 
and again for ethical reasons, the state will often recommend that 
families in the control group receive another kind of intervention. This is 
indeed what happened with the Head Start studies and may be one 
reason why these studies show a modest impact for Head Start—the 
comparison was not between Head Start and no preschool but rather 
                                                                                                                           
Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and 
Threatens Democracy 7–8, 10, 12 (2016) (arguing “weapons of math destruction” are self-
perpetuating models that work in bulk, are relied upon despite the fact that they are 
prone to error, and affect a range of decisions, including advertising and prison 
sentencing). For one of the foundational critiques of empiricism within law, see Lee 
Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 6–7, 23, 87, 125–27, 
131, 211–12 (2002) (arguing legal scholars often do not follow the same rules of inference 
as are used in the social and natural sciences, give “over-confident” conclusions, fail to 
address selection biases, exclude reliability analyses, lack blind peer-review and 
documentation of data sources, and rely on improper random sampling). 
 248. See supra text accompanying note 114. The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing 
Study is a notable exception. See infra text accompanying notes 272–274. 
 249. For a discussion of these challenges, see Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Causal Effects of 
Foster Care: An Instrumental-Variables Approach, 35 Child. & Youth Servs. Rev. 1143, 
1143–44 (2013). Researchers try to account for this in a variety of ways. See, e.g., id. 
(describing the possibility of testing the causal effects of removal by using the natural 
experiment of varying removal recommendations among caseworkers and finding that, for 
marginal cases, foster care placement is associated with higher juvenile delinquency rates 
later in life and no corresponding increase in child safety). 
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between Head Start and a different program.250 There are numerous 
other reasons family research may be less reliable than some other areas 
of research.251 
Another problem potentially compromising reliability is bias. 
Empirical evidence carries a mantle of objectivity, but despite the 
availability of clear research standards,252 studies are not always neutral 
explorations of the world of families.253 This bias can come from multiple 
sources. When research is funded by an entity with a stake in the answer, 
this vested interest casts a shadow over the research.254 Further, a 
researcher can influence a study if the researcher has an ideological 
commitment—sometimes acknowledged, sometimes unacknowledged—
                                                                                                                           
 250. See U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., Head Start Impact Study Final Report, at iii–v 
(2010), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/executive_summary_final.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/YY6C-7G5X] (noting that sixty percent of the children in the control 
group were enrolled in some kind of group program and describing the impact of Head 
Start but also noting that the effects largely did not persist into the school years). Indeed, 
when researchers study the impact of early childhood programs as a whole, there are 
marked benefits, both in the short and long term. See Lynn A. Karoly, M. Rebecca Kilburn 
& Jill S. Cannon, Early Childhood Interventions: Proven Results, Future Promise 55–78, 
128–29 (2005). 
 251. See Robert E. Emery et al., “Bending” Evidence for a Cause: Scholar-Advocacy 
Bias in Family Law, 54 Fam. Ct. Rev. 134, 135, 141–44 (2016) [hereinafter Emery et al., 
“Bending” Evidence] (noting there are relatively few family researchers and thus relatively 
few studies overall and discussing the debate about overnight visits for very young 
children, which turned on only four studies); Irwin Sandler et al., Convenient and 
Inconvenient Truths in Family Law: Preventing Scholar-Advocacy Bias in the Use of Social 
Science Research for Public Policy, 54 Fam. Ct. Rev. 150, 151 (2016) (“[A] major 
limitation on the use of research to shape policy and practice in the family law field is the 
paucity of research evidence that is sufficiently replicated and based on valid methodology 
to have clear and unambiguous implications for practice and policy . . . .”). 
 252. See Emery et al., “Bending” Evidence, supra note 251, at 136 (noting that in 
social science scholarship “the scholar’s purpose is to be, insofar as possible, self-aware and 
critical about prior assumptions, personal values, and biases, willing to subject hypotheses 
to rigorous inquiry and falsifiable tests, and prepared to consider alternative 
interpretations of the data”). 
 253. In addition to the problems identified in the text, data can be flawed. See Solon 
Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 671, 684 
(2016) (describing the ways “institutions might maintain systematically less accurate, 
precise, timely, and complete records for certain classes of people” and noting that 
“[e]ven a dataset with individual records of consistently high quality can suffer from 
statistical biases that fail to represent different groups in accurate proportions”); see also 
Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 535, 546 (2014) (“Data is often 
deeply infused with the subjective judgments of those who collect and organize it.”). 
 254. This was an issue in the marriage equality context, with the trial court in DeBoer 
discounting one of the central studies relied upon by the defendants because it had been 
funded by a party seeking to show children benefited when raised by different-sex parents. 
See DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (E.D. Mich.), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 
2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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that seeps into the study design and the interpretation of the results.255 A 
controversial example is research on family preservation efforts for 
children at risk of foster care placement. Some scholars contend this 
research has an ideological bias in favor of family preservation, which, in 
turn, influences the result.256 
Researchers also bring cultural biases around race and class to their 
research, which can influence the focus of inquiry, study design, and the 
interpretation of data. Research on parenting, for example, usually 
follows a taxonomy of parenting styles: authoritarian, authoritative, 
permissive, and disengaged.257 This taxonomy, however, is based on 
white, middle-class families and does not incorporate a style of parenting 
more associated with Black women—strict but nurturing.258 Once 
identified, researchers could determine that this style of parenting is 
correlated with positive outcomes for children, but before it was 
acknowledged, this style of parenting was subsumed under the more 
pathologized model of authoritarian parenting.259 In this way, 
researchers can interpret some behavior as pathological rather than 
merely adaptive or a different way of flourishing. 
This cultural myopia can profoundly affect research. The influential 
Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study, which largely studied 
white, middle-class individuals, found a correlation between family-based 
                                                                                                                           
 255. See Emery et al., “Bending” Evidence, supra note 251, at 134, 141–44 (coining 
the term scholar-advocacy bias, defined “as the intentional or unintentional use of the 
language, methods, and approaches of social science research, as well as one’s status as an 
expert, for the purpose and/or outcome of legitimizing advocacy claims at the cost of 
misrepresenting research findings”). For an example of this critique, see Ummni Khan, 
Antiprostitution Feminism and the Surveillance of Sex Industry Clients, in Feminist 
Surveillance Studies 189, 193–202 (Rachel E. Dubrofsky & Shoshana Amielle Magnet eds., 
2015) (describing this problem in research on sex workers conducted by those with an 
antiprostitution bias). 
 256. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Thoughts on the Liberal Dilemma in Child Welfare 
Reform, 24 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 725, 726–27 (2016) (critiquing the “corrupt policy-
research merger” and contending that some researchers choose programs, such as family 
preservation, that reflect the researchers’ values and then set out “not to test, but instead 
to prove the programs’ efficacy” in an effort to persuade policymakers to adopt the 
preferred program). 
 257. See Diana Baumrind, The Development of Instrumental Competence Through 
Socialization, in 7 Minnesota Symposia on Child Psychology 3, 13–14 (Anne D. Pick ed., 
1973) (describing the taxonomy of parenting styles); see also Jeanne Brooks-Gunn & Lisa 
B. Markman, The Contribution of Parenting to Ethnic and Racial Gaps in School 
Readiness, Future Child., Spring 2005, at 139, 148 (applying Baumrind’s scheme to Black 
mothers). 
 258. See Brooks-Gunn & Markman, supra note 257, at 148 (noting that studies have 
found that Black mothers more frequently exhibit “tough love” parenting styles than do 
white mothers). 
 259. See id. 
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trauma and abuse and long-term health.260 But when researchers 
conducted follow-up studies with a more diverse population, they found 
that other childhood traumas, including experiencing discrimination, 
living in an unsafe neighborhood, and witnessing community violence, 
were also highly predictive of long-term health.261 The original study did 
not account for these consequences of structural racism and inequality, 
which affect low-income youth and youth of color, and thus did not fully 
capture the adverse circumstances of some children’s lives.262 
Relatedly, researchers—intentionally or not—can frame research to 
confirm preexisting beliefs rather than to challenge them. For example, 
a persistent question in welfare policy is whether providing low-income 
families with material support will encourage these families to have 
additional children.263 Researchers typically do not, however, ask middle-
income families whether the availability of public education or the larger 
houses enabled by the home mortgage-interest deduction encourage 
them to have more children. It might be that these middle-class parents 
are indeed responding to such incentives. This would show that families 
across the income spectrum respond to governmental incentives and 
subsidies, but the failure to pose the question across class lines skews 
public policy. Only low-income families are assumed to possess path-
ologies that need to be tamed. 
                                                                                                                           
 260. Vincent J. Felitti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household 
Dysfunction to Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults: The Adverse Childhood 
Experiences (ACE) Study, 14 Am. J. Preventive Med. 245, 251 (1998). 
 261. See Peter F. Cronholm et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences: Expanding the 
Concept of Adversity, 49 Am. J. Preventive Med. 354, 355 (2015) (noting other 
community-level factors associated with long-term health); David Finkelhor et al., 
Improving the Adverse Childhood Experiences Study Scale, 167 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 
Pediatrics 70, 70–71 (2013) (“Among the predictors missing from the ACE Study model 
are peer rejection, exposure to violence outside the family, low socioeconomic status, and 
poor academic performance.”); see also Nancy E. Dowd, Straight Out of Compton: 
Developmental Equality and a Critique of the Compton School Litigation, 45 Cap. U. L. 
Rev. 199, 235–45 (2017) (exploring this research and its implications for law). 
 262. More broadly, some of the foundational research on child development was 
conducted using only white children. See Guthrie, supra note 62, at 50–52; Nancy E. 
Dowd, Black Boys Matter: Developmental Equality, 45 Hofstra L. Rev. 47, 59–61 (2016) 
(describing this research and its built-in biases). 
 263. This concern is reflected in family cap provisions, which limit welfare benefits to 
existing children. At least nineteen states have such provisions. Welfare Reform: Family Cap 
Policies, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/human-services/welfare-reform-family-cap-policies.aspx [http://perma.cc/9UWU-
UMTC]. For example, in California until January 2017, if a child was born to a woman who 
had been receiving assistance for the ten previous months, the woman could not receive 
additional support for the child unless the pregnancy was the result of rape, incest, or 
“conceived as a result of contraceptive failure if the parent was using an intrauterine 
device, a Norplant, or the sterilization of either parent.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 
§ 11450.04(b)(3) (repealed 2017). 
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A different element of reliability is whether the data are complete. It 
is important to ask which groups are not included in a study. Family 
scholars in multiple disciplines routinely rely on data from the American 
Time Use Survey (ATUS).264 Conducted by the U.S. Department of 
Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, the ATUS measures the amount of 
time participants spend doing specified activities, including paid labor, 
childcare, housework, and leisure activities.265 The data are collected 
through phone interviews.266 The Bureau of Labor Statistics tries to 
include families without telephones by sending letters to their addresses 
and providing a toll-free number for individuals to call,267 but it is not 
surprising that the survey radically underrepresents people on the 
margins of society.268 ATUS thus gives an incomplete picture of American 
families. 
There is a limit to what is known and, more fundamentally, what is 
knowable.269 Much social science research, especially on the family, 
cannot account for all the variables affecting outcomes. There is over-
whelming evidence that children raised by married parents have better 
outcomes than children raised in any other family structure.270 Once 
factors that are correlated with family structure are taken into account, 
particularly income and parental education, the differences are far less 
pronounced.271 But even then, there remains a gap. The lead researchers 
of the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study hypothesize that family 
structure plays a causal role in child outcomes because nonmarital 
families experience higher levels of relationship instability and multi-
partner fertility; these factors contribute to worse outcomes because the 
relationship stress associated with changing partners negatively affects 
                                                                                                                           
 264. See, e.g., Suzanne M. Bianchi et al., Changing Rhythms of American Family Life 
174, 223 (2006) (indicating that the study considered “time diaries” that were collected as 
part of the ATUS). 
 265. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
http://www.bls.gov/tus/atusfaqs.htm#1 [http://perma.cc/SC6B-23PN] (last visited Sept. 11, 
2017). 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
268. See Katharine G. Abraham et al., Nonresponse in the American Time Use Survey: 
Who Is Missing from the Data and How Much Does It Matter?, 70 Pub. Opinion Q. 676, 
678, 697–98 (2006) (analyzing respondents and finding that people who are weakly 
integrated into the community are less likely to participate, largely because they are not 
contacted). 
 269. See Emery et al., “Bending” Evidence, supra note 251, at 135 (“Given the broad 
reach of family law, the rare use of random assignment studies (the ‘gold standard’ of 
scientific research), and the relatively small number of studies (and researchers) in the 
field, the ultimate empirical truth regarding many family law controversies often is ‘more 
research is needed.’”). 
 270. See Huntington, Failure to Flourish, supra note 64, at 31–34 (discussing child 
outcomes and parental marital status). 
 271. See id. at 37. 
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parenting.272 But even accounting for this causal role of family structure, 
the question about the full impact of family structure on child outcomes 
is partly unanswerable. After controlling for observable characteristics, 
there may be other, nonobservable characteristics that affect both family 
structure and outcomes. A person with strong interpersonal skills might 
choose to get married and stay married, and this kind of person might 
also be a more effective parent. This separate characteristic would drive 
the family structure and the child outcome, but it is difficult for an 
outside researcher to identify this characteristic.273 Researchers try to 
account for this selection bias in a number of different ways, but there is 
no easy way around the problem.274 
Finally, empirical evidence captures only those variables amenable to 
measurement. So much of family law and family life, however, is un-
quantifiable. Studies about child outcomes tend to focus on metrics such 
as educational progress, adult earnings, and mental and physical 
health.275 These are important aspects of a child’s life, but so too are the 
intangibles: a child’s sense of belonging, trust, and feeling loved, not to 
mention the converse of dislocation, distrust, and feeling unwanted and 
unloved.276 Family law must account for these considerations. But by 
measuring some but not all salient aspects of family life, empirical 
evidence presents an incomplete picture of the relevant factors. 
Compounding quality and reliability concerns is the reality that legal 
actors and advocates are not necessarily able to make nuanced judgments 
based on empirical evidence. This is partially about capacity—whether 
lawyers, judges, legislators, and executive branch officials have sufficient 
training to understand empirical research, including the limitations of 
most studies. As noted, research findings are often more tentative than 
                                                                                                                           
 272. See Sara S. McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, Fragile Families: Debates, Facts, and 
Solutions, in Marriage at the Crossroads: Law, Policy, and the Brave New World of Twenty-
First-Century Families 141, 151–53 (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012). 
 273. See Jane Waldfogel et al., Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing, Future Child., 
Fall 2010, at 87, 92–93 (“A common challenge in research in this area is that parents who 
are single or cohabiting may have attributes . . . that differ from those of married parents 
and that also foster adverse child and adolescent outcomes.”). 
 274. The longitudinal nature of the Fragile Families Study is an attempt to account for 
selection bias by identifying events early in a child’s life, such as a high-conflict parental 
relationship, that predate a family breakup and might separately influence the child’s 
outcomes. See Wendy Sigle-Rushton & Sara McLanahan, Father Absence and Child Well-
Being: A Critical Review, in The Future of the Family 116, 127 (Daniel P. Moynihan et al. 
eds., 2004). 
 275. See supra text accompanying notes 97–102 (describing the evidence about child 
well-being introduced in the marriage equality litigation). 
 276. See, e.g., Erik H. Erikson, Growth and Crises of the Healthy Personality, in 1 
Identity and the Life Cycle 50, 51–99 (1959) (contending that individuals develop through 
eight psychosocial stages and that each stage involves the acquisition of a virtue, including 
hope, will, purpose, competence, fidelity, love, care, and wisdom). 
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lay readers might think. Consumers of these studies, however, are not 
always aware of their contingent nature. 
Legal actors sometimes adopt policies based on incomplete or 
preliminary evidence. Early research on mandatory arrest and recidivism 
rates for perpetrators of intimate partner violence, for example, showed 
that recidivism rates decreased when police were required to arrest a 
perpetrator.277 Based on this research, many jurisdictions adopted a 
mandatory-arrest policy.278 Subsequently, numerous researchers could 
not replicate the results or found only a modest correlation.279 At least 
part of the reason was that the original study focused on a particular 
population—men who were employed and integrated into their 
communities and thus had a reputation to protect.280 The subjects of the 
subsequent studies were not employed and had less of a stake in the 
community and thus, arguably, less of an incentive to avoid arrest.281 
Even with the new evidence about the non-generalizability of the original 
research, jurisdictions have been slow to abandon mandatory-arrest 
policies, notwithstanding considerable criticism, particularly from 
communities of color, about the detrimental impact of increased police 
involvement.282 
Even when studies seem conclusive, interpretations and under-
standing of data can change over time.283 Shaken Baby Syndrome is a 
notorious example. Many parents and caregivers have been convicted of 
homicide based on seemingly settled evidence that three factors—retinal 
bleeding, bleeding in the protective layer of the brain, and brain 
swelling—are evidence that the caregiver shook the child violently and 
                                                                                                                           
 277. See Brinig, Empirical Work, supra note 11, at 1095–96 (describing this research). 
 278. See id. (“Based on Sherman’s study, the single most frequent reform these days is 
mandatory arrest.”). 
 279. See id. at 1096 (citing the subsequent research). For an excellent analysis of 
the original study and the replication efforts, see generally Christopher D. Maxwell et 
al., Nat’l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Effects of Arrest on Intimate 
Partner Violence: New Evidence from the Spouse Assault Replication Program (2001), 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/188199.pdf [http://perma.cc/S7JE-GBR5]. 
 280. Brinig, Empirical Work, supra note 11, at 1095. 
 281. See id. at 1095–96 (“When the domestic abuse offender has less stake in 
community or employer reputation, mandatory arrest may cause more rather than less 
recidivism.”). 
 282. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 741, 797–98 
(2007) (explaining how “tough-on-crime advocates could rally around domestic violence 
reform while continuing to internalize and perpetuate racial characterizations of victims 
and criminals”). 
 283. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 10–22, 164–72 
(1962) (arguing science does not develop in cumulative, measured steps and instead 
reigning paradigms—the accepted wisdom on a particular topic—ultimately become 
unstable when they are repeatedly challenged). 
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caused the child’s death.284 More recent research, however, casts serious 
doubt on the importance of these three clinical findings, instead 
suggesting that most child deaths may well have been the result of other 
causes, particularly underlying conditions or older brain injuries.285 The 
legal system is only just beginning to take note. A federal court recently 
vacated the murder conviction of a caregiver on actual innocence 
grounds, concluding that the evidence to support Shaken Baby 
Syndrome is “more an article of faith than a proposition of science.”286 
But many parents and caregivers remain in prison, convicted based on 
what may now be understood as spurious findings.287 
Perhaps in recognition of their own limited ability to understand 
empirical evidence, legal actors can be overly deferential to researchers 
and thus often do not act as competent gatekeepers. Some “science” is 
pure junk, but it can still affect the legal system—the “garbage in, 
garbage out” problem. Parental alienation syndrome, discussed above, is 
a good example. By labeling something a “syndrome,” the research takes 
on the veneer of science.288 But the underlying work does not begin to 
meet the basic standards for scientific research and has been roundly 
rejected by researchers in multiple fields.289 Even though the court 
system theoretically has a gatekeeping mechanism to check the reliability 
of this kind of research—the Daubert standard and its corollaries in state 
courts—judges do not always use this standard, especially in family 
court.290 
The gatekeeping problem is arguably worse in the legislative branch, 
in which there is no accepted practice for gathering and examining 
                                                                                                                           
 284. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Flawed Convictions: “Shaken Baby Syndrome” and 
the Inertia of Injustice 1–66 (2014); see also Eichner, supra note 169, at 273–78 
(discussing the role of pediatricians in supporting the research and legal reliance on the 
triad of symptoms). 
 285. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 284, at 17–30. 
 286. Del Prete v. Thompson, 10 F. Supp. 3d 907, 957 n.10 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
 287. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 284, at 173–93. 
 288. Professor Maxine Eichner has documented another example of this 
phenomenon. See Eichner, supra note 169, at 213 (criticizing the diagnosis of “medical 
child abuse”). As Eichner demonstrates, doctors have developed a new diagnosis of 
“medical child abuse,” defined as parents seeking supposedly unnecessary medical 
treatment, even when other doctors have ordered the treatment. Id. at 210. Based on this 
diagnosis, the child welfare system initiates child protective proceedings, which can lead to 
the removal of a child from the home, and the state sometimes brings criminal charges 
against parents. Id. at 211. Courts have accepted a diagnosis of medical child abuse as a 
distinct form of child abuse. Id. at 219. In addition to arguing that the diagnosis of 
medical child abuse violates the constitutional rights of parents to make medical decisions 
for their children, and that it circumvents the need for proving actual child abuse, Eichner 
contends that the diagnosis of medical child abuse is based on “flawed science and flawed 
medical practice.” Id. at 213. 
 289. See supra note 164. 
 290. See supra text accompanying notes 166–169. 
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empirical evidence in a manner that promotes neutrality and reliability. 
Compounding the problem, courts generally defer to legislative 
judgments, thus extending the reach of such evidence. This insulation 
and lack of accountability make the legislative process particularly 
susceptible to co-optation by political forces or incompetence. When the 
South Dakota Legislature created a task force to study abortion in the 
state,291 the process was tilted heavily in favor of finding problems with 
abortion, including the idea that abortion hurts women’s physical and 
mental health.292 The findings of the task force provided the basis for 
South Dakota’s restrictive laws on abortion,293 and the Supreme Court 
relied on them indirectly in Gonzales v. Carhart.294 
There is somewhat less concern in the administrative context 
because courts have more latitude to act as checks on administrative 
decisionmaking. If agencies do not consider all aspects of a problem, 
then courts may strike down agency action as arbitrary and capricious or, 
in formal rulemaking and formal adjudication contexts, lacking 
substantial evidence.295 These are the prevailing federal standards, and 
state standards are similar,296 but this oversight might play out differently 
at the local level because these agencies typically do not have the same 
resources as state and federal governments. Local government agencies 
are deeply involved in the operations of the child welfare system and 
other aspects of family law yet may be less likely to explore all aspects of a 
problem or have the capacity to handle empirical evidence in a careful 
and sophisticated manner.297 
                                                                                                                           
 291. See H.B. 1233, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005). 
 292. See Reva Siegel & Sarah Blustain, Mommy Dearest?, Am. Prospect, Oct. 2006, at 
22, 22–23. 
 293. See id. 
 294. See 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (citing Sandra Cano Brief, supra note 131, at 22–
24). 
 295. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (stating that a 
court may set aside an agency’s action if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law”). An agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously 
when it: 
[H]as relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation 
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so 
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of 
agency expertise. 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 296. See Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 Va. 
L. Rev. 297, 297–302 (1986) (finding states modeled their administrative laws after the 
Model State Administrative Procedure Act, which drew upon the earlier federal 
Administrative Procedure Act). 
 297. See Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 Yale L.J. 564, 618 
(2017) (arguing that “many local agencies have limited resources and lack the 
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A different concern is the difficulty of translating social science into 
legal rules. It is not always clear how to do so because of the evolving 
nature of the underlying research; because legal rules require definite 
lines, even if expressed in a standard; and because the research may be 
more equivocal, not lending itself to this kind of concrete guidance.298 
There is the further problem that empirical work does not necessarily 
point in one policy direction in light of the judgment calls and trade-offs 
inherent in lawmaking.299 For example, research on overnight visits for 
very young children has not established a clear harm to children if they 
move back and forth between parents’ homes, but it does suggest some 
reason to be concerned.300 This preliminary evidence could be used to 
argue in favor of primary custody in one parent. But it could just as easily 
be used to argue that concerns about child attachment are not so grave 
as to require sole physical custody in one parent and that, instead, other 
values, including the involvement of both parents, should shape the 
resulting doctrine.301 In short, empirical evidence often raises as many 
questions as it might answer. 
2. Facts and Values. — Beyond reliability and translation issues, 
there are three fundamental concerns: Using empirical evidence focuses 
attention on the outcomes of legal rules, avoiding debates about 
contested values; empirical evidence allows decisionmakers to cloak 
value-based judgments in seemingly neutral garb; and empirical evidence 
                                                                                                                           
independent ability to develop sophisticated technical knowledge” but bring a different 
kind of expertise in their “mediating and information-collecting function”). 
 298. For a discussion of these challenges, see Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and 
Should Not) Learn from Child Development Research, 38 Hofstra L. Rev. 13, 13–14 
(2009) (identifying concerns with the law determining children’s capacities based on 
scientific research into child development); Emery et al., “Bending” Evidence, supra note 
251, at 135–41 (highlighting a “scholar-advocacy bias” in the family law context); Terry A. 
Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 89, 145–60 (2009) (describing the limitations of using neuroscience in the 
context of juvenile justice); Joan S. Meier, Dangerous Liaisons: Social Science and Law in 
Domestic Violence Cases 1–3 (Feb. 2, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (arguing law seeks definitive answers by examining specific facts and 
discrete events whereas social science engages in ongoing inquiries to answer amorphous 
questions about human nature). 
 299. See Rachlinski, supra note 30, at 917–19 (arguing evidence-based decision-
making is an easier fit in medicine and business, which have clear goals, such as treating a 
patient effectively or maximizing profit, than in law, which is inherently political, with 
often contested and competing goals). 
 300. See Emery et al., “Bending” Evidence, supra note 251, at 141–44 (summarizing 
this research). 
 301. See id. (making this point); Clare Huntington, Early Childhood Development 
and the Law, 90 S. Cal. L. Rev. 755, 772–82, 799–807 (2017) [hereinafter Huntington, 
Early Childhood Development] (arguing states should at least consider the underlying 
research but should also balance a young child’s need for continuity against other 
interests, including the interests of both the child and the noncustodial parent in having a 
relationship). 
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puts families to the test, potentially replicating historical discrimination 
against nondominant families. 
a. Skewing Debates. — Family law almost always involves a 
consideration of both outcomes and underlying values. Who should 
control a frozen embryo?302 Should a mentally disabled parent be allowed 
to care for a child?303 How much leeway should parents have to make 
decisions for their children?304 And so on. Deciding how the law should 
answer these questions is partly about outcomes. Which legal rule about 
embryo disposition will lead to the most desirable bargaining regime 
between would-be parents? How does a child fare when raised by a 
mentally disabled parent? Does parental discretion further child well-
being? But each question is also a debate about what society currently 
values. How should the law balance one person’s desire to procreate 
against another person’s desire not to? How much should the law protect 
a parent’s right to care for a child when the parenting may be 
substandard but not imminently dangerous? How important is pluralism 
in parenting? Moreover, many outcomes are values. When family law 
seeks to maximize child well-being, this is both an outcome and a value. 
When family law seeks to reduce family violence, this is both an outcome 
and a value. In short, values and outcomes often blend in practice, with 
most family law rules and policies evincing an inexorable mix of both. 
Additionally, most family law questions involve competing values. 
Consider one of the above examples: parental discretion in childrearing 
matters. The law gives parents considerable leeway to use reasonable 
corporal punishment,305 and courts distinguish permissible corporal 
                                                                                                                           
 302. See, e.g., McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 149, 158 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) 
(affirming the trial court’s decision that the divorcing couple’s frozen embryos were 
marital property and awarding the embryos to the couple jointly, not to be used unless 
both parties agreed to implantation). 
 303. See, e.g., Lisa Miller, Who Knows Best, N.Y. Mag. (Jan. 25, 2016), http:// 
www.thecut.com/2016/01/how-intelligent-to-be-a-parent.html [http://perma.cc/M47C-JSSV] 
(describing a mother’s experience with the child welfare system removing her child 
because of the mother’s low cognitive functioning). 
 304. See infra note 306 (discussing legal regulation of corporal punishment). 
 305. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.136b(9) (2015) (“This section does not 
prohibit a parent or guardian, or other person permitted by law or authorized by the 
parent or guardian, from taking steps to reasonably discipline a child, including the use of 
reasonable force.”); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-39(2)(g) (2015) (“Nothing . . . [in] this 
subsection shall preclude a parent or guardian from disciplining a child of that parent or 
guardian, or shall preclude a person in loco parentis to a child from disciplining that 
child, if done in a reasonable manner . . . .”); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-95(D) (2014) (“This 
section may not be construed to prohibit corporal punishment or physical discipline 
which is administered by a parent or person in loco parentis in a manner which does not 
cause great bodily injury upon a child.”); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503(b)(i) (2015) (“Physical 
injury . . . exclud[es] reasonable corporal punishment.”). 
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punishment from impermissible child abuse.306 At issue in this line 
drawing is a concern about child outcomes (whether and what kinds of 
corporal punishment harm a child), the underlying value of child well-
being, and other values, including family autonomy from the state, 
parental discretion, societal pluralism, and children’s dignitary interests. 
Deciding where to draw the line between conduct that is protected 
corporal punishment and conduct that is the basis for state intervention 
implicates all of these values. 
A central problem with empirical evidence is that it focuses attention 
on the outcomes of legal rules and the values underlying those 
outcomes. As detailed in Part I, the debate about marriage equality was 
centered on the effect of same-sex parenting on children. Child well-
being is an important outcome and value, but there were other values at 
stake too, notably equality, inclusion, and pluralism. The availability of 
abundant evidence on same-sex parenting and child well-being meant 
that this value took center stage, distracting from the other values. It was 
fortunate for advocates of marriage equality that the evidence on 
children’s outcomes aligned with the values of equality, inclusion, and 
pluralism. But if the empirical evidence had shown that children of same-
sex couples somehow had worse outcomes, such as lower high school 
graduation rates, it would have been considerably harder to argue for 
marriage equality on the basis of these other values. To be sure, this 
partly reflects the institutional context of judicial review. If the state had 
evidence of worse child outcomes, then there might have been a 
legitimate state reason for restricting marriage to different-sex couples, 
and a court might have upheld the restriction, depending on the level of 
scrutiny applied. But this tendency to focus on outcomes and the under-
lying values—a tendency encouraged and exacerbated by the availability 
of empirical evidence—is also a risk at the legislative level, with 
                                                                                                                           
 306. See, e.g., State v. Matavale, 166 P.3d 322, 341–42 (Haw. 2007) (finding no 
criminal liability for striking a fourteen-year-old with various objects for lying); Willis v. 
State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 179–80 (Ind. 2008) (finding no criminal liability for a single mother 
who hit her eleven-year-old child with history of lying and stealing); State v. Wilder, 748 
A.2d 444, 456–57 (Me. 2000) (finding that the father’s actions did not exceed the 
standard of permissible corporal punishment and thus the criminal conviction could not 
stand); Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d 861, 870 (Mass. 2015) (exempting parents and 
guardians from liability when the amount of force is reasonable, the use of force 
reasonably relates to the welfare of the child, and it does not cause, nor create, a 
substantial risk of physical or mental harm); Cobble v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 719 
N.E.2d 500, 508 (Mass. 1999) (finding the conduct of a father did not fall within 
regulatory definition of child abuse when the father spanked his nine-year-old son with a 
belt for misbehaving in school); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 11 A.3d 844, 
855 (N.J. 2011) (finding slapping a sixteen-year-old on the face a few times was not 
excessive corporal punishment when the slaps left no marks and further noting that use of 
“excessive” in the statute “plainly recognizes the need for some parental autonomy in the 
child-rearing dynamic”). 
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lawmakers choosing to focus on child outcomes rather than consider a 
range of values at stake in family law rules. 
Moreover, the widespread availability of empirical evidence 
encourages decisionmakers to focus on those values that have been 
measured and are more amenable to measurement, giving shorter shrift 
to the values that have not been measured or are harder to measure.307 
Child well-being and family violence, in particular, are susceptible to 
measurement and often are measured in social science studies of 
families.308 Empirical evidence about these two values ensures they 
garner attention in a debate, potentially overshadowing other values. 
Moreover, these values are relatively uncontested and present a 
compelling case: It is hard to justify a legal rule based on competing 
values when the rule might be at odds with child well-being or a 
reduction in family violence.309 
Further, even if there were empirical evidence about a variety of 
competing values, this would not necessarily tell decisionmakers how to 
strike a balance among the values. Empirical evidence can clarify the 
stakes in a debate—showing how much different policy options advance 
or compromise each value310—but empirical evidence does not tell us the 
importance of the values.311 Empirical evidence can demonstrate, for 
                                                                                                                           
 307. As compared with child well-being and levels of family violence, it is harder, but 
not impossible, to measure whether a rule advances other values, such as pluralism. The 
question is whether such evidence exists. 
 308. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Barber et al., The Relationship Context of Young Pregnancies, 35 
Law & Ineq. 175, 175–76, 192–96 (2017) (reporting the results of a study of eighteen- and 
nineteen-year-old women that focused on the correlation between pregnancy and intimate 
partner violence); Fragile Families & Child Wellbeing Study, Data and Documentation, 
Princeton Univ., http://fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/documentation [http://perma.cc/P5A6-
LL7E] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) (listing the types of data collected in a landmark 
longitudinal study on families, including “information on attitudes, relationships, 
parenting behavior, demographic characteristics, health (mental and physical), economic 
and employment status, neighborhood characteristics, and program participation”). 
 309. This is not to suggest that, in practice, family law decisionmakers necessarily 
prioritize these factors. See Meier & Dickson, supra note 161, at 329 (reporting the results 
of a study of custody cases and finding that in cases in which the father alleged the mother 
was alienating the children, courts switched custody from mother to father at 
approximately the same rate regardless of whether the mother alleged the father was 
abusing the children). 
 310. See Michael Simkovic, Young Scholar Medal Recipient’s Address at the 93rd 
Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute: What Can We Learn from Credit Markets? 
12–13 (May 18, 2016) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“My role is to help 
policymakers understand the parameters of the tradeoffs that they’re facing. If there are 
tradeoffs between economic growth and equality or various values that we care about, they 
need information to understand the nature of those tradeoffs.”). 
 311. Some scholars believe values can be quantified and thus compared. See W. Kip 
Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk 19–21 (1992) 
(describing the willingness-to-pay tool as a means to quantify the value of life); Simkovic, 
supra note 310, at 13 (“As soon as you have two absolute values, then you need to start 
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example, that heightened evidentiary standards for abuse and neglect 
lead to fewer substantiated cases and thus less state intervention,312 but 
the empirical evidence does not tell us how to weigh family autonomy 
against child safety. For this reason, empirical evidence can play only a 
limited role in helping decisionmakers strike a balance among 
competing values. 
Consider the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). This law and its 
state equivalents provide both procedural and substantive protections for 
Native American children facing removal from their homes, with an 
emphasis on keeping children at home and placing them with a Native 
American family if they are removed; the law also gives tribes, rather than 
state family courts, jurisdiction over cases involving Native American 
children.313 ICWA embraces a broad understanding of child well-being 
that includes a child’s ties to a tribe; the law also recognizes a tribe’s 
interest in sovereignty and continued vitality.314 
                                                                                                                           
making tradeoffs because they sometimes come into conflict. Which means you need some 
method of measuring those values against each other, and the measurement that 
economists use is money.”). This Essay takes the position that this is a dubious proposition, 
particularly with inherently noneconomic values such as protection of the parent–child 
relationship and family autonomy. Cf. Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the 
Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1553, 
1562–78 (2002) (critiquing the economic approach to measuring values in the 
environmental context). 
 312. See supra note 222 (describing such empirical evidence). 
 313. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1903, 1911–1913, 1915 (2012). For a description of state 
equivalents, see State Statutes Related to the Indian Child Welfare Act, Nat’l Conference 
of State Legislatures (July 19, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/ 
state-statutes-related-to-indian-child-welfare.aspx [http://perma.cc/6AC6-CJNK]. Congress 
enacted ICWA for numerous reasons, including the need to redress historical 
discrimination against Native American families and respect the sovereignty of tribes. See 
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(4)–(5) (setting forth congressional findings, including “that an 
alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often 
unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies and . . . 
[many of those children] are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and 
institutions”). Historically, “the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian 
child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to 
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social 
standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.” Id. § 1901(5); see also Adoptive 
Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013) (noting that Congress enacted ICWA to 
address the “consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of 
abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian 
children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually 
in non-Indian homes” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miss. Band of 
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989))). 
 314. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (setting forth congressional findings, including that “there 
is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes 
than their children”). For an excellent summary of ICWA, the current challenge to the 
laws, and the constitutional basis for the law, see Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here First: 
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In a series of challenges to ICWA, plaintiffs are contesting the law on 
multiple grounds, including constitutional arguments that ICWA is con-
trary to the interests of children because it prioritizes “blood” ties over 
children’s welfare, in essence contending that the law’s emphasis on 
preserving tribal ties and respecting tribal sovereignty compromises 
children’s outcomes.315 The litigation is still in its early stages, but as 
courts and legislatures consider the law, the debate about ICWA will 
likely turn to evidence about outcomes for children raised in Native 
American families as compared with non–Native American families.316 
There are two concerns with this use of empirical evidence. First, it 
focuses the debate on those values that have been measured. 
Decisionmakers will consider empirical evidence about child well-being, 
                                                                                                                           
American Indian Tribes, Race, and the Constitutional Minimum, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 491, 
506–17 (2017). 
 315. See, e.g., Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief at 2, Carter ex rel. A.D. v. Washburn, No. CV-1259, 2017 WL 1019685 (D. Ariz. Mar. 
16, 2017) [hereinafter Carter ex rel. A.D. Complaint], appeal docketed, No. 17-15839 (9th 
Cir. Apr. 26, 2017). One case was dismissed for lack of standing, see Nat’l Council for 
Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727, 733 (N.D. Va. 2015), and another for mootness, 
although the court noted that the “case presents significant constitutional questions” that 
“merit careful consideration” in the right case, Doe v. Piper, No. 15-2639 (JRT/DTS), 
2017 WL 3381820, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2017). Another case is in progress. See Carter 
ex rel. A.D. v. Washburn, No. CV-15-01259-PHX-NVW, 2016 WL 5464582, at *5 (D. Ariz. 
Sept. 29, 2016) (granting motions to intervene in a case challenging the constitutionality 
of ICWA). For a description of the challenges, including the institutional supporters, see 
Casey Tolan, A Series of New Lawsuits Is Challenging How Native American Kids Are 
Adopted, Splinter (July 17, 2015), http://splinternews.com/a-series-of-new-lawsuits-is-
challenging-how-native-amer-1793849248 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 316. In one case, the plaintiffs alleged that removing children “from caring, loving 
[pre-adoptive] homes and forc[ing them] into placements . . . sometimes leads to abuse, 
psychological harm, or even physical trauma and death.” Carter ex rel. A.D. Complaint, 
supra note 315, at 7. The plaintiffs further alleged that “[i]n many instances, children are 
left in abusive or neglectful Indian families where they are subjected to grave physical or 
psychological harm as a result of ICWA” and that “[s]ubjecting these children and families 
to ICWA creates delay and uncertainty in the journey to permanent family status, and the 
prospect and reality of displacement from stable, loving families causes great harm to 
children.” Id. For existing research on ICWA and child well-being, see Gordon E. Limb et 
al., An Empirical Examination of the Indian Child Welfare Act and Its Impact on Cultural 
and Familial Preservation for American Indian Children, 28 Child Abuse & Neglect 1279, 
1285 (2004) (finding eighty-three percent of Indian children who were studied and placed 
with foster or pre-adoptive families were placed according to ICWA guidelines and that 
seventy-one percent of cases involving foster care placement and eighty-nine percent of 
cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights included qualified expert 
witnesses). The Limb study further found that the state took tribal culture into account in 
eighty-four percent of cases, made efforts to prevent breaking up families in ninety-four 
percent of cases, and attempted to reunify the family in fifty-six percent of cases. Id. 
Inadequate recordkeeping and incomplete data, however, make it difficult to assess ICWA. 
See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-05-290, Indian Child Welfare Act: Existing 
Information on Implementation Issues Could Be Used to Target Guidance and Assistance 
to States 1, 2–5 (2005) (discussing the limitations in states’ ICWA recordkeeping). 
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especially as defined along traditional metrics, such as physical health 
and high school graduation rates. Empirical evidence could document 
ICWA’s progress toward other, competing values—such as whether ICWA 
preserves a child’s ties to the tribe, the tribe’s tie to the child, and tribal 
sovereignty—but if there is no evidence about these factors, then it is too 
easy to ignore them in the debate. In short, when there is empirical 
evidence about some but not all values, it can bias the debate in favor of 
those values that are measured. 
Second, additional empirical evidence about a range of competing 
values would still beg the question about how to balance these values. 
Empirical evidence about whether ICWA advances tribal sovereignty 
would not tell us how much to weight this value—what sovereignty means 
to the tribe or to society more broadly. Similarly, showing whether Native 
American children who are kept home or placed with Native American 
families have different outcomes from children removed and placed with 
non–Native American families would clarify the stakes of the debate, but 
the empirical evidence does not tell us how to balance high school 
graduation rates against tribal ties. Instead, it is still necessary to have an 
independent debate about how to balance these competing values. 
The gravitational pull of empirical evidence toward measurable 
values and away from an explicit debate about contested and competing 
values is present in numerous legal contexts. Consider the example of 
unmarried fathers. A number of laws about parental rights, custody, and 
visitation favor unmarried mothers over unmarried fathers and thus are 
ripe for constitutional challenge.317 Advocates for fathers seeking to 
challenge these laws, however, face a problem because there is not a 
clear empirical basis for finding that child contact with unmarried 
fathers improves child outcomes.318 Moreover, there is evidence that 
                                                                                                                           
 317. Under marital-presumption laws, married fathers are automatically considered 
legal fathers at birth, whereas unmarried fathers must take affirmative steps to establish 
their legal rights; further, fifteen states have laws that automatically grant an unmarried 
mother sole custody at the time of birth. For a discussion of these laws, including a listing 
of the relevant statutes, see Huntington, Postmarital Family Law, supra note 246, at 202–
05. There are active battles over custody and visitation rules in many state legislatures. See 
Scott & Emery, supra note 159, at 76–83. And courts are considering challenges as well. 
See, e.g., In re Adoption of J.S., 358 P.3d 1009, 1033 (Utah 2015) (rejecting an unmarried 
father’s challenge to his son’s adoption on the grounds that Utah could properly require 
unmarried fathers, but not unmarried mothers, to complete an affidavit to perfect 
parental rights). Most unmarried children do not live with their fathers. See Carlson et al., 
supra note 233, at 472 (2008) (“[A]mong the large (and growing) fraction of all children 
born outside of marriage today, more than three-fifths will be living apart from their 
biological father by age 5.”). 
 318. This is not to argue that children are unharmed by father absence. Indeed, there 
is considerable evidence showing such harm. See Colter Mitchell et al., Father Loss and 
Child Telomere Length, Pediatrics, Aug. 2017, at 2, 6–7 (reviewing the literature and 
showing the results of a new study showing the harm, at a cellular level, of father absence 
from death, incarceration, or divorce or separation). The precise question, however, is 
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unmarried mothers and fathers experience high levels of intimate 
partner violence.319 
This empirical background makes it seem like the right rule for 
child well-being is to give more custody rights to unmarried mothers, 
putting children with the parent who will better care for them and 
decreasing interaction between parents who may have a history of 
violence.320 Basing a rule on this evidence furthers some (albeit very 
important) values—child well-being and a decrease in family violence. 
But it obscures competing values, especially equality between parents and 
protection of the father–child relationship because neither clearly 
furthers the desired outcome of child well-being and both implicate 
family violence. In this way, empirical evidence about some values can 
eclipse a consideration of other values. And as with debates about ICWA, 
the evidence does not tell decisionmakers how to balance the competing 
values. 
Despite these concerns, empirical evidence can be relevant to the 
debate about values, and it is important not to draw a stark divide 
between the two.321 Values inform empirical evidence: To the extent 
                                                                                                                           
whether involvement of never-married nonresidential fathers—who are much more likely 
than divorced fathers to be low income and have low levels of educational attainment, and 
who have high levels of criminal justice involvement, see Huntington, Postmarital Family 
Law, supra note 246, at 186–88—improves the outcomes of their children. On this point, 
there is not yet compelling evidence. More broadly, there is evidence showing a 
correlation between improved child outcomes and involvement by nonresidential fathers, 
see Kari Adamsons & Sara K. Johnson, An Updated and Expanded Meta-Analysis of 
Nonresident Fathering and Child Well-Being, 27 J. Fam. Psychol. 589, 595–98 (2013) 
(reporting the findings of a meta-analysis of fifty-two studies of involvement by 
nonresidential fathers), but these studies do not disaggregate fathers by marital status and 
thus are likely skewed by the inclusion of divorced fathers, who tend to be much more 
involved in the lives of their children than never-married fathers, see Huntington, 
Postmarital Family Law, supra note 246, at 189–90 (contrasting the experience of children 
with nonresidential fathers with “children of divorced parents, who see their fathers more 
frequently”). Relatively new evidence is showing that the parenting practices of social 
fathers, regardless of marital status, are equal to and in some cases superior to the 
parenting practices of biological fathers, as measured by engagement with the 
nonbiological child, shared responsibility with the biological mother, cooperation with the 
biological mother, and trust by the biological mother. See Lawrence M. Berger et al., 
Parenting Practices of Resident Fathers: The Role of Marital and Biological Ties, 70 J. 
Marriage & Fam. 625, 629–36 (2008) (comparing social and biological fathers along these 
variables). 
 319. See Barber et al., supra note 308, at 176, 192–95 (reporting the results of a study 
of eighteen- and nineteen-year-old women, which found that “pregnancy relationships 
included more than twice the amount [of] disrespect as non-pregnancy relationships, 
more than triple the rate of threats, and four times the rate of physical assault”). 
 320. See, e.g., Leslie Joan Harris, Family Policy After the Fragile Families and 
Relationship Dynamics Studies, 35 Law & Ineq. 223, 225–35 (2017) (drawing on the 
evidence about increased intimate partner violence to argue against a default joint custody 
rule for unmarried parents). 
 321. See supra note 4 (discussing the conflation of facts and values). 
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society values something—say, child well-being—researchers are more 
likely to study it.322 But empirical evidence can inform values, too. As a 
foundational matter, many values in family law contain embedded factual 
assumptions. One reason that society continues to support traditional 
families is the assumption that, on average, this family form has benefits 
for child well-being.323 And indeed there is evidence to support this 
assumption.324 But if there were evidence that this was not true, this 
evidence might slowly change the underlying value. 
Empirical evidence informs values in a more subtle way as well. In 
the marriage equality cases, the courts focused on outcomes for 
children.325 But the cases were also a proxy for the larger value-laden 
debate about whether a family headed by a same-sex couple is socially 
acceptable. The two are related: To the extent same-sex parents do not 
harm children, this can help make the family form more acceptable.326 
And to the extent the family form is more acceptable, this may help 
improve outcomes for the children.327 
The feedback loop can also work in the other direction. There is 
considerable evidence that children raised in plural marriage families 
                                                                                                                           
322. See supra text accompanying notes 25–26, 73, 146–151 (discussing empirical data 
related to father–child relationships, child custody research, and the neuroscience of 
juvenile brain development). 
 323. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7–12 (N.Y. 2006) (noting the 
“undisputed assumption that marriage is important to the welfare of children”). 
 324. See Huntington, Failure to Flourish, supra note 64, at 31–44 (describing the 
research establishing that children of married couples have better outcomes than other 
family forms but also noting the degree to which the outcomes are correlative, not causal). 
 325. See supra text accompanying notes 94, 108, 119–120. 
 326. The process of social acceptance is complex. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, 
Multidimensional Advocacy as Applied: Marriage Equality and Reproductive Rights, 29 
Colum. J. Gender & L. 1, 3–18, 33–40 (2015) (describing the importance of advocating for 
social change on multiple fronts). Simply providing more information about a family form 
does not necessarily change views, see Cultural Cognition Project Study, supra note 241, at 
16 (finding that “[a] majority of Americans say that their position on gay and lesbian 
adoption is centered on the welfare of the children” but that “few say they would change 
their minds if shown convincing contrary evidence”). For a discussion of the relationship 
between social acceptance of same-sex couples and the marriage equality litigation, see 
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and the 
Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 293, 313–14 (2015) (arguing 
that novel families can gain social and legal acceptance if they satisfy social-welfare criteria 
and that LGBT families and advocates were able to make this showing through what the 
authors identify as collaborative processes). 
 327. Courts have acknowledged this connection, finding that legal recognition would 
help children by solidifying the legal relationships in the family and giving them 
important social capital. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 771 (E.D. 
Mich.), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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have worse outcomes than children raised in other family structures.328 
There is some evidence that this stems from the practice of plural 
marriage itself,329 influencing the view that plural marriage is socially 
unacceptable. But it is also plausible that the poor outcomes are at least 
partly due to the state’s hostility toward these families. All states prohibit 
plural marriage as a matter of civil law, and many states also make it a 
crime.330 Thus, families based on plural marriage tend to be highly 
isolated.331 Moreover, the illegality of polygamy may well create a 
selection effect, with social outliers choosing this family form. If 
polygamy were legal, a wider range of people might choose it, including 
adults with a broader range of social and economic resources. It is hard 
to tell, then, whether the different outcomes stem from growing up in a 
family with plural marriage, growing up in extreme social isolation, 
growing up with under-resourced parents, or some combination of these 
factors. Regardless of the particular cause and effect, the point here is 
that empirical evidence and values are interrelated: The social value of 
monogamy can influence the empirical analysis of plural marriage, which 
in turn reinforces the social value of monogamy. 
                                                                                                                           
 328. In a case before the Supreme Court of British Columbia, the court relied on the 
trial testimony of an expert witness in the field of economics and a review of the social 
science literature to find that the practice of plural marriage fosters institutional control of 
women by men through “early and arranged marriages, the payment of brideprice, easy 
divorce and the devaluing of romantic love”; that women in polygynous relationships 
suffer from higher rates of domestic violence and death in childbirth, have shorter 
lifespans than women in monogamous marriages, suffer from marital dissatisfaction and 
low self-esteem, and have more economic difficulties than women in monogamous 
marriages because of a lack of, or inequitable division of, resources; that children of 
polygamous marriages, as compared with their counterparts in monogamous families, 
have higher infant mortality, elevated risks of abuse and neglect, more emotional, 
behavioral, and physical problems, and lower educational attainment. See Reference re: 
Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588, paras. 780–86, 789–90 
(Can. B.C.). 
 329. See Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and 
Bargaining for Equality, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1955, 1976 (2010) (summarizing the evidence 
on polygamy and finding that the natural sex ratio does not fit the needs of polygamous 
communities). In polygamous communities, more females need to be recruited, some 
men need to be excluded, or younger females need to be married; in polyandrous 
societies, female infanticide is known to occur. Id. at 1976–77. Professor Adrienne Davis 
further notes that polygamy tends to lead to statutory rape, incest, and low levels of 
education, which contribute to problems with individual well-being. Id. at 1977. 
 330. See id. at 1968. 
 331. Utah Office of the Attorney Gen., The Primer: A Guidebook for Law 
Enforcement and Human Services Agencies Who Offer Assistance to Fundamentalist 
Mormon Families 8 (2011), http://site.demo.utah.gov/attorneygeneral/wp-content/ 
uploads/sites/9/2013/08/The_Primer.pdf [http://perma.cc/5DFD-B2NG] (“The fun-
damentalists adapted to a secret, underground lifestyle to avoid prosecution and what they 
perceived as persecution from the ‘world.’”). 
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In sum, a fundamental concern with empirical evidence is that it 
focuses attention on the outcomes of legal rules, emphasizing those 
values that have been and are susceptible to measurement and 
distracting attention from competing values. A debate so conceived is 
thus incomplete, with decisionmakers considering some but not all 
aspects of the legal question. Further, empirical evidence cannot tell 
decisionmakers how to balance competing values. It clarifies the stakes 
and provides information about the extent to which rules advance or 
compromise different values, but empirical evidence does not tell 
decisionmakers which values to consider and how to prioritize them. In 
both ways, then, empirical evidence discourages a forthright debate 
about competing values. 
b. Providing Political Cover. — A second problem is that empirical 
evidence can provide political cover for the value judgments that are 
made.332 Prioritizing some family relationships—and some families—over 
others is an inevitable aspect of state regulation,333 but it is also a deeply 
contested political and normative endeavor. Similarly, choosing how to 
regulate families necessarily involves a host of trade-offs. Allowing 
different-sex, but not same-sex, couples to marry reflected a state 
determination about desirable family forms. And reforming the child 
welfare system to prioritize child permanency over family integrity, as 
Congress did in ASFA,334 reflected a judgment about the lesser 
importance of families of origin. In these examples, the state relied, at 
                                                                                                                           
 332. See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral 
Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1, 35 (2011) (“It’s also likely . . . that the Court sometimes consciously resorts to 
empirical factfinding for strategic reasons. The Justices might well believe that their 
decision . . . will provoke less conflict . . . if framed in the seemingly neutral idiom of fact as 
opposed to the morally evocative idiom of constitutional principle.”). Professor Libby Adler 
has made a related argument, about how the claim of expertise, including by scientists, is 
itself ideological. See Adler, supra note 10, at 35 (“[E]xpertise has a history of serving a 
depoliticizing function. It cloaks political ideology in neutral garb for purposes of gaining 
legitimacy in a discourse in which bare political desire stands counterpoised to legal 
correctness.”). 
 333. See Huntington, Failure to Flourish, supra note 64, at 55–80. The state recognizes 
some but not all economic and affective ties between individuals. See Laura A. Rosenbury, 
Friends with Benefits?, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 189, 200 (2007) (describing the close 
relationships, notably including friendship, that family law does not regulate). The state 
provides support to some family groupings but not others. The Earned Income Tax 
Credit, for example, supports certain extended family relationships, such as an aunt or 
uncle caring for a niece or nephew, but not other relationships, such as an adult caring for 
a minor cousin. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 152(c)–(d) (2012). And the state provides different kinds 
of support to different families. See Huntington, Failure to Flourish, supra note 64, at 55–
80 (describing how state support for families differs by income group, noting that state 
scrutiny and suspicion tends to accompany support for low-income families, and using tax 
deductions for middle-income families and food stamps and housing subsidies for low-
income families to illustrate this point). 
 334. See supra text accompanying notes 170–175. 
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least in part, on empirical evidence. In supporting different-sex marriage, 
states cited evidence purporting to show the benefits to children of this 
family structure.335 And in its radical reform of the child welfare system in 
1997, Congress relied on evidence about children lingering in foster care 
and the poor outcomes for these children.336 
This reliance on evidence may reflect well-intentioned efforts to 
inform policy, but there is a more cynical explanation as well. Empirical 
evidence obfuscates the normative and political nature of the judgments. 
By citing evidence supporting the effects of different-sex marriage on 
child outcomes, states sidestepped (at least temporarily) the politically 
fraught battle over families headed by same-sex parents. And by citing 
evidence about poor outcomes for children in foster care, Congress side-
stepped the racially charged debate about breaking up families of color 
and instead contended that it was promoting child well-being. In short, 
rather than acknowledge that a rule or policy reflects values or elevates 
one value over another, decisionmakers can claim they are simply 
following the evidence. 
Professor Suzanne Goldberg has written about a version of this 
phenomenon in constitutional law, arguing that courts play an inevitable 
role in choosing among contested normative judgments about a group’s 
capacities.337 Goldberg contends that courts are uncomfortable with this 
role and thus conceal their normative choice with facts.338 She explains 
that courts at times rely on thin facts—which are empirical, uncontested 
facts, such as women, not men, give birth—courts mostly rely on thick 
facts.339 Thick facts are conclusions that appear to be based on empirical 
evidence but actually reflect deeply normative judgments, for example, 
that giving birth creates a connection between mother and child.340 
These thick facts are not based on actual empirical evidence but instead 
on intuition and assumptions.341 
                                                                                                                           
 335. See supra text accompanying notes 101–102 (describing states’ arguments in the 
marriage equality cases). 
 336. See supra note 171. 
 337. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social 
Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1955, 1965–76, 1980–88 (2006). 
 338. See id. at 1965–76. 
 339. See id. at 1965–70. 
 340. See id. As Goldberg explains, thick facts “contain both description (group X has 
a particular characteristic) and evaluation (the characteristic limits the status or capacity of 
group X). Yet courts regularly ignore the contestable evaluation . . . .” Id. at 1965 
(footnote omitted). 
 341. See id. at 1965–70. 
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Goldberg argues that empirical evidence can be an antidote to this 
tendency, contending that, when properly used,342 this evidence can lead 
courts to challenge underlying assumptions and intuitions.343 The 
marriage equality trials arguably vindicated this argument. When 
advocates presented evidence about same-sex parenting, they were able 
to move beyond the notion that gay and lesbian parents would harm 
children.344 
But empirical evidence can conceal normative judgments in a 
different way. Even if decisionmakers are citing actual studies and doing 
so rigorously, this reliance on evidence obscures the underlying value 
judgments. A legislature can claim it is prohibiting plural marriage 
because of the harm to children. A child welfare agency can state that it 
is prioritizing child well-being by promoting adoption because of the 
harm of staying in foster care. And a court can contend it is promoting 
child development by upholding a law giving greater custody rights to 
unmarried mothers because of the high rate of intimate partner violence 
among unmarried couples. These rationales may be backed by evidence, 
but they also obscure underlying value-based choices. Resorting to 
empirical evidence makes it seem like the decisionmaker is not taking a 
political position and instead is simply following the evidence. 
c. Replicating Discrimination. — Finally, using empirical evidence can 
be particularly problematic for nondominant families because it risks 
replicating historical discrimination. Evidence on unequal outcomes for 
different demographic groups may be accurate, but the underlying 
conditions that create the family situations are often the result of 
systemic discrimination and inequality. Thus, using empirical evidence 
about poor outcomes to justify legal rules inflicts a second act of 
discrimination. 
Return to the legal challenges to ICWA. Apart from failing to 
consider multiple, competing values, a focus on evidence about child 
outcomes in Native American homes as compared with other homes 
obscures centuries of aggressively hostile state policies toward Native 
American families.345 Indeed, the explicit, long-standing state policy was 
to remove children from Native American homes and assimilate the 
children into the dominant culture.346 In light of this and numerous 
                                                                                                                           
 342. Goldberg recognizes the danger of courts cherry-picking studies that support 
their preferred norm without interrogating the methodology or assumptions of the study. 
See id. at 1989. 
 343. See id. at 1989–92. 
 344. See supra text accompanying notes 234–235. 
 345. See generally Charles Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian 
Nations (2005) (presenting a comprehensive history of the modern tribal sovereignty 
movement). 
 346. See Lorie Graham, Reparations and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 Legal Stud. 
F. 619, 624–31 (2001) (describing this history). Before ICWA, one study found that up to 
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other historical efforts to destabilize tribes, it is understandable that 
Native American families might not produce the same outcomes, such as 
educational achievement, as non–Native American families, as measured 
by traditional metrics.347 But uncritically adopting this evidence on 
outcomes would perpetuate and replicate discrimination against this 
marginalized population. 
The same dynamic would likely play out in any litigation over 
unmarried fathers. A decision by policymakers to base custody rules on 
the absence of evidence that unmarried fathers contribute to better 
outcomes for their children would fail to account for the reasons why 
these fathers struggle to provide for their children economically and 
socially.348 Unmarried fathers are overwhelmingly low income, with low 
levels of education and high levels of criminal justice involvement.349 But 
for at least some of these men—particularly African Americans—the state 
played an active role in shaping their disadvantage. Historically, the state 
created and sanctioned pervasive systems of labor exploitation and racial 
discrimination, from slavery to sharecropping to segregation, all of which 
limited the economic potential of Black men.350 Even when these systems 
were no longer lawful, the state adopted numerous other policies that 
compromised the economic capacities of Black men,351 from redlining 
residential neighborhoods, resulting in racially concentrated poverty, to 
maintaining a criminal justice system that stops and frisks young men of 
color at highly disproportionate rates352 and treats drug violations by 
                                                                                                                           
thirty-five percent of Native American children were removed from their homes, and 
eighty-five percent of these children were placed in non–Native American families. See 
Steven Unger, The Destruction of American Indian Families 1–2 (1977). 
 347. See Education, Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, http://www.ncai.org/policy-
issues/education-health-human-services/education [http://perma.cc/Q29F-BS4U] (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2017) (“Native students’ academic achievement and educational 
attainment lags far behind that of their white peers. Over the past 10 years, Native students 
have been the only population to have not improved in reading or math . . . . Native youth 
face some of the lowest high school graduation rates . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 348. See generally Edin & Nelson, supra note 233 (examining the challenges of 
fatherhood among low-income, urban men). 
 349. See McLanahan & Garfinkel, supra note 272, at 147 tbl.8.1 (noting that forty-five 
percent of single, unmarried fathers do not have a high school diploma, as compared with 
nineteen percent of married fathers; and that thirty-nine percent have been incarcerated, 
as compared with seven percent of married fathers). 
 350. See generally, e.g., William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner 
City, the Underclass, and Public Policy 10–12, 109–24 (2d ed. 2012) (arguing that a “racial 
division of labor has been created due to . . . centuries[] of discrimination and prejudice”). 
 351. See generally Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How 
Our Government Segregated America 153–76 (2017) (discussing government policies that 
prevented African Americans from climbing the economic ladder). 
 352. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(describing the disproportionate impact of New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy on men of 
color). 
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Black men much more harshly than similar violations by white men, 
despite similar rates of drug use and selling.353 A legal rule based on 
evidence about father involvement and child outcomes would fail to hold 
the state accountable for the present conditions of many of these fathers 
and would risk replicating past discrimination.354 
The problem persists in the policy context, in which empirical 
evidence about child outcomes in different families raises the question of 
whether the state will support all families. As Professor Mary Anne Case 
has argued, when parties make a claim on state resources, such as 
childcare subsidies, it is not unreasonable for the state to ask for good 
outcomes in return for that support.355 This triggers an inquiry into 
which families are capable of creating these outcomes.356 Requiring 
improved outcomes might lead to less, not more, investment in struggling 
families to the extent there is evidence that disadvantaged families are 
not well positioned to foster good outcomes for their children. 
Compounding the problem, increasingly, studies indicate that it is hard 
to improve parenting in low-functioning families—there is a dearth of 
evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of parenting programs for such 
families.357 
In sum, putting families to an empirical test about their ability to 
produce good outcomes for their children can lead decisionmakers to 
replicate discrimination. Focusing on empirical evidence about outcomes 
does not require interrogating the reasons why a group may not be able 
to show a positive contribution. It can also direct attention away from 
questions about what families need as a matter of dignity and equal 
citizenship and instead toward a determination of which families can 
perform as the state wishes. 
                                                                                                                           
 353. See Alexander, supra note 27, at 98–100. Indeed, given this history, it is all the 
more noteworthy that unmarried Black fathers are more likely than unmarried white or 
Latino fathers to play an active role in their children’s lives. See supra text accompanying 
notes 232–233. 
 354. The argument is somewhat different if the state, in support of custody rules, cites 
evidence about higher rates of intimate partner violence between unmarried couples. See 
supra text accompanying note 319. In that context, the central concern is that focusing on 
family violence overshadows other values, notably gender equality and the father–child 
relationship. See supra text following note 320. 
 355. Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About 
Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 Chi.-Kent 
L. Rev. 1753, 1772–76 (2001) (making this argument in the context of public support for 
childcare in commenting on Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public Value: Linking 
Responsibility, Resources, and Republicanism, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1673 (2001)). 
 356. See id. 
 357. See Shonkoff & Phillips, supra note 197, at 226 (“[E]fforts to change the course 
of [children’s] development by strengthening parenting have met with mixed success. 
Shifting parental behavior in ways that shift the odds of favorable outcomes for children is 
often remarkably difficult.”). 
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III. GUIDING THE USE OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN FAMILY LAW 
If family law’s empirical turn brings both considerable benefits but 
also substantial reasons for concern, it is essential to develop a framework 
to guide the use of this evidence. Decisionmakers must know when and 
why to use it, because not all questions can be resolved through empirical 
evidence. This Part proposes a framework to guide this process—
encouraging the use of empirical evidence when appropriate while also 
preserving space for a wide-ranging debate about competing values. 
Further, when empirical evidence is relevant, decisionmakers must be 
cautious about how they rely on it. This Part provides tools to guide the 
use of this evidence, calling for more effective gatekeeping across all of 
family law’s institutions, increased attention to the dangers of 
perpetuating discrimination along intersecting identities, and a robust 
role for legal scholars in translating empirical evidence into legal rules 
and policies. 
A. The Proper Role of Empirical Evidence 
Nearly all family law questions reflect contested and competing 
values, but some questions do so more than others. Gaining traction on 
the issue of when to use empirical evidence requires an appreciation of 
this aspect of family law—some questions involve a relative consensus 
about a value or which value to prioritize, and some questions involve a 
relative lack of consensus about a value or how to prioritize competing 
values. Empirical evidence is more relevant to the former kinds of 
questions and less relevant to the latter. 
As a threshold matter, then, decisionmakers should determine 
whether there is consensus about a value or the priority of values.358 If 
there is a relative consensus on these issues, then empirical evidence can 
help identify policy choices that further the consensus value or effectuate 
the decided balance of values. In this context, society and the legal 
system have largely resolved the relevant value-based judgments, and 
empirical evidence helpfully elucidates policy choices. It is widely agreed 
in modern society, for example, that intimate partners should not 
physically assault each other, a judgment that, as hard as it is to recall, 
                                                                                                                           
 358. This raises the questions of how to determine whether there is a consensus on the 
underlying judgment and whether there must be consensus that there is consensus. As 
with any complex issue, the poles are relatively easy to identify. Compare Baker v. State, 
744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (recognizing—as the first state supreme court to do so—a 
constitutional claim to relationship recognition for same-sex couples), with Baskin v. 
Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 672 (7th Cir. 2014) (affirming “[t]he district court judgments 
invalidating and enjoining . . . prohibitions of same-sex marriage” in one of the last lower 
court decisions before Obergefell). With the framework proposed in this section, no more 
may be needed: The goal of the threshold question is determining whether the question 
falls at one end or the other of a consensus continuum. 
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was once much more unsettled.359 Today, the issue facing decisionmakers 
is not whether but instead how to achieve this goal, and the question for 
family law is one of implementation. Empirical evidence helps 
decisionmakers compare alternative rules and policies to determine 
which will best reduce intimate partner violence. To be sure, no values 
are entirely uncontested, and even furthering seemingly incontrovertible 
outcomes requires some consideration of competing values, such as 
individual autonomy and family privacy.360 But when there is a clear goal 
and a consensus about the underlying value, as well as some sense about 
how to prioritize competing values, high-quality empirical evidence can 
be immensely useful in the development of policy. 
If the answer to the threshold question is that there is no consensus 
about a value or there is considerable disagreement about how to 
balance competing values, then empirical evidence is less relevant, and 
decisionmakers must be particularly careful in their use of this evidence. 
The evidence should not dominate the underlying normative question, 
and nonquantified or nonquantifiable values must be given due credit. 
In these contexts, it is important to look to sources of authority other 
than empirical evidence—empathy, a capacity to reason, a sense of 
justice.361 This can be a messy and difficult process, and first principles 
may not be amenable to compromise. Indeed, it is challenging to find 
agreement around values in a rapidly changing, pluralistic society, but 
the debate must be resolved on its own terms, as one of values and 
norms.362 At the very least it is essential to recognize that the debate 
implicates these contested and competing values and that empirical 
evidence will not fully resolve the issue. 
The legal challenges to ICWA are a good example of the limited 
relevance of empirical evidence. The lawsuits raise several value-laden 
                                                                                                                           
 359. See, e.g., Goodmark, Troubled Marriage, supra note 176, at 9. 
 360. See Leigh Goodmark, Should Domestic Violence Be Decriminalized?, 40 Harv. 
J.L. & Gender 53, 57–69 (2017) (describing the debate about whether intimate partner 
violence should be decriminalized in favor of alternative approaches and identifying the 
various values at play in the debate, including the autonomy of victims and the desire for 
retribution). If there is a residual debate about competing values, such as family privacy 
versus a reduction in family violence, empirical evidence can play a limited role in 
elucidating the debate. Understanding, for example, whether more intrusive measures, 
such as drop-by police visits for families with a history of violence, would reduce family 
violence might inform the debate about how to trade off these competing values. 
 361. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 28 (2d ed. 1993) (summarizing his theory of 
reflective equilibrium); Brian Leiter, Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment, and the 
Supreme Court as Super-Legislature, 66 Hastings L.J. 1601, 1602 (2015) (arguing the 
Supreme Court acts as a super-legislature in that most constitutional questions before the 
Court are not dictated by law and thus the Justices regularly, and properly, consult their 
own moral and political values). 
 362. This raises a host of questions beyond the scope of this Essay, such as whether 
courts are well equipped to make moral judgments. 
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debates: how to balance a child’s well-being as defined by traditional 
metrics against a child’s well-being as measured by a broader set of 
interests, including tribal ties; how to weight child well-being versus tribal 
well-being; and the value to be attributed to tribal sovereignty.363 For all 
of these questions, empirical evidence can elucidate some of the stakes of 
the debate, showing, for example, whether children truly have worse 
outcomes when kept in Native American homes with some level of abuse 
or neglect.364 But empirical evidence fundamentally cannot answer the 
question of whether and how to balance these competing values.365 
Most family law questions fall somewhere between these poles, with 
an incomplete agreement about the underlying values and an 
incomplete agreement about how to balance competing values.366 In 
these contexts, it is important to make empirical evidence only one part 
of the debate and to be explicit about the range of values at stake. 
Consider predictive analytics in the child welfare system. This tool 
appears to be a cost-effective means for reducing severe injuries and 
death, but it also has a high rate of false positives.367 The legal and policy 
question is whether this is an acceptable method for triaging child 
welfare cases. As a threshold matter, the question falls between the two 
poles because, although there is a consensus that society should protect 
children from abuse and neglect, there is an ongoing debate about how 
                                                                                                                           
 363. See supra notes 313–316 and accompanying text. 
 364. If decisionmakers do consult empirical evidence for this more limited question, 
they must do so aware of the dangers, particularly the temptation to justify a political 
choice with data and the potential for empirical evidence to replicate historical 
discrimination. 
 365. Even when empirical evidence might help answer a factual question that informs 
values, such as the immutability of sexual orientation, we might not want decisionmakers 
to consider this evidence. Professor Edward Stein has argued that the existence of a 
genetic basis of sexual orientation, for example, should be irrelevant to questions about 
sexual-orientation discrimination. See Edward Stein, Sexual Orientations, Rights, and the 
Body: Immutability, Essentialism, and Nativism, 78 Soc. Res. 633, 638–54 (2011) 
[hereinafter Stein, Sexual Orientation]; see also Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and 
the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 
503, 506 (1994) (arguing immutability is not a requirement for suspect-class status). Even 
if a genetic tie could be shown, and he is dubious that it can, Stein is concerned that 
consulting evidence about the genetic nature of sexual orientation improperly turns an 
ethical judgment about fairness and inclusion into a scientific question. See Stein, Sexual 
Orientation, supra, at 634. He believes society should decide questions about the 
acceptability of sexual orientation based on values, not science. See id. at 654–55. 
 366. Part of this depends on the level of specificity with which the question is posed. 
See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733, 1735–
36 (1995) (describing “incompletely theorized agreements,” whereby judges “agree on 
the result and on relatively narrow or low-level explanations for it,” as “an important 
source of social stability and an important way for diverse people to demonstrate mutual 
respect, in law especially but also in liberal democracy as a whole”). 
 367. See supra text accompanying notes 187–196. 
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to balance this goal with other concerns, including family autonomy, 
family integrity, and disproportionate intervention in families of color.368 
Empirical evidence is useful to the inquiry, but it should not 
dominate. When an administrative agency is determining how to reduce 
child abuse, it should consider multiple approaches to the problem. 
Empirical evidence properly guides this process of comparing policies, 
shedding light on effectiveness and efficiency. Based on this evidence, an 
agency might choose predictive analytics. But because the tool sweeps in 
many children not at high risk for death and severe injury, it is essential 
to ask whether the trade-off is acceptable. Empirical analysis can shed 
some light on an acceptable rate of false positives by demonstrating the 
harm to a child of unnecessary involvement with the child welfare system 
and the harm to a child from unaddressed abuse or neglect. But 
tolerance for false positives is also a value-based judgment, and, 
therefore, considerations other than empirical evidence must be 
addressed.369 Again, empirical evidence can tell us the risk that 
accompanies false positives—how many families are improperly swept 
into the child welfare system. And empirical evidence can tell us whether 
other policy options further different values—for example, whether 
caseworker judgment, as compared with predictive analytics, leads to 
more or less intervention for families of color. But empirical evidence 
cannot completely determine the acceptability of false positives or how to 
weight these and other concerns. This must be debated as a question of 
competing values. In short, empirical evidence is useful but not 
dispositive. 
Turning to a more complex question, consider plural marriage. 
Parties encouraged by Obergefell are beginning to challenge the two-
person limit on marriage—sometimes called the next frontier in 
marriage equality370—both whether it should be criminalized and, more 
positively, whether states must allow multiple parties to marry one 
another.371 Taking the affirmative question of a right to marry, the 
                                                                                                                           
 368. See Huntington, Rights Myopia, supra note 186, at 643–55 (describing these 
competing values). 
 369. Cf. 4 Blackstone, supra note 49, at *352 (“[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape, 
than that one innocent suffer.”). For further discussion of values and the use of predictive 
analytics in other contexts, see Brendan O’Flaherty, Assessment and Prediction in 
Homelessness Services and Elsewhere, 50 Austl. Econ. Rev. 229, 229–30, 232, 234 (2017) 
(arguing that the use of predictive analytics to allocate homelessness services can work 
against notions of fairness, which may be easier to achieve than optimality, and can fail to 
identify those truly in need of services). 
 370. See, e.g., Douglas E. Abrams et al., Contemporary Family Law 127–29 (4th ed. 
2012). 
 371. See Collier v. Fox, CV 15-83-BLG-SPW-CSO, 2015 WL 12804521, at *1–4 (D. 
Mont. Dec. 8, 2015) (dismissing a case brought by a man and two women challenging 
Montana’s criminal law prohibiting bigamy because the parties lacked standing since they 
had not engaged in plural marriage and instead were seeking a pre-enforcement 
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framework proposed above guides the use of empirical evidence. As a 
threshold matter, there is a prevailing, but not uniform, view that plural 
marriage is unacceptable.372 Some commentators argue that the practice 
is morally repugnant and incompatible with notions of justice and basic 
democratic values,373 and others contend that it is possible to have an 
ethical vision of polyamory.374 Further, there are clearly competing 
values, with a question about how to balance inclusion and pluralism on 
the one hand and child well-being and gender equality on the other.375 
                                                                                                                           
injunction against the State without any evidence that the State would enforce the 
provision); Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1176 (D. Utah 2013) (finding Utah’s 
criminal prohibition on bigamy unconstitutional as applied to cohabitation), vacated as 
moot, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (finding the case moot because the State adopted a 
policy of nonprosecution for cohabitation and thus vacating the decision below), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 828 (2017). 
 372. For a discussion of the relationship between plural marriage and social 
acceptance, see Scott & Scott, supra note 326, at 313–14, 364–69 (arguing that the state 
will recognize those novel families that satisfy social-welfare criteria, particularly 
interdependence and long-term mutual care, and that polygyny is so strongly associated 
with harms, notably sexual abuse and extreme gender inequality, that it will be particularly 
challenging for these families to gain social recognition). 
 373. See Stephen Macedo, Just Married: Same-Sex Couples, Monogamy, and the 
Future of Marriage 146–48, 164–65, 184–90, 203 (2015) (arguing against legal recognition 
of plural marriage in part because of its associated harms); see also John Witte, Jr., The 
Western Case for Monogamy over Polygamy 457–65 (2015) (describing the low social 
acceptability of polygamy and arguing that “any change in traditional polygamy laws must 
come from below . . . by gradual democratic adjustments”). 
 374. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and 
Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 277, 283 (2004) (“Polyamory is a 
lifestyle embraced by a minority of individuals who . . . articulate an ethical vision that I 
understand to encompass five main principles: self-knowledge, radical honesty, consent, 
self-possession, and privileging love and sex over other emotions and activities such as 
jealousy.”); see also Gregg Strauss, The Positive Right to Marry, 102 Va. L. Rev. 1691, 
1762–65 (2016) (arguing that “the law cannot reconcile the inequalities of liberty created 
by traditional polygamy” but noting that other forms of plural marriage, apart from one 
man and multiple wives, might be reconcilable with equality). In Brown v. Buhman, the 
Utah district court assessed the context of plural marriage and was skeptical about any 
harm associated with it. 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1188. The court noted that the historical 
perception of the harm was not about actual harm to children but instead the harm from 
“introducing a practice perceived to be characteristic of non-European people—or non-
white races—into white American society.” Id.; see also id. at 1191 (noting the State had 
not introduced evidence supporting a finding of social harm and thus there was no 
material issue of fact). That said, the court did not decide the substantive due process 
challenge by relying on empirical evidence and instead rejected it because of the long 
tradition in Anglo-American law of prohibiting plural marriage. See id. at 1194–97. 
 375. See Gregg Strauss, Is Polygamy Inherently Unequal?, 122 Ethics 516, 516–17, 
524–44 (2012) (arguing that the traditional structure of polygyny (one spouse marrying 
multiple partners) necessarily creates inequalities but that other forms of plural 
marriage—poly-fidelity (each spouse is married to every other spouse) and molecular 
polygamy (any spouse can marry outside the original family)—do not, theoretically, 
present such structural inequalities). Compare Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1188, 1191, 
1194–97 (expressing skepticism about any harm associated with plural marriage but also 
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With this question falling between the two poles, empirical evidence may 
be helpful, but it is important to calibrate its role. 
If a legislature were to take up the issue, lawmakers should debate 
whether, as a matter of values, being married to more than one person at 
the same time is the kind of decision that consenting adults should be 
allowed to make. Lawmakers will need to balance values such as 
autonomy, pluralism, and inclusion against the values of child well-being 
and gender equality. Although there is considerable evidence on child 
outcomes and harm to women,376 it is important for decisionmakers to 
cabin that evidence and not let it completely decide the issue. Moreover, 
legislators must explicitly embrace the normative nature of the judgment 
and not simply hide behind the evidence of poor child outcomes. 
When courts consider a legal challenge to the two-person restriction 
on marriage, judges should approach the question somewhat differently 
from lawmakers.377 As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the relevance 
of empirical evidence depends on the type of constitutional challenge to 
a ban on plural marriage. In a substantive due process claim, the 
question is whether the right to marry more than one person is a 
fundamental right, which is a normative, values-based question.378 There 
may be some room within this analysis for a consideration of empirical 
evidence, particularly with respect to the consideration of children and 
the foundational nature of marriage. But this is at heart an inquiry about 
values and should be treated as such. 
                                                                                                                           
acknowledging the long tradition of prohibiting plural marriage), with Scott & Scott, 
supra note 326, at 342 (expressing concern about the relationship between plural 
marriage and harm to children and women). 
 376. See supra notes 328–329 and accompanying text. 
 377. The framework proposed in this section directs decisionmakers to limit the use of 
empirical evidence, but I recognize the argument that, in constitutional cases, citizens are 
debating values and typically do so in a language that can reach other citizens who hold 
different values. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism 
and Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 379–85 (2007). Empirical evidence, with its 
pretense to be value neutral, can be a powerful language, and thus there is a temptation to 
bring it into normative debates. For further discussion of the role of empirical evidence in 
constitutional decisionmaking, see Kahan, supra note 332, at 31–41 (describing the debate 
about the use of empirical evidence in constitutional decisionmaking); Timothy Zick, 
Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. 
Rev. 115, 179–202 (2003) (analyzing courts’ increased reliance on empirical evidence in 
constitutional cases). 
 378. As the Court stated in Obergefell, substantive due process “requires courts to 
exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the 
State must accord them its respect.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). 
This will entail an analysis of the values that the Court identified as inherent in the right to 
marry: that personal choice in marriage reflects individual autonomy, that marriage is the 
ultimate form of relationship recognition, that marriage is also about children and 
families, which are separately protected in the Constitution, and that marriage is a 
foundational social institution. See id. at 2599–602. 
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If a court does recognize plural marriage as a fundamental right, 
then the court would proceed to the second prong of the analysis—
whether “the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest.”379 This analysis is about means-end fit, asking whether the 
state’s interest in limiting marriage to two people is sufficient to 
overcome the infringement on the now-recognized fundamental right to 
marry more than one person at a time. In contrast to identifying the 
existence of a fundamental right, assessing the state’s interest does call 
for empirical evidence. This inquiry would focus on the connection 
between plural marriage and harm to children and vulnerable family 
members, asking whether prohibiting plural marriage reduces the risk of 
these harms. But even in this prong of the analysis, there are non-
empirical questions at stake—for instance, what risk of harm that may 
result from allowing plural marriage is sufficient to justify the 
prohibition? This, too, needs to be answered as a values-based question. 
In short, a substantive due process analysis allows only a small role for 
empirical evidence.380 
Both legislators and judges must recognize the interrelationship of 
the values and empirical evidence surrounding plural marriage. As noted 
above, one informs the other, and neither can be neatly disentangled.381 
The widespread value of monogamy likely influences the empirical 
evidence, and this evidence likely influences the value. There is no easy 
way around this entwining, but acknowledging the relationship will help 
decisionmakers be more wary of both the empirical evidence and the 
values influenced by the data, not placing too much weight on either and 
understanding that shifting one may influence the other. 
In sum, contested and competing values pervade family law. It is 
critical to preserve space to debate these issues explicitly, as difficult as it 
                                                                                                                           
 379. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). 
 380. The analysis is somewhat different in an equal protection challenge. In an equal 
protection challenge to a ban on plural marriage, empirical evidence is relevant to 
whether the identified category is a protected class. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–42 (1985) (describing the four characteristics of a protected 
class: whether the class has been the subject of historical discrimination, has a defining 
characteristic that bears a relationship to an ability to contribute to society, has obvious or 
immutable characteristics, and is a minority or politically powerless). If the category is a 
protected class, then empirical evidence is also relevant to the tailoring between the 
classification and the goal of the legislation. Empirical evidence would be relevant to the 
state’s articulation of its goal, presumably protecting children and vulnerable family 
members from an arguably exploitative family form. If the category is not a protected 
class, then under rational basis review, the legislature does not need to show empirical 
evidence to support its speculation that the law advances its goal. See FCC v. Beach 
Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (explaining that under rational basis review 
“legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational 
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data”). 
 381. See supra notes 328–331 and accompanying text. 
2018] THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN FAMILY LAW 303 
 
often is. Similarly, it is essential for decisionmakers to guard against the 
tendency to use empirical evidence to cover political choices about 
preferred values and norms. The framework proposed in this section 
accepts the relevance of empirical evidence but guards against its 
domination. Properly implemented, the framework thus addresses the 
risk that the empirical turn will allow decisionmakers to avoid and 
obscure value-based judgments. Finally, the approach recognizes that 
values can be informed by empirical evidence, and thus it allows for 
evidence to have its own, perhaps modest, place in the conversation 
about values. 
B. Practical Tools 
Once decisionmakers determine that empirical evidence is relevant 
to the question at hand, this evidence must be used in a manner that 
addresses the concerns in Part II. This section identifies three tools to 
achieve these ends: (1) improved gatekeeping across family law’s 
institutions, (2) greater attention to the ways empirical evidence reflects 
but also refracts intersecting identities, and (3) a robust role for legal 
scholars in the translation of empirical evidence into legal rules and 
policies. The goal of this section is to offer initial thoughts on these tools, 
intended to spark a larger debate about how to use empirical evidence in 
a manner that takes advantage of its benefits while guarding against its 
dangers. 
1. Gatekeeping. — Legal actors need to be both more sophisticated 
and more skeptical in their consumption and use of empirical evidence. 
A core issue is developing more effective gatekeeping mechanisms. As 
noted above, federal courts generally follow basic evidentiary rules about 
the admission of expert testimony,382 but, too often, family courts do not 
and thus admit unreliable evidence.383 Although generally desirable, it 
may be unrealistic to reinvigorate Daubert in family court in light of 
overwhelming caseloads, minimal support, and generally loose 
                                                                                                                           
 382. For further guidance to courts on how to use empirical evidence, see John 
Monahan & Laurens Walker, A Judges’ Guide to Using Social Science, 43 Ct. Rev. 156, 162 
(2007) (advising courts how to obtain, evaluate, and use empirical evidence to establish 
legislative facts, adjudicative facts, and social frameworks). 
 383. See supra text accompanying notes 166–169. For further discussion of how courts 
can better evaluate social science research, see John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social 
Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 477, 498–508 (1986) (proposing that courts evaluate scientific research analogously 
to how they evaluate precedent and prioritize research that “(1) has survived the critical 
review of the scientific community; (2) has employed valid research methods; (3) is 
generalizable to the case at issue; and (4) is supported by a body of other research”); see 
also Davis, There Is a Book Out, supra note 11, at 1594–602 (describing how courts can be 
more rigorous in their use of social science, expert testimony, and extra-record literature 
to determine legislative facts). 
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evidentiary standards.384 To address this structural problem, one 
approach is to create a review process separated from the individual 
courtroom, thus removing the burden from family court judges. A 
centralized body of experts could vet the empirical evidence related to the 
issues regularly addressed in family court: adolescent development, 
domestic violence, coparenting, and the like. This is more than a call for 
judicial training, which would help prepare judges for the empirical 
world. It is a centralized method for reviewing the voluminous research 
and determining which pieces meet the Daubert standard, thus improving 
the quality of the research family court judges use. This approach would 
present its own challenges, such as ensuring the neutrality and 
sophistication of the members of the review board. But if this panel 
operated as an additional resource, supplementing but not automatically 
supplanting individual review, it would improve the quality of empirical 
evidence used in family courts. 
Even a strict application of the Daubert standard, however, does not 
account for the ways in which empirical evidence fails to reflect 
historical, government-supported discrimination. Courts will need to 
address this separately. In the context of plural marriage, for example, 
when a court is considering evidence of any harms associated with plural 
marriage, the court must also ask whether these harms inevitably flow 
from the family structure or whether they are at least partly the product 
of historical discrimination.385 To the extent there is evidence that 
children of plural marriage have worse outcomes than children in other 
family structures, courts must question—assuming the underlying 
evidence does not—whether these outcomes are due, at least in part, to 
state hostility to plural marriage. 
Beyond courts, legislative bodies should develop better gatekeeping 
mechanisms, as they do not currently have a standard practice for 
ensuring the reliability and relevance of empirical evidence. This is 
admittedly an enormous topic, and this section cannot identify all of the 
current failures and possible solutions, but the basic idea of the 
mechanism is to encourage legislatures to consider multiple sides of an 
issue. When Congress enacted a series of reforms to the child support 
system in the 1970s, it had abundant evidence that child support orders 
were inadequately enforced,386 but it did not have evidence that a robust 
child support system would ameliorate child poverty.387 Instead of 
                                                                                                                           
 384. See supra text accompanying notes 166–169. 
 385. See supra text accompanying notes 328–331. 
 386. See Joanna L. Grossman & Lawrence M. Friedman, Inside the Castle: Law and 
the Family in 20th Century America 224–31 (2011) (describing the history of federal child 
support laws and their inadequacies and shortfalls). 
 387. This evidence would have been hard to find because low-income, nonresidential 
parents generally do not have an income to support their children. See Office of Child 
Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Family-Centered Innovations 
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considering alternative means for improving child poverty, such as a 
guaranteed child-allowance provision, common in many European 
countries for more than half a century,388 Congress reinforced the 
cultural norm of economically independent families.389 If Congress had 
had additional evidence about various alternatives, at least it would have 
had to explain why it was not choosing the child allowance—a more 
effective,390 albeit less politically popular, policy. 
With judicial review of their actions and, for some agencies, internal 
norms of evidence-gathering, administrative agencies have some check 
on the quality of their decisionmaking, but these agencies still have 
tremendous leeway in their use of empirical evidence. It is essential to 
develop a system to ensure the empirical evidence agencies use is of high 
quality and addresses the concerns about data reliability, the proper use 
of the evidence, and so on. Administrative agencies’ capacity to address 
these issues is exacerbated at the local government level because budget 
constraints and the limits of institutional capacity will mean that agencies 
do not generally have access to sophisticated tools for evaluating 
empirical evidence. One solution is for agencies to partner with 
universities. These research institutions can play a useful role in helping 
agencies both identify and critique relevant empirical evidence. The 
University of Florida, for example, sponsored a two-day working 
conference on early-childhood development, bringing together 
                                                                                                                           
Improve Child Support Outcomes 1 (2011) [hereinafter Family-Centered Innovations], 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocse/family_centered_innovations.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/SUL6-UTYA] (“One quarter of all custodial and noncustodial parents are poor 
and nearly two-thirds of custodial families in the child support program have incomes 
below 200 percent of the poverty threshold.”). Fathers in these families are often unable 
to pay even small amounts of money to support their children. See Laurie S. Kohn, 
Engaging Men as Fathers: The Courts, the Law, and Father-Absence in Low-Income 
Families, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 511, 531–44 (2013) (“Research suggests that the majority of 
low-income fathers’ failure to meet their obligations is not because of their unwillingness 
to support their children, but because they do not earn enough to satisfy their 
obligations.”). 
 388. See Duncan Lindsey, The Welfare of Children 319–20 (2d ed. 2004) (describing 
universal children’s allowance programs in Europe and elsewhere). 
 389. At common law, parents were required to provide economic support to their 
children. See Blackstone, supra note 49, at *435 (seeing this duty as “a principle of natural 
law,” arising from “nature herself” and the act of “bringing [a child] into the world” 
because it “would be in the highest manner injurious to their issue, if they only gave the 
children life, that they might afterwards see them perish”); Kent, supra note 49, at 161 
(“The father is bound to support his minor children, if he be of ability, even though they 
have property of their own; but this obligation in such a case does not extend to the 
mother.”). 
 390. If Congress had compared alternative means, it would have had to address the 
research showing that guaranteed child incomes is a more effective means of supporting 
low-income families than child support. See Lindsey, supra note 388, at 313–38. 
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academics, childcare providers, and government officials.391 The fruitful 
exchange was an opportunity to translate the existing knowledge about 
early-childhood development into actionable steps at the national, state, 
and local level. 
2. Attention to Intersecting Identities. — As Professor Robin Lenhardt 
has argued, often the law appears to be race neutral but, in operation, 
perpetuates racial inequality.392 She contends that when the state 
underinvests in schools serving mostly students of color, fails to combat 
racial segregation in housing, and does not protect the safety of the water 
supply, families, and especially low-income families of color, suffer the 
consequences.393 Indeed, there are numerous ways family law obscures 
the importance of intersecting identities, including race, class, and 
gender. Courts often cast constitutional claims by unmarried fathers as a 
contest between married and unmarried fathers, not between unmarried 
mothers and unmarried fathers, thus avoiding a debate about sex 
discrimination and gender roles in the family.394 Debates about 
unmarried fathers risk glossing over the race and class dimensions of 
marital status, ignoring the reality that most unmarried fathers are low 
income and disproportionately of color.395 Thus obscured, the debate 
appears to be between men who willingly assume responsibilities of 
fatherhood by marrying the mother of their children and men who shirk 
these responsibilities. This framing, however, ignores some of the reasons 
for low marriage rates in poor communities, notably government-
sponsored discrimination that has compromised the economic potential 
of some men, and especially Black men, making it harder for these men 
to provide for their children.396 It also obscures the role of the state in 
                                                                                                                           
 391. Early Childhood National Summit, Univ. of Fla. Anita Zucker Ctr. for Excellence 
in Early Childhood Studies, http://ceecs.education.ufl.edu/national-summit/ 
[http://perma.cc/Z8AA-QE2D] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017). 
 392. See R.A. Lenhardt, The Color of Kinship, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 2071, 2074–77 (2017). 
 393. See id. at 2088. 
 394. See Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental Rights in 
the Age of Equality, 125 Yale L.J. 2292, 2292, 2334–42 (2016) (arguing that in 
foundational cases establishing the limited rights of unmarried fathers, the Supreme 
Court framed the conflict as a clash between husbands and unmarried fathers, not 
between mothers and fathers, and thus avoided questions of sex neutrality in custody law). 
 395. See McLanahan & Garfinkel, supra note 272, at 147 tbl.8.1 (reporting 
characteristics of participants in the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study). At the 
time of the focal child’s birth, 29.5% of the married fathers had earned at least a college 
degree, as compared with 3.8% of unmarried nonresidential fathers; 12.5% of the 
unmarried fathers were white, and 58.4% were Black. Id. Many scholars do recognize this 
aspect of the debate. See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 Md. L. Rev. 
55, 79, 106, 118 (2016) [hereinafter Carbone & Cahn, Nonmarriage] (stating that those 
who do not marry differ from those who do marry in ways that affect children and that 
nonmarried parents tend to have fewer resources than married parents). 
 396. See supra text accompanying notes 350–353. 
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using marriage as a tool to subjugate nondominant populations—policies 
that have made marriage far less appealing to such groups.397 
Following Lenhardt’s invitation to uncover the law’s role in 
perpetuating inequality, it is essential for decisionmakers to see how 
empirical evidence can direct attention to inequality but also obscure 
and compound it. Beginning with the potential for empirical evidence to 
help uncover inequality, it can show how families of color are 
disproportionately represented in the child welfare system,398 arguably 
from a built-in bias toward seeing pathology in such families.399 And in 
the child support system, empirical evidence can show that the majority 
of men who do not pay child support lack the economic means to do 
so.400 By documenting these differences, decisionmakers can use this 
empirical evidence to better understand the ongoing salience of race, 
class, and gender and begin to pay attention to the problem.401 As noted 
above, empirical evidence can also be an antidote to discrimination and 
demeaning stereotypes, such as the inaccurate image of the uninvolved 
Black father.402 
On the other side of the ledger, however, empirical evidence can 
obscure inequality. When decisionmakers take this evidence at face 
value, without interrogating the underlying causes of differential 
outcomes along identity lines, primarily race and class, it masks the 
source of the inequality.403 Even more troubling, empirical evidence can 
compound the salience of intersecting identities. In predictive analytics, 
a repeated criticism is the algorithm’s reliance on a parent’s experience 
in the child welfare system as a child.404 Even if this is a reliable predictor, 
including this data point risks reinscribing discrimination against low-
                                                                                                                           
 397. See generally Katherine Franke, Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality 
(2015) (highlighting the potential for undesirable state-enforced legal rules that can 
accompany civil marriage). 
 398. Children’s Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The AFCARS Report: 
Preliminary FY 2015 Estimates as of June 2016, at 2 (2016), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/cb/afcarsreport23.pdf [http://perma.cc/4N5F-SUFR]. 
 399. See Emily Putnam-Hornstein et al., Race and Ethnic Disparities: A Population-
Based Examination of Risk Factors for Involvement with Child Protective Services, 37 
Child Abuse & Neglect 33, 34, 42–44 (2013) (discussing the literature making this claim as 
well as the evidence in a study of a California birth cohort); see also supra note 203 (citing 
sources discussing possible explanations for the correlations between race and child 
maltreatment). 
 400. Family-Centered Innovations, supra note 387, at 2. 
 401. See, e.g., Office of Child Support Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Annual Report to Congress FY 2015, at iii, 9–11 (2016), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/programs/css/fy2015_part_01.pdf [http://perma.cc/KP25-5QP9] (describing 
the reorientation of the child support system in response to the challenges facing low-
income men). 
 402. See supra text accompanying note 233. 
 403. See supra section II.B.1. 
 404. See supra text accompanying note 190. 
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income families of color. For Native American families, in particular, this 
risk factor would expose exceptionally high numbers of parents to 
greater scrutiny. Native American children face the highest cumulative 
risk of foster care placement, even with the protections of ICWA in 
place.405 To the extent the prior foster care placements reflect some form 
of bias and not only higher rates of maltreatment, including the foster 
care placement history of a Native American parent as a factor in the 
algorithm recreates this discrimination. 
In sum, when using empirical evidence to make decisions, it is 
essential for decisionmakers—legislators, courts, and administrative 
officials—to be attuned to the potential for empirical evidence not only 
to uncover inequality but also to compound it. Decisionmakers must ask 
whether the underlying evidence is a reflection of historical 
discrimination. And then they must ask whether the use of empirical 
evidence will perpetuate that discrimination. 
3. A Translation Role for Legal Scholars. — Finally, there is a pivotal 
role for legal scholars in guiding the use of empirical evidence.406 The 
legal system always needs better research and more reliable data, but 
more fundamentally it needs sophisticated translation of social and hard 
science into legal rules and policies. Researchers outside of the legal 
academy are not well positioned to turn their findings into legal rules 
and policies, and indeed trying to do so risks compromising the 
underlying research.407 But legal scholars are well suited to this work.408 
Policy analysis is one of the archetypes of legal scholarship, with scholars 
identifying problems, objectively comparing evidence about alternatives, 
and recommending solutions.409 Moreover, this translation work is more 
                                                                                                                           
 405. See Christopher Wildeman & Natalia Emanuel, Cumulative Risks of Foster Care 
Placement by Age 18 for U.S. Children, 2000-2011, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 5 (2014) (finding a 
5.91% cumulative risk of placement in foster care for all children in the United States 
before age eighteen, but with sharp differentials by race and ethnicity). Asian children 
face a 2.14% risk, white children a 4.86% risk, Latino children a 5.35% risk, Black children 
a 10.99% risk, and Native American children a 15.44% risk of placement in foster care. Id. 
 406. Family law scholars can also produce empirical research, as some are already 
doing. See, e.g., Douglas W. Allen & Margaret Brinig, Do Joint Parenting Laws Make Any 
Difference?, 8 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 304, 304 (2011) (studying the effect of a joint cus-
tody presumption on custody determinations); Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, 
“These Boots Are Made for Walking”: Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 Am. L. & 
Econ. Rev. 126, 126–30 (2000) (studying which parent files for divorce most often and 
examining the relationship between filing and custody disposition); Meier & Dickson, 
supra note 161, at 331–34 (reporting the results of a study finding a negative correlation 
between a mother alleging abuse and the award of child custody). 
 407. See Emery et al., “Bending” Evidence, supra note 251, at 135. 
 408. See Huntington, Early Childhood Development, supra note 301, at 792–801, 806–
10 (arguing legal scholars should play a pivotal role in translating the empirical evidence 
on early childhood into legal rules and policies). 
 409. Martha Minow, Archetypal Legal Scholarship: A Field Guide, 63 J. Legal Educ. 
65, 66 (2013); see also id. at 67 (describing another model of legal scholarship as 
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than simply reconciling divergent studies. It requires the integration of 
other bases for legal regulation, including a consideration of values, 
morality, and so on.410 Legal scholars can help put empirical work in 
context, noting instances in which the research advances a particular 
goal but the legal system may want to do something other than simply 
advance that goal. 
Family law scholars are on the right path, regularly drawing on 
empirical work from a range of disciplines, including sociology,411 
economics,412 psychology,413 and neuroscience.414 Family law scholars 
integrate the wealth of information available about families, from in-
depth ethnographic studies about unmarried parents415 to detailed 
statistical portraits of marriage rates.416 Often, the empirical evidence 
does not answer questions as much as fuel additional debate, with schol-
ars using empirical evidence to support different arguments.417 But this 
                                                                                                                           
“[t]est[ing] a proposition about society or the economy or about human beings that is 
used by lawyers or assumed in legal sources” and then either conducting or analyzing 
empirical work about this assumption before “digest[ing] the findings for legal 
audiences”). 
 410. Cf. Sandler et al., supra note 251, at 151 (describing the role of advocacy, as 
compared with research, and noting “[s]uccessful advocacy involves multiple factors 
beyond the translation of empirical research findings into action, including attending to 
the morality, ethics, related laws and legal procedures, civil rights, social values and mores, 
feasibility, and economic costs of action proposals”). 
 411. See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Triple System of Family Law, 2013 
Mich. St. L. Rev. 1185, 1218–19 (relying on the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing 
Study). 
 412. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, The Effect of Transactions Costs on the Market for 
Babies, 18 Seton Hall Legis. J. 553, 553–60 (1994) (relying on economic principles and 
research to analyze adoption law). 
 413. See, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing Hostility and 
Conflict After Divorce, 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 441, 442–48 (2008) (relying on 
psychological research to argue for a model of forgiveness in family law). 
 414. See, e.g., Maroney, supra note 298, at 145–60 (exploring the use of 
neuroscientific evidence in the juvenile justice system). 
 415. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, The Other Marriage Equality Problem, 93 B.U. L. 
Rev. 921, 937 (2013) (relying on the ethnographic work of Kathryn Edin, among others). 
 416. See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage Markets: How Inequality Is 
Remaking the American Family 11–20 (2014). 
 417. Compare Carbone & Cahn, Nonmarriage, supra note 395, at 111 (citing 
empirical evidence about the ability of unmarried parents to negotiate financial support 
and time with the children without the legal system, and thus arguing that the legal system 
should not change the current treatment of unmarried parents), with Huntington, 
Postmarital Family Law, supra note 246, at 227–29 (drawing on research about nonmarital 
families to argue for reforms to family law, particularly that unmarried fathers should have 
similar rights to unmarried mothers). For other scholarship using empirical evidence to 
make arguments about whether and how to regulate unmarried couples, see Cynthia 
Grant Bowman, Unmarried Couples, Law, and Public Policy 169–70 (2010) (arguing the 
differences between married and cohabitating couples—such as different levels of stability, 
domestic violence, and economic interdependence—combined with the fact that many 
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scholarship does advance the conversation. The point here is to 
encourage and guide this continued engagement with empirical work. 
As family law scholars continue this translation project, however, it is 
important to be attentive to the concerns about empirical evidence iden-
tified in this Essay. A starting point is recognizing our own ideological 
commitments, which can seep into the selection, consideration, and 
translation of empirical evidence. Beyond this basic point, family law 
scholars should consider the guidelines set forth in this Part—using 
empirical evidence to advance specified outcomes while remaining 
mindful of the limited role for empirical evidence in debates about con-
tested and competing values. And scholars should pay particular atten-
tion to the role of empirical evidence and intersecting identities. This 
involves the consideration of factors such as the socially constructed 
hierarchies of families along various identities; the role of historical 
discrimination in creating current family conditions, particularly the 
stratification along race and class lines; the role of race in constructing 
all families, including white families; the acceptance of a range of family 
forms without using the nuclear family as the default norm; and so much 
more.418 
CONCLUSION 
Family law’s reliance on empirical evidence is not going away. Nor 
should it. Using empirical evidence to inform difficult policy choices and 
evaluate different legal rules is and should be an integral component of 
good governance. But the empirical turn also presents considerable 
cause for concern. Beyond the oft-cited issues of data reliability and the 
ability of legal actors to use empirical evidence appropriately, there are 
fundamental concerns that empirical evidence focuses attention on 
outcomes rather than on competing values, cloaks normative judgments, 
and risks replicating historical, state-sponsored discrimination. 
To address these issues while also capturing the benefits of empirical 
evidence, this Essay has proposed a framework to guide the use of 
empirical evidence. This evidence has utility, but decisionmakers in 
family law must preserve space for debating values, avoid using evidence 
to claim neutrality, and be wary about the potential for reinscribing dis-
                                                                                                                           
cohabitating couples are economically disadvantaged and have children, should 
encourage governmental recognition of cohabitational unions); Marsha Garrison, Is 
Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of Cohabitant Obligation, 52 
UCLA L. Rev. 815, 839–41, 861–63 (2005) (drawing on empirical evidence indicating that 
married and cohabitating couples view their relationships differently and display different 
behavior to argue that children benefit from having married parents and that the law 
should encourage marriage by treating married couples differently from cohabitating 
couples). 
 418. Lenhardt, supra note 392, at 2101–03 (proposing that these and other factors 
should be considered in understanding the role of race in family law). 
2018] THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN FAMILY LAW 311 
 
crimination. When empirical evidence is relevant, more effective 
gatekeeping mechanisms across the institutions of family law are critical, 
as is closer attention to the ways empirical evidence can compound the 
legal salience of intersecting identities. Finally, family law scholars should 
continue to play an active role in the translation of empirical evidence 
into legal rules and policies. 
By identifying the trend toward increased use of empirical analysis, 
and discussing its potential benefits and drawbacks, it is possible to chart 
a better course for the use of empirical evidence in family law. Using 
empirical evidence when appropriate, but cabining it when necessary, 
creates a more effective but also a more balanced and inclusive family 
law, benefiting individuals, families, and society as a whole. 
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